

The Making of the Contemporary World



Conflict and
Reconciliation
in the Contemporary World

DAVID J. WHITTAKER



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Conflict and Reconciliation in the Contemporary World

The world in the twentieth century has witnessed many major political, ethnic and ideological conflicts. *Conflict and Reconciliation in the Contemporary World* examines the interdependent processes of conflict origins, resolutions and reconciliation, in the light of eight case studies, from four continents, including Yugoslavia, Israel, Northern Ireland and South Africa.

The examples of conflict include discussion on:

- threatened regional peace and security
- cycles of internal discord, population displacement and violence
- controversy over causes, progress and resolution
- the value of external mediation, enforcement or intervention such as sanctions or 'punishments'
- means, timing and permanence of reconciliation.

Conflict and Reconciliation in the Contemporary World gives a concise, original and multi-faceted introduction to the study of modern conflict situations.

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The Making of the Contemporary World

Edited by Eric Evans and Ruth Henig

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Contents

<i>Maps</i>	vi
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	vii
1 Conflict, resolution and reconciliation	1
2 El Salvador: conflict transformed	10
3 Apartheid in South Africa: reconciliation in debate	21
4 Cambodia: reconciliation after mayhem	34
5 Cyprus: conflict tranquillised	45
6 Afghanistan: descent into turmoil	56
7 Israel and the Palestinians: a conflict between two rights	68
8 Northern Ireland: reconciliation delayed	81
9 Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia): peace under contract	94
10 The contemporary world and conflict	107
<i>Guide to further reading</i>	117
<i>Index</i>	120

Maps

1	The conflict case studies	viii
2	El Salvador	11
3	Israel	69
4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	95

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Map 1 The conflict case studies

1 Conflict, resolution and reconciliation

A great deal has been written about conflict and conflict resolution (the latter is a science in itself). Less has been written about the cycle of conflict, resolution, reconciliation. This book covers new ground in treating the three phases together. Eight examples of conflict have been selected as case studies in Chapters 2 to 9 in the hope of encouraging understanding and discussion of the origins and development of conflict. In each of these case studies the account of the conflict looks at likely causes, outlines developments and the resolution process, and considers the possibilities and the prospects of long-term healing, the reconciliation stage. Here, reconciliation goes beyond resolution to refer not just to the *political* arrangements to resolve differences and hostile action but to the *psychological* process whereby understanding and tolerance lead to readiness to live together in a new framework of peace and well-being.

The eight conflicts were selected with the following criteria in mind:

- Originating mostly as civil wars, they present threats to regional peace and security, often with wider reverberations giving them an international dimension.
- They present cycles of internal discord, violence, infringement of basic human rights and human displacement.
- They often arouse appeals to external mediation, enforcement, sanctions and intervention.
- They pose questions as to causes, progress of conflict and methods of resolving it.
- They raise the issue of how far after conflict resolution the survivors are able to take up harmonious living in a reconciled community.
- The presentation is designed to be factual without being too detailed. Overall, the treatment of these conflicts is set in non-judgemental mode.

THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

All the conflicts presented in this book move beyond tension and disagreement, distrust and suspicion, which perhaps all international relations have as possible outcomes, to incompatible positions and their reinforcement in conspiracies, growing hostile behaviour and postures that represent challenge, violation of basic human rights, scapegoating and discriminatory policies, possible eviction and displacement of people, and resort to military action. Some of these conflicts then deteriorate into crises which pose a danger to international peace and security, frequently because one of the disputing parties resorts to sudden surprise action. Others perceive this behaviour as a major threat, and feel an urgency to respond appropriately in the belief that inaction will entail disastrous consequences. Judgement becomes clouded, often ambivalent.

It is difficult to categorise the eight conflicts selected but they have all led to some degree of human rights violation. Most of them—El Salvador, Cambodia, Cyprus, Afghanistan, Israel and the Palestinians, Northern Ireland, Bosnia—have led to military action. Population displacement often leading to a refugee problem has been characteristic of the troubles in South Africa, Cambodia, Cyprus, Bosnia and Israel. Quarrels between people observing ethnic allegiance have been a feature of the unrest in South Africa, Bosnia, Cyprus and Israel. Economic problems have sharpened conflict in El Salvador, South Africa, Israel and to some extent in Northern Ireland. Divergence on ideological grounds among Salvadorans and Afghans and religious differences in Israel and Northern Ireland have set whole communities at loggerheads. In three of the conflicts—in El Salvador, South Africa and Israel—the forcefulness of self-styled guerrilla ‘liberators’ has introduced a dynamic which makes the conflict one of irreducible high intensity.

Very plainly these are multi-factor conflicts. Most of them have two factors in common: that of escalating tension and that of the importance to disputants of symbolism. Neither of these factors is likely to make settlement straightforward. Given the strength of feeling over actual or imagined differences it is not surprising that much effort and ingenuity goes into the highlighting of issues that are then presented as principles and core-values which must be upheld and defended whatever the cost. It is seen as necessary in Cyprus and Northern Ireland to defend the distinctiveness and identity of separated communities. Tensions are wound up, and misinterpretations of attitudes and behaviour are manipulated by an artifice which sets the clash of feelings in terms of attack and siege. Rival leaders in Bosnia, in the Middle East and in

Cyprus lose little time in demonising their opponents, and in orchestrating claims that could be considered more rationally and with less clamour. The establishment of 'last-ditch' positions and 'bottom-line' demands is given symbolic, almost ritualistic importance in most of these conflict scenarios. Compromise is then announced as unacceptable because withdrawing from assertiveness is the way of sacrificing principles, and of surrender.

Historically, most of the selected conflicts are deep-rooted. For many years South Africa's whites and blacks have wrestled for power in the shade of an oppressive and discriminating apartheid regime. The retreat of imperial hegemony has left Cambodia and Cyprus unstable, riven by competing parties seeking self-determination. Israelis and Palestinians have eyed the same tract of territory as an exclusive Promised Land for many centuries. Again, there is the void left by the relinquishing of colonial power. Contention in El Salvador and Northern Ireland has its origins in economic and legislative disadvantage, compounded in the last named by religious schisms. Moreover, some aspects of these conflicts can be traced back to the glacial days of the Cold War between 1945 and 1989 when any macro-conflict between the Superpowers was on hold. One can argue that this tense period of frozen great-power relationships helped to contain some conflicts, while it added fuel to others, for example in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Israel's West Bank and El Salvador. Micro-conflicts broke out from time to time as parties in 'client-states' committed to the ideological tenets of the Superpowers came to blows in Central America, the Middle East and the Far East. Ironically, the post-Cold War harmony and collaboration between former political adversaries has not ensured a global form of 'peace dividend'. The small conflict, diverse in nature, varying in intensity, often dramatic in its savagery, has been a common feature of the last two decades. In the contemporary world there are now more political entities than before—small states and sub-states—and an unremitting inclination by an array of national groups to assert their individuality and press for independence. Media sources, with resolute imagination, transmit contrary perceptions, magnify them, frequently distort them. The modern world offers would-be contestants a bewildering yet attractive arsenal of sophisticated and highly lethal weaponry which is never too difficult to obtain.

RESOLUTION AS A PROBLEM

The conflicts that follow this introductory chapter demonstrate the intrinsic problem of resolution as a fixed and final settlement. Three

scenarios remain unresolved—Cyprus, the struggles in former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. Cyprus represents a conflict tranquillised positively by the presence of an interpositionary force sent there in 1964 by the UN, and negatively by three decades of stalemate in negotiation where the end is nowhere yet in sight. Yugoslavian fighting is seen as brought to a stage-managed conclusion when the United States airlifted to Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of the warring factions and holed them up until they agreed to a contractual settlement. Yet, the Dayton Agreement, while it has stopped much of the military feuding, has failed to secure political stability and the safe repatriation and resettlement of at least 1 million refugees. In the case of Afghanistan, with the withdrawal of the Soviet invader, a multi-national peace conference proposed far-reaching and unanimously agreed arrangements for containment and comprehensive reform. Unexpectedly, and at least in the broader international community, resolution there is twisted out of line and aborted because of Afghan internecine turmoil. International hopes have been blighted over Cambodia to the extent that a resolution scheme carefully supervised on the ground by a large UN peacekeeping force has not been implemented anything as completely as envisaged because of power-gaming between Cambodian political factions. Elsewhere there are, however, some resolution successes, qualified as they must be by speculation about the lasting effect of such contrived and fragile acts of settlement. Resolution has been determined on paper and then by strenuous work on the ground in El Salvador, South Africa and Northern Ireland. Peaceful finality is less certain in Israel where, despite a carefully crafted settlement, the ‘peace process’ is bedevilled by the mutual certainty of each of the disputants that both of them are ‘right’ and that justice is very firmly on their side.

Three particular approaches to conflict resolution are demonstrated by the conflicts discussed in later chapters. They are negotiation, mediation by a third party and authorised intervention. In each case a recourse to *negotiation* has proved to be an arduous and uncertain blazing of a trail between those whose disagreements are prone to lack of objectivity and undue haste to conclude on terms they prefer. The classic moves begin by ascertaining the essential basic demands of other parties with a view to exploring areas where concessions might be possible. This way of working demands appreciable rationality and patience from participants who, in frustration, are subsequently tempted to apply what they consider to be a judicious mix of bluff, threat and promise. This tactic usually

tends to close down options for compromise, making mutual accommodation more difficult. A measure of realism, even good sense, may bring about an eventual peace agreement after hard bargaining. Negotiators, at this stage, may reluctantly stand away from previously untenable positions and 'reperceive' possible alternatives and tangible benefits. In the chapters that follow it is instructive to see the ebb and flow of reason and stubbornness. Particularly interesting is the increasing possibility of a successful outcome to talks or 'talks about talks', when participants try more objectively to tease out mutual interests rather than retreat to standpoints which they doggedly defend.

Not one of the eight conflicts surveyed shows those who disagree coming to a fair and realistic settlement through their own efforts. Against a background of intense media interest 'open diplomacy' soon becomes 'frozen diplomacy'. Third parties exercise useful functions in exploring foundations for peace agreements in several of the conflicts examined, often in places other than the actual locus of conflict. They frequently devise proposals which would be unacceptable in eye-to-eye dealings between adversaries or between political leaders ploughing a particular furrow. Third parties have more room for manoeuvre and less to 'lose' if their suggestions are rejected or radically modified. They work quietly with a wide range of options out of the public spotlight.

Mediation of some sort by an outside body is another step towards resolution, especially when violence tends to spill over into neighbouring areas. In six of the conflicts, and in various ways, the help of the UN has been sought. The Charter of the UN has a whole chapter, Chapter VI, dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes. This encourages any of the 185 member states who have a dispute likely to endanger peace, first of all, to 'seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice' (Article 33). In practice, this voluntary solution-seeking has needed a fair amount of heavy pressure from the UN Security Council. Most states are reluctant to accept any arbitration and judicial settlement by anyone else, however impartially it may be presented. On the other hand, their preparedness to go further in negotiation may be influenced by domestic events, say a surge of opposition by a dissident group or ministerial changes, or by a stream of international disapproval. Conciliation, for example, via the UN's supplying a Good Offices mediator is only likely to be effective, as Cyprus and Cambodia show,

if it is counselled on-site, as it were, and not from a distant headquarters. The mediation service of the UN has never been asked for in the instances of South Africa and Northern Ireland. This is in line with Article 2 of the UN Charter which specifically does not authorise the UN to 'intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...'. Britain has held to this legal point very firmly without controversy; Israel appeared to shelter behind it fending off international dismay at the inequitable treatment of the Palestinian minority; and South Africa's resort to this exclusion brought a storm of rebuke for what was seen as a show of contempt for international opinion opposing the noxious principles of apartheid. Regional organisations have proved useful third-party advocates. The Palestinians have received a great deal of help from the Arab League, the Cambodians from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Regional mediators were largely responsible for the constructive outcome of the El Salvador conflict, and in the case of Bosnia there were painstaking and not always successful mediation attempts by the European Community, NATO, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and by a number of individual peacemakers. Either way, a patched-up resolution, either by negotiation between adversaries or external mediation, raises questions. Does resolution of conflict in El Salvador, South Africa, with the Palestinians, in Northern Ireland put the lid on the conflict without actually resolving underlying issues? Is the settlement in Cambodia, a still-divided land, likely to constitute immediate, medium-term or long-term settlement?

Intervention in an internal conflict by an external body may be an ultimate step towards resolution. In some circumstances, the enabling provision of the UN's Chapter VI is tried and found wanting, or never tried at all. As a result of increasing worldwide concern when a conflict is judged to flare into crisis and, in the UN's words, 'to prevent an aggravation of the situation', the Security Council may authorise, under Chapter VII, some penalising action not involving the use of armed force, for example, the issuing of stern resolutions calling for immediate bettering of the situation or the imposition of sanctions and embargoes. Sanctions were levelled at apartheid South Africa in 1961 and at the Soviet invaders of Afghanistan in 1980. Their effectiveness as curbs on policy has long been debatable. It would, of course, be better to cope with conflicts before they reach conflict stage, by employing some form of preventive diplomacy, a comment often made about the conflict in former Yugoslavia. If restraining measures prove ineffectual then some form of

intervention may be authorised. A UN force to protect civilians was despatched to Bosnia. Inevitably, as civilian harassment grew, the West lamented the passivity of this force, while invading Serbia accused them of impartiality and belligerence. A peacekeeping force was requested by the government in Cyprus to dampen down civil strife by positioning itself between combatants. In the Middle East, although the UN did not specifically hold the line around beleaguered Palestinians, the overflow of conflict and the carrying out of arrangements for ceasefire and withdrawal have been a responsibility for UN monitors and observers. The mayhem in Cambodia called for a very large UN response by way of resolution, and to effect this 22,000 peacekeepers were sent to be responsible for a rehabilitation programme destined to last for twenty-six months.

RECONCILIATION AS A PROBLEM

Reconciliation is the third theme addressed in this book, where, as already noted, the concept goes much further than the resolution of conflict. The further stage of securing an integrated community rather than a fractured one depends on individual and group preparedness to make concessions for the sake of tolerance and civilised behaviour. How far is it possible to help this process of remediation? Is it realistic to expect that all aspects of a conflict are purged and eliminated? Is it feasible to mount a programme of 'assisted reconciliation'? The UN, in fact, in Cambodia, set up an ambitious programme to settle people together after their traumatic experiences. El Salvador and South Africa have modelled their programmes on experimental work in South America which focussed on the premise that revelation of the truth about what has happened enables those who survive a conflict to come to terms with oppression and cruelty and discrimination. Honesty in confession, pardon, not through exoneration but through amnesty, willingness on all sides to understand and face a united future rather than a hideous past—this is the approach taken in those two countries, by way of catharsis, to build a reconciled community. The case studies tentatively suggest an appreciable extent of reconciliation in El Salvador, a debatable extent in South Africa, a fragmentary level of progress in Cambodia, and a knife-edge possibility in Northern Ireland. In contemporary Cyprus and Afghanistan there seems no possibility of bridges being erected over human gulfs. The former conflict has had a general anaesthetic administered by the UN; the

latter tears itself apart in ideological and religious disunion. The Bosnian and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts have not been 'resolved' despite years of negotiation amply assisted by inducement, pressure and threat from outside. Reconciliation in most parts of the former Yugoslavia will depend upon gigantic strides in restitution and recovered trust—it could be described as peace and resolution under contract, where the 'auditors' of the process and those monitoring the progress are vigilant members of third-party groups: the UN and NATO. Reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians is more unpredictable than in any other of the conflicts studied. With both sides believing their claims to be entirely justifiable and indissoluble, who is likely to take the first steps towards equitable co-existence?

An alternative understanding of the term 'reconciliation' is that of the politico-military situation where stalemate confers a realisation that lowered expectations and demands will cost less than the price of continued conflict. Both sides are 'reconciled' to futility and finality. They recognise that they will have to learn to live with a situation where the resolute demands of yesterday are marked down and this must be the least bad option. This ought to be the case in Cyprus and in Bosnia but the case studies may indicate the limitations of theory in practice. There is a need for the outside observer to look critically at the suggested criteria of that ultimate stage of a community reconciled in tolerance, for this must be the hallmark of a conflict truly and permanently resolved. A reconciled community assimilates rather than discriminates, promulgates humane and legal rights, does its best to dissolve alienation and fear, encourages people to share values and develop congenial relationships, and promotes a hope that material benefits will accrue as a product of peaceful transactions and independence. The eight case studies bear these criteria in mind, while they thrust forward an overall query: what evidence is there that any of these conflicts have moved on into a reconciliation phase?

The case studies of conflict following this chapter do suggest a number of key questions. What is it that enables the UN to read the resolution of a conflict in El Salvador as 'transformation...fixed and final'? What are the circumstances in a country's internal conflict that justify external intervention? The rupture of society in Bosnia and Cyprus and Afghanistan induced outside bodies to go in by way of protection and relief. Could these conflicts have been foreseen and prevented at any earlier stage? Does power-gaming and economic uncertainty reduce the likelihood of reconciliation taking

hold in a society? Are there 'irreconcilable elements' in South Africa, Cambodia, Cyprus and Northern Ireland, as is sometimes claimed? An introductory chapter such as this is not the place to raise too many queries. Chapter 10, in conclusion, will summarise points outlined earlier and will put a number of these in question form. It is hoped that reading the chapters that follow will encourage reflection, speculation, discussion and further enquiry. To help with this, there is at the end of the book an annotated guide to further reading. It will become clear to readers that the origins and nature of most conflicts are highly controversial, and that the processes of resolution and reconciliation are so unpredictable and fragile as to be 'knife-edged' and time-demanding. Is there not a grain of truth in the assertion from Northern Ireland that 'ten years of conflict will take one hundred years of resolution'? Reconciliation in its most complete sense can be expected to take a little longer.

2 El Salvador

Conflict transformed

If the conflict in Northern Ireland seems unresolved as the millennium is entered, a conflict in El Salvador (Central America) is said to be in sight of 'fixed and final' termination, provided that former adversaries can be reconciled. This is certainly the view of the UN Secretary-General as a civil war is largely settled and transformed through negotiation. There may be an element of wish-fulfilment in this but what has taken place in El Salvador is an interesting example of how to deal with conflict and its aftermath. Central to the whole operation of resolving this conflict was the public establishment of the truth about what had happened. Knowing the truth through revelation, confession, amnesty and pardon would surely promote reconciliation among members of a shattered society.

EL SALVADOR AS AN AREA OF CONFLICT

El Salvador is the smallest of the South American republics. It lies between Honduras and the Pacific and is neighboured by Guatemala to the north and Nicaragua to the south. Five million people are crammed into the country, which has a greater population density than India. Nine out of ten live in the centre and west, where large estates, *haciendas*, grow coffee and cotton for export, recruiting labour from mostly illiterate workers whose poverty and servility are a legacy of Indian tribalism and Spanish colonial times. Whole families migrate to states or mines, or leave for nearby Honduras or Nicaragua. Two-thirds of the population live precariously on erratic incomes, and one-third exists in extreme poverty. Almost 60 per cent of the land is owned by 2 per cent of Salvadorans—a small oligarchy of estate owners and industrialists supported by military vigilance and the



Map 2 El Salvador

hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. Today, the economy of El Salvador is reckoned to be twenty-five years out of date, debt-ridden and unable to diversify. In any case, 21 per cent of the national income goes to the top 5 per cent of the people.

Deep-seated resentment and secular radicalism have fed an explosive combination of a disappointed middle class and *las massas*, the bulk of town and country people, having lost hope in any peaceful reform, supporting populist leaders, often Communist, who advocate underground activism and possibly guerrilla warfare. Since 1931, conflict in El Salvador has moved through phases of repression and its grudging alleviation. Until the 1980s authoritarian governments managed to screw down revolutionary fervour but as each side—government and insurrectionist—received support and arms from Cold War protagonists (Soviet, Cuban or United States), tension flared into savage, civil war.

INTERNAL CONFLICT: EXTERNAL MANIPULATION

In two respects El Salvador lies at the heart of what Professor Alan James has termed ‘a Dangerous Crossroads’. First, there have been

thirty years of regional instability because of bickering between El Salvador and Honduras, and a boiling-over of dissent and armed revolt in nearby Nicaragua and Guatemala. An umbrella organisation, the Organisation of American States (OAS), founded in 1948, has generally preferred to settle differences among states regionally, rather than take them to the UN. This attempt to attain a regional sense of balance has frequently been negated by nationalistic impulses pitting states against one another. The common element has been frustration. Second, there is the looming presence of the USA, which remained to some extent indifferent when Central American governments exercised repressive control of their radicals, but became increasingly concerned at the speed of growth of revolutionary movements and at obvious Soviet 'interest' in the American 'backyard'. Thus, El Salvador's conflict potential (socio-economic at heart) has become magnified as the result of internal instability and external interference.

The Reagan administration, newly installed in 1979, decided to draw a line in Salvadoran sand to 'roll back' revolution from being injected into the soft underbelly of the USA. 'Instructors' were despatched to underpin the resolve of El Salvador, now governed by a military junta, and a supply of financial aid was put in hand (making the country the third largest recipient after Egypt and Israel). Washington moved further into the El Salvador conflict in 1981 by explicitly backing the Salvadoran president, José Napoleon Duarte, who had his hands full coping with incompetent generals and corruption exercised by a Mafia élite, safe in distant Miami. Inevitably, the president, however willing he was to reform, became wedged between Rightist autocracy and a Leftist revolutionary front, the Farobando Marti Liberation Front (FMLN). Not helicopters, machine-guns or dollars applied as external manipulation were likely to reduce the intensity of internal conflict frozen in a permanent state of siege. Washington insisted on unconditional surrender by dissidents 'shooting their way into power' and constantly rebuffed pacification probes by other Central American states. This distracted attention from the real issues in the El Salvador internal contest: namely, economic betterment, law and order fairly applied, and the promotion of democratic representation. External pressures were preventive rather than facilitative. On all sides the question was asked: was Washington trying to do in Central America something that had failed in South East Asia? Everywhere car stickers proclaimed: 'El Salvador is Spanish for Vietnam.'

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

In December 1980 the UN General Assembly, alarmed at the seething Central American conflicts, urged the El Salvador junta to take immediate steps to end such human rights violations as summary arrest, torture, roving death squads and evictions. A Special Representative of the Secretary-General was sent there to report. Out of the public eye but in constant contact, representatives of four Central American states (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela) styled themselves the *Contadora* and undertook intensive enquiries and discussions. How might the El Salvador conflict be ended and its combatants reconciled? By now there were 70,000 dead, most of them civilians and more than a million Salvadorans had been displaced from their homes. No-one was winning the war: everyone was losing it. Throughout the 1980s the gun ruled and no quarter was given by either side. Steadily, though, conflict sank into no-win quagmire. From time to time there was a brief glimpse of sanity when both sides arranged so-called 'days of tranquillity', when the needs and rights of women and children received some attention. Very steadily, too, the Catholic Church began to champion the rights of the victimised poor as local priests began to preach a 'Liberation Theology'. Many clergy were arrested by a government hunting down leaders of popular protest. A measure of democratic progress was achieved in 1983, when a constitution and a greater degree of legal redress were restored, but it was in August 1987 that a breakthrough came. The Secretary-Generals of the UN and of the OAS, in league with the presidents of five Central American nations (Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador itself), succeeded in bringing representatives of warring parties in El Salvador to the table. The presidents, hoping to apply leverage and coordination to UN diplomatic initiatives, called themselves 'the Friends of the UN Secretary-General'. The USA was a less formal 'fifth Friend' on frequent occasions. An agreement was signed to be known as the Esquipulas II Agreement (Esquipulas I had been a tentative draft). Working towards a ceasefire, the Agreement was to launch a democratic process through dialogue and amnesty, and eventually clear the way for free, fair, pluralistic elections. The timetable was tight. Participants sensed the momentum for guaranteeing what James Baker II, an American Secretary of State, later termed 'safe political space'.

CONSOLIDATING THE PEACE PROCESS

To take peace forward, certain steps were undoubtedly crucial.

Compliance with provision for ceasefire and disarmament had to be monitored. The UN was to do this. There must be a joint plan for demobilisation and repatriation and resettlement of displaced people. Only rapprochement between government and FMLN could effect this, with the FMLN acknowledged as a legitimate political party in the legislature. Peace was the indispensable forerunner to a rebuilt social and economic structure for all in El Salvador. Wider perspectives must obtain given that the ending of the Cold War resulted in less ideological intrusion from outside: the US and the USSR were now able to agree to suspension of their arms shipments. There is an interesting instance of objectivity here, in that the five Central American governments went to the UN Secretary-General with a request that he establish a verification unit to verify their compliance with the Esquipulas pledge to cease aiding insurrectionist movements and to prevent their territory being used for attacks on other states. This unit, the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) would assist peaceful transfer of power and show Salvadorans feasible alternatives to armed conflict. For the UN this was a dramatic innovation—the UN would intervene on the ground within a sovereign state and before hostilities were brought to a halt. El Salvador, in fact, was willing to allow the UN to assume a major role in transforming the political and institutional scene, provided it brought an end to civil war. This operation was opened up even more in July 1990, when the San José Agreement allowed UN observers to enter El Salvador, again before a ceasefire, in order to report on the extent of human rights violations. Eight months later, in April 1991, an agreement in Mexico City had the disputing parties, then deadlocked in military terms, now initialling proposals for ‘purifying’ the army and the judiciary; in other words, getting rid of reactionary elements. A proper electoral process was envisaged. Yet there were major stumbling-blocks: the FMLN wanted army reform before arms were laid down; the government insisted on disarmament prior to any reform. The FMLN, in particular, was incensed that a number of army leaders clearly involved in repressive actions were granted government amnesty. As for the judiciary, any progressive reform would clearly be a painfully slow eventuality.

The peace process, however, remained tantalisingly slow. Normalisation and national reconciliation needed stimulus and watchfulness. The UN moved into a more effective mode in July 1991 when it set up the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). Despite daunting differences, the UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, told the Security Council that because of openness

and readiness on all sides, 'Salvadoran society stands poised to undergo profound transformation which will permit peace, once it comes about, to take hold irrevocably and irreversibly.' The UN mission used 101 members from twenty-seven UN member states and working from six sites. The push for reform became a push for peace. The impetus for peace would achieve 'peace through consent and confidence' and 'revolution by negotiation'.

A ceasefire scheduled for 31 October 1992 became a mammoth operation, with interposition and disarmament taking place in fifteen locations. There were 60,000 government soldiers and an estimated six to eight thousand guerrillas. Front-line UN observers grew to 674 supported by a baseline network of UN Specialised Agencies such as WFP, WHO, UNESCO and UNICEF, bridging war and peace by seeing to civilian needs. The first signs of a real armistice were encouraging but El Salvador was ravaged by land-mines, bomb damage, and infrastructural dislocation.

The revitalisation of a near-broken community was now taken in hand. Undoubtedly, it could be said of El Salvador, as was said of Nicaragua by a foreign aid worker, that the country had 'the prices of New York, the wages of Bangladesh and the public services of Timbuktu'. In transition there was one word that most wanted to hear from politicians—'work'. Free seven-acre farm plots were to be offered to tens of thousands who had fought or been displaced. By 1997 there would be 35,000 new farm jobs for young men who had never seen a birthday without a gun in hand. No feelings of reconciliation would ever take root without a secure economic base. UN verification teams toured the length of the country overseeing land transfer, the reintegration of former combatants, the financing and establishment of peace-related projects—housing, rural clinics, business reinvestment for small firms, agricultural credits and mechanisation, livestock breeding, and water and sanitation schemes. In 1994 came the onerous task of preparing for a democratic presidential election to be supervised by 900 UN observers from fifty-six states working in teams.

Building peace in El Salvador hinged on several realistic factors. Primarily, there was the evident energy and determination of most Salvadorans to choose the path of rational reconciliation, reconstruction and long-term development. Then, there was the unpreparedness of UN monitors and aid workers to put up with delay or unhelpful attitudes and behaviour. Added to this was the tough insistence of the US Congress that any lessened resolve on the part of Salvadorans would threaten reduction of US financial aid. Transition

from war to peace was often agonisingly slow, particularly in respect of land redistribution, but no allowance was to be made, certainly by external agencies, for any slipping into reverse gear. In this example of conflict resolution the UN was both catalyst and director.

RECONCILIATION THROUGH FACING THE TRUTH

An innovatory feature of steering El Salvador out of conflict was the institution of a Commission on the Truth which was set up in April 1991 under the Mexico Agreement of that year. Three men were chosen by the UN Secretary-General to be Commissioners—two senior ex-ministers from other Central American states and a US law professor. The Commission was no judicial body and it would be free to evolve means of investigation and report, provided that utmost confidentiality was safeguarded. Further, the Commission could go on to make recommendations about legal, political and administrative measures. To overcome the trauma of war Salvadorans would have to go through the catharsis of facing the truth about what had taken place since 1980, for only when that truth was brought to light could they contemplate forgiveness. Collective and certainly individual reflection must emphasise hope for the future rather than the sacrifices of the unalterable past. This was seen as the real meaning of pardon as a prelude to reconciliation. The Commission's Report in 1993, entitled *From Madness to Hope*, detailed torture, abduction, and the murder of women, children, priests, nurses and doctors, mayors and journalists, and, indeed, mass killings by both sides. Commissioners had never been deterred by anybody refuting their authority or entering a plea of non-liability. There was an 'open-door' policy for hearing testimony from any who felt justified in giving it; there was a 'closed-door' assurance to those worried about any lack of confidentiality. In the closing words of the Commission Report:

Learning the truth and strengthening and tempering the determination to find it out, putting an end to impunity and cover-up, settling political and social differences by means of agreement instead of violence—these are the creative consequences of an analytical search for the truth.

Reconciliation was thus seen as release from tension and as creative in restoring Salvadorans' faith in themselves and in their leaders and institutions.

The Commission's rationale about facing the truth as it is set out in their Report highlights a concept—truth—which has always been the subject of earnest disputation. Philosophers for centuries have wrangled over the extent to which truth depends upon demonstrable proof, is coloured by individual faith and group opinion, and is a tortuous relationship between the first enquiry into a problem and the final stage of its judgement or resolution. In the context of El Salvador, all these points seem relevant to a programme for truth establishment and publication. The Commission on the Truth appears to have adopted a pragmatic line, where truth (by consensus) conforms to fact and reality, which, to the utmost extent, are discoverable by methodical, reliable, human enquiry. It is fairly clear, however, from the actual Report that accounts of particular atrocities or inhumane policies were accepted as true by some (say the victims) and even dismissed as false or prejudiced by others (say those cited as culpable). Moreover, it is not clear from the report how far the Commissioners were prepared to go in allowing for the possibility of error, perhaps on account of truth being concealed or because of witnesses' inadequate recollection. If points such as these arise when one considers the Commission's creative and analytical motives, the further moves towards individual and collective reconciliation must seem complex and unpredictable. Even so, the majority of Salvadorans in 1991 set out to travel that particular road.

The process of revealing the truth did not always go smoothly in El Salvador. In the first year of operation about 95 per cent of the 22,000 reported violations and criminal actions were attributable to government army and security personnel. The FMLN was judged guilty of the remaining 5 per cent. There was then a need to identify those responsible, to grant them amnesty, to relieve them from their posts, but not to punish them. The Truth Commissioners were to find this a difficult task, since government officials might plead that they were only doing their job and that any force judged excessive was only a legitimate response to anarchy. On the other hand, FMLN guerrillas frequently side-stepped prime responsibility for injury to others by declaring that what they termed a revolution had to be defended come what may. Participants in a conflict that runs deep are likely to regard their actions as permissible in certain circumstances. Was the Commission ever likely to dislodge adequately ingrained standpoints among hardened ex-combatants?

Using truth revelation as a prelude to reconciliation met with scepticism on the part of numerous Roman Catholics. They were after all familiar with confession and forgiveness. Had some of the

guilty, they asked, avoided a full confession by merely going through the motions of asking for mercy and pardon? Were they not evading justice in order to achieve peace? One Roman Catholic priest put it in unambiguous terms: 'the guns are silent but Salvadorans are not reconciled....You cannot have reconciliation without truth but to have truth you must expose immunity. And in El Salvador today immunity continues.' This is perhaps a debatable point but it was clear that among the FMLN and their supporters there was a reluctance to forgive oppressors who were regarded as implacable enemies of the people, ideologically so. Otherwise, was not a hard-won revolution betrayed? Generally speaking, in the light of common sense and some sense of dawning moral awareness the majority of Salvadorans have learned to forgive because there can be no other survivable way. All are *campesinos*, peasants, trying now to live together. Nothing is accomplished by mere 'finger-pointing', by exacting punishment and revenge. All might feel bitter after suffering so much, now they had to learn tolerance and respect. For them the goals were simple: reconcile then reunify our society. Martyrdom had brought change—living together must succeed dying together. This might sound a trite belief to the observer. Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that this ambitious programme of resolution and reconciliation was not to be left to chance. Great care was taken, though, as we have noted, to apply careful monitoring procedures, for the most part administered by UN personnel. In the spring of 1996, when it seemed things were lagging behind schedule, a small UN Mission (Minusal) took over from ONUSAL with a peace-building mandate, stated in rather ambitious terms, 'to help El Salvador take giant strides' (and so supervised ones) away from a violent and closed society towards democratic order. The provisions of the January 1992 peace accords were to be measurably implemented. External verification and pressure were to be exercised for the foreseeable future in harness with a Salvadoran National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), although this body was not equipped to pursue negotiations among parties in dispute. Its proposals moved some way to generating goodwill without securing precise commitments as to the costs and timing of reform. Its chief success lay in seeking and building consensus.

Procedures for facing the truth, then, and for clearing away the debris of conflict were to be implemented by El Salvador and the UN working together. The work of the Truth Commission was partly modelled on similar mechanisms originating in Argentina and Chile,

and, as we shall see in the next chapter, they were to be incorporated into post-conflict arrangements in South Africa. In contrast to the other commissions, however, the one set up in El Salvador assigned the international community a direct role as part of a peace process brokered by the UN. Inevitably, the sheer width of the agenda given to the Commission raised questions about how far an external authority might intervene within a sovereign state, in this instance, as an investigative agency. In the light of discovered facts, was such a body empowered to recommend reorganisation of a state's legal, judicial and military structures? There was even the risk of Commission recommendations being at variance with what parties had agreed at the peace negotiation table. The Truth Commission Report of 1993 had actually recommended the dismissal of several members of the El Salvador judiciary. There was scant sense of reconciliation in the televised retort of El Salvador's President Alfredo Cristiani that the Truth Commission had exceeded its mandate and that the international community must understand that a sovereign state had its own laws.

A similar instance of official disinclination to face objective truth about violation of human rights and recommendations as to dealing with it occurred earlier in Argentina and Chile. Is it any surprise that members of a judiciary and those in ruling political circles find reconciliation much more difficult than ordinary members of the public? Empowered within narrow parameters of status and privilege, the representatives of a former entrenched regime have more to 'lose'. In El Salvador any disinclination on their part or refusal to adjust to an improved regime would be spotlighted by the UN international watchdog.

TRAUMA AND TRUTH

After twelve traumatic years of conflict and six years or so of peace, the success of the reconciliation programme in El Salvador remains somewhat questionable. All Salvadorans have to confront the truth about violated human rights, and thereafter to work for political, social and institutional reform. This should open the door to reconciliation. Components of the original conflict are still perceptible. There are many disadvantaged people among the urban bourgeoisie, there are landowners unwilling to cede their acres, and the living standards of marginalised rural peasants have hardly narrowed at all. Populist leadership, which gave Salvadorans release

from autocratic oppression, is widely thought to be shifting towards a capitalist model, one likely to exacerbate the unevenness and the neglect of tensions which sparked off the conflict in the first place. Then there is what medical authorities term 'post-traumatic stress', that deep disturbance where victims who have become survivors stumble forward into a world too demanding for them to handle. There seems to be a grim paradox in the labelling of the El Salvador situation as a 'low-intensity conflict', when many war-weary and materially insecure survivors of that conflict live in a high intensity of uncertainty as to whether they can or cannot bring about reconciliation with their neighbours.

3 Apartheid in South Africa

Reconciliation in debate

Segregation of people is common to many countries. In Cyprus, Israel, Northern Ireland and Bosnia elements of population are located to some degree in separate enclaves. It is in South Africa that segregation was translated into an ideological creed known since the 1940s as apartheid, 'separateness'. This inevitably enmeshed the black majority in South Africa in a web of discriminatory practice. For the best part of fifty years the outside world came to condemn apartheid as something abhorrent in its racial divisiveness and reliance upon inhumane exploitation. In the final decade of this century a relieved world has witnessed the ending of racial conflict, the defeat of the apartheid regime, and its replacement by a black majority government and an African president. An ambitious scheme to promote reconciliation has been hoisted into place by the new government. Its principles, its methods and the extent of its success make for an interesting debate.

THE NATURE OF APARTHEID

The forced separation of black and white in South Africa originated mainly as a protective response among Dutch settlers at the Cape in the 1650s who faced and feared the surrounding Bantu natives. British soldiers and farmers 150 years later displaced the Dutch (then termed 'Boers') who trekked northwards to found independent republics. The growth of industrialisation and the tapping of vast mineral resources after 1900 made South Africa dependent upon large numbers of black male workers migrating to white cities from 'reserves' where their families were left to sparse subsistence farming. Segregation of white and black was seen as defending and preserving white culture, residence and the social order, as well as operating a 'colour bar' to protect 'lower-class' whites from competition in the job market.

Nelson Mandela has spoken of apartheid as 'a new term but an old idea...a monolithic system that was diabolical in its detail, inescapable in its reach and overwhelming in its power'. A creed it was, too, in that the Dutch Reformed Church regularly provided the ideologues with theological justification for white supremacy.

Apartheid was organised by parcelling out the country into white areas and African reserves. Six million white *Herrenvolk* went on to occupy 87 per cent of the land, enjoying high living standards and every amenity yet, as a 'vulture culture', growing ever more apprehensive about their future. Around the white settlement areas loomed a disconsolate mass of 30 million black Bantu. Originators of apartheid had an ingenious solution to the problem of finding cheap labour for factories and goldmines. Workers were bussed in from shacks in teeming 'townships' located downwind from the big cities. After 1962, country people were relegated to eight 'Bantustans'—up-country 'homeland reserves'—to develop in their own way, or so the theory went. The notion of separate development was, of course, apartheid at a remove and it was a spurious idea, for without fertile land, investment and infrastructure, no appreciable development is possible. These facilities were never made available. There were also 4 million Indians or mixed-race 'Coloured' people assigned to particular living places and occupations.

The divide-and-rule strategy of apartheid was deliberately employed to reduce black solidarity. In the reserves, government policies took advantage of long-standing tribal parochialism and feuding among Xhosa and Zulu clans. Elsewhere, the urban migrant was soon introduced to divisive perceptions of status common to white society: namely, persons who were skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled or servants. In the struggle for survival, as the Black Freedom Movement was to find, it was everyone for himself and for nobody else under the yoke. It was to take many years and much feverish political management before a black response to white overlordship shaped itself into united civil disobedience campaigns. In the 1950s the apartheid regime at last found itself engaged in conflict, as latent discontent sparked off a general strike against the Treason Trials of 1956. A fractured community was faced with draconian white laws. All Africans over the age of 16 were compelled to carry a Native Pass issued by the government for showing to any employer, policeman or civil official. Failure to produce this pass meant a fine, even detention for up to ninety days. No travel was possible without a permit. The signs 'WHITES ONLY' or 'AFRICANS ONLY' emblazoned on park benches, or at the entrance to a hotel, swimming pool, hospital, dance

hall or beach, betokened the strict exclusion of the inferior race under the 1953 Separate Amenities Act. The Group Areas Act of 1950 confined Africans and Indians to specific residential areas in towns. Any trespass into white urban areas would lead to forced relocation or even imprisonment. Overall, in the white perception there was the fear of *svart gevaar*, a black danger which would always infiltrate both the white material culture and the confidence of *baasskap*, that inalienable supremacy. Exclusion through 200 legal statutes had the dual function of guaranteeing the security of white mastery and the preordained servitude of the rest. An ironical consequence of this position was the emergence of a group of middle-class Bantu professionals and intellectuals. They were lawyers, teachers, doctors, journalists and clergy—people able to recruit supporters not only for the African National Congress (ANC) but for a ‘resistance front’ of other political and cultural groups. They were joined by a growing band of sympathetic whites and Indians in the universities and the media. Meanwhile, the mass of the population, certainly by the 1970s, began to stir from lethargy into liberationist zeal. Apartheid contained the seeds of conflict.

Apartheid as a set of principles was never quite watertight. There were compelling reasons why apartheid could never be ‘total’ in spite of shrill racist clamour and repressive legislation. White Afrikaner farmers and businessmen needed ample supplies of black labour, provided they were rigorously controlled in residence and movement. Many liberals felt they had a Christian mission to promote the ‘differential development’ and self-determination of blacks who had been herded away in tribal chiefdoms. As the South African economy grew ever more powerful, so apartheid policies had to address the problems of urbanisation magnetising an inflow of many thousands of black job-seekers and the consequent economic and social malaise of the reserves. ‘Black power’ in numbers and forcefulness was to force apartheid, that protective system for white interests, on to the defensive, revealing it as an expression of weakness rather than strength. From weakness sprang a dilemma: without a privileged position whites could not survive; without safeguarding racial separation privilege was not maintainable. For white leaders such as Hertzog, Malan and Verwoerd, apartheid was a survival mechanism, a life-raft supporting power, unity and the growth of group identity. Theirs was a backs-to-the-wall position, a fruitless posture given the dependence of the minority on the servile complacency of the majority.

Recent South African scholarship has published fresh views on the nature of apartheid:

- Ideological disunity was always more obvious than solidarity. 'Hardliners' and 'softliners' seldom agreed about the complexities of defusing potential class conflict, maintaining white supremacy, and steering between the counter-productive areas of all-out dominance and assimilation (through racial mixture or 'miscegenation').
- Apartheid was probably never a long-term Master Plan. Its principles were often hastily devised in an ad hoc manner to meet economic and social changes. Party leaders, industrial magnates, farmers, financiers frequently resorted to provisional and often contradictory styles of situation management.
- Already by 1930 conservative as well as liberal elements in South Africa were aware of the impossibility of ordering separate development of white and black 'to a large extent on lines of their own'. Calls for ethnic mobilisation might express nationalistic urges in rival white and black camps but the eventual emergence of a multi-racial South Africa was hardly in doubt. Equally certain was the prospect of conflict.
- Racist intolerance often had less to do with skin colour prejudice and more to do with feelings of vulnerability, fear and loss of group identity, particularly among a peripheralised white working class.

THE OUTSIDE WORLD CONDEMNS

National governments, the UN, and a host of non-governmental organisations voiced a swelling protest from generalised, disapproving rhetoric just after the end of the Second World War to more specific and earnest campaigning in the 1960s. In 1952, India and states newly enfranchised from imperialism, such as Ethiopia, Iraq and Liberia, had asked the UN's General Assembly to consider urgently the question of 'Race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid'. Discrimination on so great a scale was a negation of the UN and its Charter and could easily lead to international conflict. South Africa resisted the allegation stating that the policies complained of were a domestic matter. This contemptuous response failed to deflect UN members from pressing home increasingly strong condemnation over the next twenty years. Attempts at persuasion and negotiation by UN Secretary-Generals and their representatives got nowhere. To help advance freedom in South Africa, many African and Arab states were prepared to supply whatever they could afford in the way of material and military aid.

By 1976 a majority in the General Assembly was explicitly supporting 'armed struggle' in South Africa as a way of defeating apartheid. Moral pressure was spearheaded by the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain, which recruited almost 40,000 vigorous campaigners at one point during its time of activity, 1959–94. There were similar action groups in the USA, in Scandinavia and in Holland. From time to time the US Congress expressed outrage and went on to pass legislation restricting South African trade. Indirect pressure eventually took the form of consumers and dock worker unions in Europe and the USA boycotting South African goods, and in 1977 led to mandatory embargoes on the shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to Cape Town. During the following fifteen years the UN pressed, never too effectively, for the application of mandatory sanctions against South Africa and for disinvestment by trading partners, although there were certain governments, such as those of the USA, UK and France, who preferred to retain their links under the guise of 'constructive engagement', in the belief that penalising a delinquent state would lead to a siege mentality and render it impervious to dialogue and negotiation.

In 1974 the UN called for the total exclusion of South Africa from all international organisations and conferences held under the auspices of the UN, so long as apartheid was practised and in 1978 the UN established an International Anti-apartheid Year. There was now in many lands quite uncompromising support for the 'liberation' struggles of the South Africans. The Security Council, for instance, in October 1977, had demanded the cessation of violent repression and torture, the release of detainees, the abrogation of bans on freedom groups and news media, the ending of the inferior and marginalising Bantustan system and, conclusively, a recourse to democratic elections and the establishment of black majority rule. The apartheid scenario was now one of explicit conflict. Month by month and year by year the UN and an array of 400 liberal non-governmental organisations issued condemnation of apartheid and calls for action. Sadly and quite predictably, tightening the screw from outside only led to fiercer repression and opposition. Even so, no other fight for basic freedoms has ever gained such wide political support and concrete assistance from other nations, perhaps 130 of them.

THE GROWTH OF AFRICAN PROTEST

Black opposition to white apartheid in South Africa has moved through a number of stages. The first decade after the Second World War was one of 'soft' conflict and resentful alienation. Slowly the ANC began to build

structured means of resistance through action committees, an illicit press and legal representation for detainees and the evicted. Student Power and Youth Power sharpened the intensity of conflict. They filled the prisons too. Three out of four detainees were aged between 18 and 25.

It was in March 1960 that police brutality in Sharpeville, when sixty-nine unarmed protestors were gunned down inescapably, brought 'hard' conflict in its train. There was now a polarisation of forces—a white solidarity, preventive with law and rifle, and a black solidarity movement making a stand for Black Consciousness. Mandela and others were taken off to years of penal servitude, their associates in the courtroom clenching fists invoking 'the anvil of united mass action and the hammer of armed struggle'. The accused used their trials as platforms for declaring beliefs rather than as any test of the law. They defended themselves in a moral sense, instead of resorting to fine forensic points. Growing protest gave way reluctantly to military training and the deployment of armed 'freedom fighters'. From its inception in 1912 the ANC had regarded non-violence as an indisputable core principle. It was best for the oppressed to pursue the unavoidable conflict in ways that saved lives, not threw them away. Guerrilla warriors, termed the Spear of the Nation, would seek to achieve liberation as far as possible without bloodshed and civil war. Internationally, other states, as members of the UN, were faced with the issue of endorsing the legitimacy of an armed struggle to resolve an internal conflict. In theory, systematic violation of human rights leading to explosive conflict could be held to threaten world or regional peace and so justify international intervention. In practice (as will be apparent from other conflicts described in this book), UN member states used rhetoric as their main weapon. After all, there is the awkward question: if an armed struggle within an internal conflict is to be legitimised, which group or groups are to be given UN blessing?

By 1980 a seismic revolt had taken to the streets. Violence at times became unrestrained on all sides. The essential emptiness of the apartheid creed was demonstrated when over 600 organisations in South Africa—churches, academic circles, media representatives, trade unions, cultural groups—came together to form a United Democratic Front. This conflict would be resolved politically and intellectually. When white power spoke of 'total strategy', it related to force to crush dissidence; when the black majority used the phrase, it referred to a final push to achieve freedom of opportunity in education and employment. Liberation of the Bantu, it was repeatedly

proclaimed, would not entail ousting the whites. Increasingly, the realisation gained ground on all sides not only that toe-to-toe confrontation precluded any compromise, but also that holding to Might is Right would erode the economic and social fabric of the entire country. Apartheid was neglectful as well as discriminating. A black population likely to double within thirty years and already vitiated by violence, school drop-out, crime and drug dependence would shatter the prosperity as well as the peace of their land. South Africa would only have a future if it began to dismantle the apparatus of apartheid. Very, very slowly the imperative of reconciliation was becoming clear. South Africa would have to be a united nation, a 'rainbow' nation. By the end of the decade the apartheid conflict was slipping into another mode: the struggle in the streets was becoming a struggle for office because black government could not be delayed much longer.

THE DEFEAT OF APARTHEID

The crumbling of the creed happened with surprising rapidity. In the late 1980s there were secret talks between the Pretoria government and the ANC, which explored the middle ground between white fears (and a sense of retreat) and black hopes. In February 1990 President F.W.de Klerk sounded an auspicious note, declaring in Parliament, 'Now is the time to speak out loud and clear about the dreams that unite us, because these dreams are the foundation of our new South African nation.' Thus was the urgency of reconciling conflict proclaimed, and officially so. The ANC was now loosed from its ban. Mandela was released to take his 'long walk to freedom' after thirty-seven years in jail. By degrees the demeaning restrictions of apartheid were lifted. Segregation in public places was ended. Steadily, the noxious laws that had inflamed protest were repealed. As the white National Party gradually lost ground, they could dream only of a fragile retention of some of their commercial and investment privileges. Exploited black masses shared visions handicapped by 50 per cent illiteracy and 25 per cent unemployment. Right-wing factions reviled de Klerk as a traitor as he engaged in working-party discussions for a new constitution that would smoothly but irrevocably transfer power to the majority. A time of transition would be a time of compromise when a black government had to provide structural guarantees for the white minority. At the same time, 22 million black people had to be coaxed into careful acceptance of

compromise. They must be ready to be enfranchised for democratic voting. For much of the time the prospects of an end to conflict and of any lasting reconciliation were bedevilled by savage fighting between the more fanatical activists of the ANC and Zulu nationalists.

Only one way of reconciling South Africa's conflict seemed practicable and fair. Power and reconciliation were to be shared. A Government of National Unity would put an end to the isolation and rejection of both black and white. ANC leaders made much of the significance of their logo of the spear and the wheel. Freedom for the deprived had required an advancing thrust; freedom for all South Africans would need a common revolution. There would be no time for recrimination: enemies must become partners. A new united government was elected, with the ANC getting 60 per cent of total votes and the National Party 20 per cent, and it took office in Pretoria in April 1994. Nelson Mandela became the first black President with F.W. de Klerk, the former President, as a Vice-President. In a Cabinet of twenty-seven there were ten white members, six of them from the National Party. South Africa was now a nation on a new footing; no longer were most South Africans co-existing in an occupied territory.

RECONCILIATION: THE RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES

The new nation is divided still between an affluent minority and a majority, blinking in the light of unaccustomed freedom and scarred by crime and poverty of resources. Reconciliation, to have any meaning at all, ought to bridge differences. But reconciliation, taking shape in heart and head, cannot ignore the pocket. A series of socio-economic improvements has to transform prospects for whole communities if the new democracy is to be entrenched. The dire extent of inequality and neglect has spurred the government into a flurry of redevelopment schemes, each with its own terminology. Action to redress inadequacy must be 'affirmative' or 'corrective' with precise targets and calculated outcomes. 'Renewal strategies' in education and training, health provision, land restitution and housing must aim at the 'empowerment' of people, formerly near-destitute and voiceless. Education will be 'outcomes-based', learning is to be lifelong. A New Deal for all must guarantee 'implementation' of promises and programmes. Assured of 'delivery' and given the resources 'the New Africans will do the job'. Democratic leadership, steady optimism and a unified shoulders to the wheel attitude are to transform the nation and reconcile its once-divided people.

At the beginning of the reign of the new government an ambitious Reconstruction and Development Programme set out to reduce disparities in job chances, education, housing, nutrition and the care of women and children. State intervention was to cater for the basic needs of all, rather than rely upon trickle-down improvement. This scheme did not run smoothly and in 1996 was superseded by a better coordinated Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), which had as priorities doubled economic growth from 3 per cent to 6 per cent, costs (and benefits) calculated for three years at a time, sustainable job creation, and the maximum encouragement of private sector investment. (There was an issue of unrealised *political* reconciliation at this point, in that radicals on the left of the ANC deplored the retreat from the 'socialism' they had seen in pre-election promises.)

After only a few years, there is a pervasive sense in South Africa that economic and social disparities remain so gross that measurable transformation is imperilled. Leaders in 1998 sounded a more cautious note. For ex-President F.W.de Klerk it was 'not too late to prevent South Africa from being caught in a downward spiral of polarisation, tension, and lack of confidence'. For every winner there is a host of losers—the fuel for resumed conflict. Chief Buthelezi, the charismatic Zulu leader, warned that, 'our people are imbued with dreams [and] false hopes. Our economy is at the crossroads between success and failure.' Thus far the dreamers have shown remarkable patience and restraint. Nelson Mandela's autobiography *Long Walk to Freedom* points to freedoms not yet widely attained:

The truth is that we are not yet free; we have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed.... We have not taken the final steps of our journey but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road.

Few in South Africa would now care to count the odds on even-handed emergence from years of discrimination, repression and impoverishment.

RECONCILIATION: TELLING THE TRUTH

The newly-elected Government of National Unity decided in May 1994 to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with a brief to investigate human rights abuses under the former apartheid regime,

which had been sanctioned by the state or were the result of protest by liberation groups. Under scrutiny would be the period 1960–94. The underlying rationale stated that instead of forgetting the past there must be truthful acknowledgement of what had happened. ‘A commission’, the Minister of Justice told Parliament, ‘is a necessary exercise to enable South Africans to come to terms with their past on a morally accepted basis and to advance the course of reconciliation.’

The TRC would investigate abuses by publicly hearing testimony from victims and statements from the accused. Further steps would involve report, recommendation, arrangements for reparation and rehabilitation. The truth laid bare would be beamed to all South Africans regardless of colour. This approach had been tried before in Chile, Argentina and El Salvador with varying success. In Latin America, Truth Commissions were devised following transition from military to civilian power. In El Salvador, as we have seen in Chapter 2, the international community exercised a direct investigative role as part of a peace process brokered by the UN. Unfortunately, in Chile and Argentina the truth-telling procedures were hampered by uncertainty about the government’s reign of office, by stone-walling from senior officers, by inadequate funding, and by a lack of confidence among victims that it was safe to tell the truth. Recourse to granting a general amnesty resulted in disregard for both truth and justice. South Africa was determined to learn from El Salvador’s success and from the disappointments in Chile and Argentina. Eighteen commissioners, impartial and broadly representative of the nation, were to be chosen by President Nelson Mandela. Their unenviable task was to prise apart thirty-three years of repression and counter-violence and to do it within four years. The Final Report of the TRC had to go to the State President by 31 July 1998.

The objectives of South Africa’s TRC seem clear enough. Organisational arrangements provide for public disclosure before a tribunal of commissioners who are mainly figures from professional and public fields, not lawyers. Their chairman is Archbishop Desmond Tutu. The public sessions are held in Cape Town and at various locales in the countryside. The unremitting efforts to secure reliable and at times dramatic evidence are followed closely by the media. Very little is heard in camera—this would defeat the purpose of the exercise.

Three committees were formed: Human Rights Violation; Amnesty; Reparation and Rehabilitation. Agendas were carefully thought out but aroused great debate. The first committee was restricted to considering ill-treatment, torture, abduction and murder. Critics were puzzled that more subtle, personally devastating acts, such as detention, forced

removal and organisational banning, were not in the brief. In any case, how was objective evidence, free of prejudice and preference, to be secured? Above all, there was a need to establish precise involvement and not to rely on anecdote or rumour. Would revelation, admission and apology even open up old wounds? Would detection obtain justice? These questions had dogged the progress (and the confidence) of Truth Commissioners in El Salvador.

The second committee could grant an arraigned individual amnesty but only if all relevant facts were disclosed. Enquiry would look at the factual and legal nature of an offence, its motives and objectives, and whether it was collectively or individually directed. Much controversy arose over these terms of work. It would never be easy to counter the defence of those accused who pleaded that what they did was acceptable at the time. This might be a line—other than conspiracy of silence—from former members of the army or police. In addition, how responsible were those politicians who had framed the parameters of South Africa's shameful past? In October 1997, when South Africa's former Foreign Minister and the Police Minister both gave evidence before the Commission, they each disclaimed responsibility for what their subordinates might have done by way of illegal actions in an excess of discriminatory zeal. Both regretted they had not done more to prevent such things occurring. (The possibility is that they did not wish to know about systematic and irresponsible abuse.) In March 1998 ex-Presidents P.W.Botha and F.W.de Klerk each tried to avoid being called to account by the TRC. A grant of amnesty carries the risk that a perpetrator is thought to be 'getting away with it'. On the other hand, denying amnesty could lead to litigation and appeal against refusal to forgive. In any case, does an admission of guilt and consequent amnesty free that person from later civil or criminal prosecution by a victim's family?

The third committee was to view reparation and rehabilitation as end-products in a reconciliation process. Some recompense would surely be demanded by whole communities and by individuals. Undoubtedly, there would be room for help through mediation, arbitration and probably protection from intimidation and corruption. A network of non-governmental and welfare organisations was seen as offering valuable support to this committee. In matter of fact terms, the work of the Commission in this area had to go beyond any ritualistic washing of hands.

South Africa is undertaking an ambitious social experiment aiming to get the balance right between healing and justice. Its guiding light is a search for a unified community which will put the past to one side

when informed by disclosure and reflection and move together into a prosperous future. The experiment with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is certainly ambitious, but has the conflict in South Africa bitten so deeply and for so long that any dependable reconciliation remains questionable?

South Africa has devoted a great deal of care to shaping procedures to build reconciliation. The whole enterprise is a long-term affair, but is there any eventually tangible by-product? Or does the process of revelation rekindle polarisation, as Salvadorans have also suggested? Chairman Archbishop Tutu on numerous occasions has put the attainment of reconciliation in these terms: 'People will give up, not just on reconciliation but on democracy if it [the TRC] does not deliver the goods.' The Chairman has stated the task of the Commission as he sees it in very plain terms:

- The TRC is not required to resolve conflicts. It is not a court and no verdicts are called for. (After all, most of the Commissioners are not lawyers.)
- TRC procedures represent a ventilating process—to hear testimonies about human rights abuse, to document them, to present them publicly, and to facilitate the granting of amnesty—all this in the spirit, letter and law of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, no 34, of 1995.

'What do South Africans then do with the revealed truth?' he asks. They share 'frameworks' through which the past can be explored, the present viewed and the future approached, in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, unity and reconciliation; they share perceptions, attitudes and experiences with others, with the objective of forging new perceptions and attitudes.

This sounds fine, but dealing with the trauma of the past may bring problems of the present and anxieties about the future very much into the open. Reconciliation may be delayed or, indeed, aborted. TRC Commissioners are aware that many who have suffered during long years of apartheid want their oppressors punished. This involves trial and verdict. For these victims, justice encompasses restitution and retribution. After the truth has been told what amount of restitution is appropriate and adequate? Mere disclosure (even if absolutely full and without reservation) coupled with apology is not enough. It needs to go further than the restoration of a victim's humanity and dignity. Retribution, that essential element of justice, is sacrificed for the sake of 'truth' and peace. On the other hand, if the TRC procedures had

retained the element of retribution, this would probably have deterred many from testifying.

A point frequently stressed by the Commissioners is that open hearings must be confrontational for victim and violator face each other. This must not be a 'media circus' and it demands sensitivity in handling emotionally distressed victims and acutely embarrassed perpetrators. If reconciliation is to be the desirable outcome, then objective understanding of the situation is furthered by regarding both parties as victims of apartheid. There is some thought among TRC officials that the term 'victim' is better replaced by 'survivor', implying a degree of control and perhaps recovery which the other term does not connote. Is 'perpetrator' the right term? Possibly, labelling individuals in this way to some degree closes down the possibility of and the need for understanding the complexities of motivation and action. It is in regard to provision for the granting of amnesty that debate has been most vigorous and impassioned. To let an acknowledged violator 'off the hook' is to let them 'get away with murder'. Amnesty is an expression of mercy and is really in the gift of those who have suffered. In consequence, a number of awkward questions arise. Supposing that to permit amnesty was seen as a political necessity, does this not abrogate the right of victims to see offenders punished? If so, is not justice being sold short? There is no insistence on offenders being obliged to make amends. That way, can there be reconciliation between aggrieved and offenders?

At its apparent demise, South Africa's apartheid conflict is being dealt with in a historic way. An impressive set of machinery has been devised and put into operation to secure a reconciled and unified community. Understandably, questions are raised on every side, questions similar to those being asked in El Salvador. If the concept of the TRC was an innovation, does it not represent a historic compromise? A compromise which is not likely to please everybody and begs questions as to justice and equality? Above all, as we have put it earlier in this chapter, does not reconciliation among members of a community, which is still very much divided and plainly unequal, depend upon transformation and redistribution? Both in South Africa and in El Salvador there is unease that the government, elected on a manifesto full of promises, is, in fact, renegeing on certain promises by preferring a 'free-market' economy on capitalist lines to a more 'socialist' one. This is held to widen the gaps between rich and poor, and does little to heal fissures in society making for irreconcilability. Without farreaching social and economic changes in the post-apartheid society, black and white people are unlikely to be fully and permanently reconciled.

4 Cambodia

Reconciliation after mayhem

The conflicts in El Salvador and South Africa appear settled in that fighting is over, a new, popularly elected regime succeeds an autocratic one, and measures to promote reconciliation among former combatants have been put into place as a definite programme. Revelation of truth is public, cathartic, held to be healing and unifying. Cambodia differs from them in this respect. The truth about its long conflict is dramatically clear to the world at large. But Cambodia's peace, achieved through an international rescue operation, has, on the whole, led to confusion, disputed allegiance and not many signs of genuine reconciliation. On the other hand, El Salvador and Cambodia are similar in another respect. Each has been the field for a UN mission, multi-dimensional in scope and largely unprecedented, an operation following through three stages—peace brokering, peace monitoring and peace-building—to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a community. The consent of formerly warring parties to outside aid has been crucial. Yet the final objective of a thoroughly reconciled people is both hard to appraise and impossible to predict with certainty.

Everybody knows about the mayhem in Cambodia. The horror of the 'Killing Fields' has been shown on the world's TV screens and in the press. The unspeakable barbarity of the Khmer Rouge and its leader Pol Pot has filled everyone with dismay and disgust. The nation of Cambodia has been savaged beyond comprehension, its people reduced to slavery and then rescued by the international action of the biggest task force the UN has ever fielded. The UN brought in 22,000 foreigners to monitor, coordinate, rebuild and somehow effect reconciliation among a hostile and devastated people, traumatised by horror. This reconstruction plan was perhaps too ambitious, too starry-eyed. Had the UN taken on more than it could ever manage? The international organisation had come in to help create a governmental system since not one of the political parties could be trusted to carry out

reform either alone or with others. When the UN hold was finally relaxed there was speculation about whether the Cambodians might return to corruption and fratricidal intimidation. Once again, the question has to be faced, do years of death and dissolution fracture a community so utterly that restoration of civilised society seems a hopeless business? To repair a physical habitat is difficult enough, to build bridges for sharing everyday life requires a quantum leap in bringing to bear resources, persistence and imagination. What possibility can there be of a people blinking in the light of a tentative 'normality' ever being prepared to live together as a reconciled community?

THE ORIGINS OF CAMBODIA'S CONFLICT

Dynastic kings ruled the country for centuries until France took it over as a colony between 1863 and 1954, retaining the monarchy and achieving a fair degree of controlled stability and prosperity. The arrogance of imperial power was shattered by the Second World War, which was to usher in almost forty years of bitter feuding. External pressures and internal tensions brought turbulence to Cambodia. Prince Norodom Sihanouk tried to keep his kingdom out of the escalating war in Vietnam. Unfortunately, eastern borders were being used as supply routes by the Viet Cong communist forces in Vietnam, and the US Air Force then retaliated by carpet-bombing large areas where enemy bases were suspected. Cambodia's royal house tried to walk a neutralist tightrope, courted at times by America's CIA and the Marxist persuasions of Moscow and Beijing. Sihanouk's subjects, 10 million of them, generally displayed unpredictable loyalty, for there were significant Chinese and Vietnamese elements. Their attitudes swayed between monarchical respect and the resentful opposition of poor peasants and town dwellers. Turmoil erupted in 1970 when Sihanouk was overthrown in a military coup. A million terrified Cambodians fled their villages and sought refuge in tented camps thrown up around the cities.

The void in Cambodian society was rapidly filled by an extreme left-wing insurrectionist group, the Khmer Rouge, whose guerrilla tactics gradually occupied more and more of the country. Their taking over in the capital, Phnom Penh, in 1975, initiated a regime, Democratic Kampuchea, which was to astound the world with its fanaticism and brutality. Society was now to be reconstituted in macabre fashion. Malicious oppressors hunted down the Western-educated élite who, if

they spoke foreign languages, or even wore glasses, were 'eliminated'. A bizarre wave of the future would be the peasants, the 'Base People' corralled in rural collectives to await the agrarian utopia of Year Zero. The all-embracing Maoist philosophy of the movement's leader, Pol Pot, aimed to displace 'reactionary' Buddhism and substitute thought control. The party's information apparatus would enforce conformity, thus doing away with the need for schools. Nor, since self-sufficiency was to be the driving motive for all work, would there be any need for money or markets. There was to be no choice and certainly no right of appeal. Sustaining this extraordinary creed and system was a bureaucracy whose spies recorded in minute detail any deviation 'incompatible with the revolution'. Not toeing the line was punishable by torture and death so that the Cambodian landscape became littered with gruesome heaps of skulls and mass burial sites. One in seven Cambodians, well over a million of them, met a hideous final fate.

Cambodia's unreal world of no hope and no future lasted for three years, until Vietnam mounted a 'rescue' mission in December 1978, forcing the Khmer Rouge to retreat to the forest wilderness bordering Thailand. Many people in a shocked world, if not the Vietnamese 'liberators', expected the Superpowers to do something urgent to revive a nation now on its knees. It was plain that what had happened was likely to destabilise the entire region of South East Asia, but from a humanitarian point of view 8 million Cambodians were struggling to stay alive and 700,000 of them were squatting in camps in Thailand as refugees. There was unconcern in Washington, Moscow and Beijing, or at least uncertainty about how far to back the illicit invasion of the Vietnamese which had evicted a monstrous regime, and whether to stand behind corrupt and unreliable personalities in Cambodia itself. At least the Vietnamese occupation restored some normalcy, enabling towns, schools, banks, markets and Buddhist monasteries to come back to life. Nevertheless, those who had suffered an infamous regime found it hard to resume traditional customs and occupations, and they looked for sanctuary in neighbouring lands. Eventually, special pleading by the UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, and support for him by the Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev and America's President George Bush steered the way, in 1988, towards mounting an elaborate aid operation in Cambodia once a ceasefire was secured. China also put its weight behind the restoration of peace and regional security. The enterprise would be big and costly, as it needed to take over from the tangle of eighty non-governmental agencies who were doing what they could to offer emergency relief.

The straightforward objectives of the aid operation had to be, first, to end the conflict with a ceasefire and armistice; second, to give Cambodians resuscitation (essentially a relief programme); and third, to restore ordered and representative government. Priority had to be given to amassing resources and seeing to infrastructure and training. A heartening fact was that most Cambodian survivors were itching to begin the Herculean job of reconstruction.

THE PROGRAMME FOR TRANSITION AND NATIONAL REBUILDING

In 1989, eighteen states, together with representatives of Cambodia's four political factions, met in Paris to negotiate a definite resolution to the Cambodian conflict. Generally, there was agreement over certain criteria which are commonly used by the international community to decide whether there is an urgent, compelling situation of grave humanitarian distress demanding prompt relief. The state affected must itself be willing and competent enough to deal with the situation, and there must be no feasible alternative to intervention to relieve the situation.

There seemed to be grounds for swift and comprehensive action by an international body because the behaviour of a regime towards the people it was oppressing was a serious threat to international peace and security in the region of South East Asia. The gross violation of 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' (thus termed in Article 55 of the UN Charter) was not a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of a certain state but a matter with which an international body such as the UN must be rightly concerned. Those gathered in Paris believed they had an overriding duty to forestall what amounted to genocide and to help put in place means of relief and administration. Of course, no civilised society would evolve without reconciliation between those who had been torn apart, but restitution and reform must preface reconciliation.

In fact, the Paris Peace Accords of 1989 were negotiated in faltering fashion with much argument over peace strategies and their implementation. There were many difficult issues. Peace-making in El Salvador had been so much easier because UN mediation had moved forward on a footing of a strong will for peaceful settlement; in Cambodia political in-fighting blurred prospects of clear popular consensus. What should be the precise scope and objectives of a multi-phase operation? Could the whole thing go through in only two years?

What should be the specific roles of military and civilian personnel? What safeguards were regarded as essential to preserve the impartiality of those who went into a very quarrelsome country? Above all, how would those who carried through such a complicated programme ever know the success attained, first, in conflict settlement and, second, in advancing reconciliation? Slow and steady confidence-building measures would be required to pacify and reassure Cambodians, but in time that business must be handled by the Cambodians themselves. Cambodian politicians were unused to sharing power, yet this was essential for any progress. It was the Australian delegates to the Paris conference who managed to give the programme a kick-start with what was called a 'Red Book' peace proposal. After intensive discussion, the UN Security Council incorporated these ideas in a Framework Document. The UN could now confidently launch a comprehensive scheme with a careful mandate to demilitarise, rehabilitate and enfranchise those denied democracy for so long. The UN force would be known as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The eighteen governments that at last authorised a peacekeeping operation on 23 October 1991 were to be guarantors, and field personnel would be offered by fifty states. Altogether, the full tally would number 16,000 soldiers and 6,000 civilians from more than 100 countries. Success would absolutely depend upon local support.

A number of priorities must govern the direction of fashioning a revived Cambodia. These were military disarmament, the restoration of state legitimacy, the reordering of civil administration, the rebuilding of a viable economy and preparations for a democratic election scheduled for May 1993. Disarming and demobilising former combatants was dangerous and frustrating, since fighting men's needs were supplied by a network of sympathetic non-combatants whose cooperation with the authorities was unpredictable. Cambodians had learned to trust nobody. Roads and fields were laced with 70 million landmines which maimed eighty villagers each week. The white-painted UNTAC jeeps were regularly ambushed. When confrontations grew violent or vehicles were hijacked UN staff questioned the usefulness of a directive from headquarters saying that force might only be employed in self-defence. Clearly, sterner measures might have been needed. In all, thirteen peacekeepers were killed and fifty wounded. Under the UNTAC mandate it was not even possible to intervene to stop any outbreak of fighting between the armed forces maintained by the various political parties. The most that could be done was to report incidents in the hope of shaming those who were violating the negotiated ceasefire.

A scheme for reordering reliable administration was put in hand to encourage more effective government. A Supreme National Council was to be chaired by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, returned from exile in Beijing, and to comprise twelve politically representative Cambodians. UN advisers would be on hand. At a lower level there would be an elected National Assembly of 120 delegates. International recognition was accorded this group by assigning two of the councillors to the UN's General Assembly in New York. Subservient to this Council were five ministries—Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public Security, Finance and Information. This part of the UNTAC programme may be seen to break new ground in UN attempts to resolve conflict. The UN approach to international assistance in this case went well beyond both conflict resolution and humanitarian aid provision. As part of a viable intervention strategy, UNTAC was to underpin Cambodia's social, political and economic institutions. It was the view of the UN Secretary-General that the UN had come in at the request of the Cambodians—the UN could not replace these institutions if political will began to flag. Here was an international organisation intervening within a sovereign territory to exercise an ambitious, direct control function, in effect, almost a 'trusteeship' role. This was done in agreement with the Cambodians as part of a 'transition' programme. Control was to be managed not by means of taking over full executive and legislative authority, but by assuming responsibility for control in only five specific ministries. This would have been difficult anywhere but in Cambodia there was a desperate shortage of experienced and politically neutral officials. There were serious language problems. Nevertheless, when things were running smoothly the UN proposed to bring its transitional role to an end and hand everything over to Cambodians.

The reconstruction of Cambodia's administration featured two innovative and imaginative schemes. One was to encourage administrators to decentralise their own work through delegating more responsibility to associates in the provinces. Now there was to be a clear and reliable chain of command between Phnom Penh, the capital, allowing for local initiative and more contact with ordinary people. A second instance of designing structures and spreading confidence and trust was a tentative attempt by UNTAC to establish an independent judicial system. A Special Prosecutor's Office was set up in early 1993 with the express duty to indict, arrest and try those believed to be involved in acts of political violence. Again, this measure was something the UN had never before had to resort to, but the very idea of a safe environment for Cambodians to live in was being menaced by

increased political feuding and by the inadequate response of the relevant security authorities.

Rebuilding the Cambodian economy was an obvious first stage in the encouragement of reconciliation. Nationally, the government must renovate budgeting and taxation arrangements, introduce employment strategies, plan trade and industrial development for the towns. To begin with, provisional schemes were put in place and eventually UNTAC was to help the Cambodians to launch a comprehensive First Socioeconomic Development Plan for the period 1996–2000. The Plan would especially target poverty in Cambodia. One of the poorest lands in the world, after its society had been brought to a state of collapse, 40 per cent of the population were living below any acceptable poverty line and nine out of ten were struggling to make ends meet on tiny plots of land. Of the 361,000 refugees repatriated to Cambodia, three out of four were women and children. Women and children were the most vulnerable people, forlorn and emaciated, for after the Khmer Rouge débâcle half of all Cambodian families were headed by widows. Not only would it be vital to provide for a better standard of living for dispirited people, no tolerant, democratic state would ever emerge if access to guaranteed employment, better health and diet and education were not offered very readily.

Preparations for an election were now in the making. This was regarded as crucial for the establishment of representative democracy. The country was divided into twenty-one electoral provinces to be supervised by teams from forty-seven countries for a period of six weeks in April to May 1993. For members of UNTAC, a flak jacket and steel helmet were thought more advisable than an armband. Optimism was there from the start with the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi (later to go to Bosnia), proclaiming, 'a historical opportunity to restore peace to Cambodia...the advent of a new era in south-east Asia and in international relations'. This was a large canvas to work on. In remote villages people who had survived years of tension and terror needed intensive counselling. Every Cambodian over the age of eighteen registered as a voter was issued with a plastic registration card with name, age and photograph. Unfortunately, many of these cards came to be jettisoned by country people recalling the terrible documentation exercise of the Khmer Rouge era when everybody's identity was labelled with a badge. Even so, 90 per cent of those enfranchised turned out to vote by secret ballot, an astonishing success. The two principal parties were Funcinpec, a royalist group,

and the Cambodian People's Party, a republican front. (The former was optimistically styled 'the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia'.) When results were announced on 10 June 1993, both parties had won comparable support so that a coalition was deemed to be the obvious arrangement. Khmer Rouge was humiliated and despatched to the wilderness though not to oblivion. The controversial Prince Norodom Sihanouk was now reluctantly regarded as the least bad alternative to resumed chaos.

Sihanouk himself foresaw a possible return to unrest and civil hostilities after the election was over. In spite of this, he proposed that, following the withdrawal of UNTAC, which was to take place in November 1993, Cambodia be divided into twenty-one provinces, each to be governed by alliance between the main political groups—royalist, republican and former socialist parties. Mysteriously, he went on to declare publicly his belief that a Khmer Rouge presence was inevitable in the new National Assembly, despite their refusing to take part in the election. This last statement led to much nervous foreboding among ordinary Cambodians, especially those in remote regions and small towns, where, in any case, there was a growing climate of violence resulting from politically motivated acts of intimidation. Nobody was at all certain as to whether Khmer Rouge as a whole might break up into discordant factions, with Pol Pot and his extreme cronies being discounted and some rogue elements coming in to play a constructive rather than destructive role.

Several questions about the election process troubled UNTAC. Should the holding of this election have gone ahead automatically if the earlier phase of disarmament had not been satisfactorily completed? How was the legitimacy and representativeness of a supervised election to be reinforced? And, given the fragility of understanding and tolerance at high levels, how likely would it be that feelings of reconciliation would trickle downwards?

PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION

Sihanouk's Royal Government of Cambodia and the UN both see 'national reconciliation' as the ultimate objective. Former adversaries will be helped to live together, burying the past and facing the future. Individuals in consequence will bury hatchets and unite to rebuild their nation. There is not too much optimism among observers as to the likelihood of Cambodians coming together. Can any degree of

national reconciliation germinate in Cambodia's political tangle? First of all, in regard to Cambodia it is never easy to work out who is the prime executive. There is Prince Norodom Sihanouk, a mercurial veteran of thirty years of domestic infighting, alternatively King or non-King (President), who is warm towards any royalist or, indeed, any republican who will endorse his autocratic preferences. Then there is what foreign journalists have nicknamed the Terrible Trio in the capital, Phnom Penh—Sihanouk's son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Hun Sen, a battle-scarred former Khmer Rouge general, and Sihanouk's half-brother, Prince Norodom Siviruddh. The first two are in office together as co-Prime Ministers. They each spend much of their time manoeuvring and plotting the embarrassment and disadvantage of the other, operating from a fastness protected by armed brigades. They head rival missions of 'peace and national reconciliation' and relay strident appeals for 'unity'. Both parties are prepared to use force to protect their interpretation of the 'law' and 'public security'. The third member of the power clique, Prince Norodom Siviruddh, is a former Cambodian Foreign Minister exiled in November 1995 on a charge of plotting to kill Hun Sen. In March 1998 he was offered amnesty and invited to return provided he agreed to stand trial for political crimes. With such a bewildering political scenario, that is to say with no clear reconciliation at the apex of the governing pyramid, is it realistic to count on much reconciliation further down the structure?

Second, there is the obvious corruption of power-hungry officials and generals who run 'protection rackets', traffic in drugs or sell temple artefacts to the Western world. Their agents roam towns and villages harassing Cambodians hungry for peace and reliable work.

Third, there is the slow-kindling anger of the dispossessed middle class and the rural proletariat, dissatisfied with their share of life's necessities and living hand to mouth in an atmosphere of fear and make-or-break opportunism. They are not easily reconciled nor are they likely to be quiescent for long.

Fourth, there is the shadow of Pol Pot. His death in March 1998 ended years of speculation about his survival; but will the tradition of genocidal fanaticism 'Brother Number One' imbued still encourage guerrillas to come down to the lowland towns and so shatter any chance of setting Cambodia on an even keel?

Finally, there is the determination of the UN to face Cambodians with the need to take on their own reconstruction. Already, this international organisation has spent \$3 billion on trying to build 'peace and pluralism'. The majority of the UNTAC task force was

withdrawn at the end of 1994, leaving a small staff of experts and liaison officers to insist on progress in administrative retooling, relief for displaced people and refugees, together with unambiguous guarantees for human rights. It has worried some UNTAC heads of mission that there were not very many Cambodians in the programme management team. When UNTAC finally 'handed over' where would the successor executives come from? They ought speedily to be recruited and trained.

In many respects the operation to rebuild Cambodia and promote reconciliation among its people may be considered to have flaws. Gareth Evans, Australia's Foreign Minister and one closely associated with the 'Red Book' peace proposal of 1991 (mentioned above), has summarised these inadequacies. He believes that the aims of the mission fell short of achievement on account of slow deployment of personnel, precarious communication between central and local headquarters and, above all, because a 'neutral political environment' was never established. There was a damaging shortage of trained and experienced Cambodians to man the vital sectors of the new bureaucracy. The UN Secretary-General himself acknowledged in 1995 that the Cambodian experience pointed to the need for realistic understanding of political, social and infrastructural conditions *before* any plans for international assistance, by way of 'intervention', could be put into operation.

A recent UNICEF report on Cambodia (1997) graphically highlights what it terms 'the impact of trauma on tradition'. The strong sense of *samaki* (which means something like 'people-in-families caring about and wanting to help others irrespective of who they are') has been replaced by a primitive attitude of 'survivalism' (in other words, 'nobody can be fully trusted—silence keeps you safe—look after yourself at all costs'). The hoped-for social changes implied in the call for 'national reconciliation' can only come about surely if ordinary Cambodians in their thousands and in their own localities have the will to alter circumstances, and the confidence to sustain the process. UNICEF's field workers do not understate the difficulty of bringing about changed attitudes.

They end their Report by saying:

Individual and national trauma have eradicated a sense of control over events. Individual helplessness has borne collective dependence. Dependence has sapped confidence to take advantage of capacity-building, making it difficult even to apply for training to gain more skills. But confidence can be restored if

circumstances are conducive to empowerment. Only the people concerned can empower themselves; but others can contribute by supporting the creation of an environment that makes empowerment possible.

There seems to be a suggestion here, in the case of Cambodia post-conflict, that a return of the 'sense of *samaki*' would powerfully help 10 million Cambodians to move away from a brutalised past towards perspectives that can only take root in a climate of tolerance.

5 Cyprus

Conflict tranquillised

Conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Middle East and Cyprus have several things in common: from time to time each has been described as insoluble and as divided by hate, with the people there impervious to reconciliation. Each is long-standing. All have seen external states and individual would-be mediators working hard to devise solutions and schemes for reconciling adversaries. In the case of Cyprus, the internal conflict appears tranquillised while two neighbours to the conflict situation, Greece and Turkey, apply mounting and dangerous pressures. There is a crisis in the making here, one with international ramifications.

CONTEMPORARY CYPRUS

For nearly two generations the beautiful island of Cyprus, the ‘pearl of the eastern Mediterranean’, has been a place of searing intolerance, conflict and violence. A ‘Green Line’, pock-marked with barbed wire and tank traps, bisects the island, with the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) in the south and centre, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to the north. A UN peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, has maintained patrols and observation posts along that line for thirty-five weary, dangerous years. For those who ‘think Greek’ in language, tradition and culture in the ROC, there are two Cypruses—the one that must be Greek, the other that is Turkish and should be Greek. For the Turkish Cypriots there is their own third of the island that they have held since Turkey invaded in 1974, and the other, beyond the watchline, that treats them with disdain as aliens. Cypriots know all about conflict. Shattered white houses and sun-drenched streets have often witnessed tumult, gunfire and burning barricades as communal hostilities have flared. Today’s tourist visitor may not be aware of the latent conflict. Over the

past five years a slow trickle of tourists has been lured away from the imposing hotel strands of the south to the neglected, forlorn towns and villages of the Turkish north. For the foreigner it is declared to be the perfect retreat from 'the pressures of modern existence'. It is wise, though, for those heading south or going home via Athens not to have passport pages stamped on arrival in Kyrenia or Famagusta. (A throwaway page may be used.) For the few remaining Greeks in the north, the pressures of modern existence are pinpointed by dealing with Turks in banks, garages and supermarkets. Evidence of conflict is everywhere and its roots run deep.

CYPRUS THE COLONY: ORIGINS OF CONFLICT

Turkey captured Cyprus from Venice in 1573 and Turkey's ascendancy lasted until 1878 when Imperial Britain acquired administrative rights in a search for a vantage point in the Levant. This paramount position was confirmed in 1914 on the outbreak of war when the island was annexed from the Ottoman Empire. Nine years later the island became a British Crown Colony. Turkey is a mere forty miles away, Greece 660 miles, yet Hellenic influences run deep and there have always been strong bonds of association with Greece, which had in fact colonised Cyprus in 1400 BC. The strategic importance of this place for Britain had always meant that London regarded 'stability' and 'status quo' as priorities. Any latent hostility between ethnic groups in the island could be contained by gentle policing, in the belief that such responsibility justified a British presence. Ultimately, independence as a republic was conferred by Britain in 1960. How that came about and what its consequences have been makes a most interesting story.

INDEPENDENCE CONFERRED: CONTESTANTS POLARISE

In 1945, Britain, retreating from Palestine and Egypt, thought of Cyprus as a staging and listening post in which they should and would remain. Greek Cypriots had expected the UK to withdraw and not reinforce its holding. Generally, and especially at the UN, the imperial powers of those days were sensitive about colonial matters. A straight challenge to Britain came from Greece on 16 August 1954. Their representative asked the General Assembly to discuss 'the

application under the auspices of the United Nations of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples'. London took this to be an oblique reference to the evident wish of Greek Cypriots to attain a distinctive future for themselves free of dependence on a colonial guardian. Even more ominous in British eyes was the prospect that this might lead to union with Greece, in a union known as *Enosis*. The British response was prompt. They urged that in the light of the UN Charter Article 2 (7), which precludes UN intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states, the matter of Cyprus should never be included on the agenda. Moreover, the status quo in Cyprus and legitimate government by the UK was guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, whereby two other powers, Greece and Turkey, were co-guarantors. Clearly, London was not prepared to cede sovereign responsibility for Cyprus.

In 1955 the UK government decided to make the best of the Cyprus conflict with an ingenious initiative. Tabled for General Assembly debate was a British motion deploring 'Support from Greece for Terrorism'. Whitehall hoped that most other states would accept that the main guarantor power should exercise efforts to eradicate terrorism and restore stability. Nonetheless, the international dimension of the Cyprus conflict was brought into play once more. This time it was the distinction between *self-determination* and *self-government*. In international law and in terms of the UN Charter, self-determination is the right to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. It rests upon freedom of choice exercised by a dependent people. And the wishes of such people must be clearly known. What had been a Greek submission to the UN now gained earnest endorsement from Third World states. A point urged in debate, namely that self-determination should be considered not as an absolute right but as an issue in context, only served to increase the dilemma for the UK. Apart from the strategic importance of the island for Britain, there was the implacable inter-group hostility of its inhabitants. Self-determination would surely lead to partition in Cyprus. Strong government was what was needed—not the merry-go-round of unpredictable assertiveness by minorities. Secession could be a ruinous derivative of permitted self-determination. Self-government was the easier and more sensible option and it ought to be based on communal partnership. After all, it could be underwritten by the guarantor states of the Lausanne Treaty. This course did not reassure the Greek Cypriot fraternity led by their leader of Church and State, Archbishop Makarios. For Makarios self-determination came first to be recognised directly through negotiations between

London and the Cyprus capital of Nicosia. Articulate Turkish elements, on the other hand, would stand for neither the self-determination of the Greek majority nor the patronising governmental powers of Britain and a Governor in Nicosia.

THE ANGUISH OF CO-EXISTENCE

The situation in the towns and villages of Cyprus in the 1960s grew steadily more acrid and tense. There were kidnappings and murderous sorties, and houses were burned to the ground. Resentful Greeks frequently resorted to feuding. Turks felt humiliated and deeply suspicious. Unhelpfully, the participation of Athens and Ankara served merely to augment the role-prominence of Greece and Turkey and their kinsfolk in Cyprus. Cynics in Nicosia were heard to declare that this was a British ploy to demonstrate the insolubility of the Cyprus conflict, since neither the two island disputants nor their mainland patrons were expected to agree, and thus it was best for Britain to stay. More realistically, there was now in the Mediterranean a scenario where the politico-military politics of Britain were ranged alongside two NATO powers, Greece and Turkey, who eyed each other wrathfully over the implications of the Cyprus Problem.

Was, then, the only way out some form of partition? The way forward must be explored and the decade ended in 1959 with conferences in Zurich and London, when draftsmen were instructed to draw up a constitution for an independent republic, the Republic of Cyprus (ROC). Undoubtedly, this was the most and the least that could be done in a situation rapidly drowning in virulent argument and violence. The new constitution of August 1960 seemed reasonable on paper. Three powers, the UK, Greece and Turkey, would guarantee a new republic free of binding political and economic links with mainland Greece and Turkey. The President was to be a Greek Cypriot (Makarios was the obvious candidate) in harness with a Turkish Vice-President. There would be a Council of ten members, seven Greek and three Turkish. Similarly, 70 per cent of the House of Representatives would be Greek-speaking and 30 per cent Turkish-speaking. Self-government would respect the interests of minorities. Britain was still to exercise sovereign control over two military bases in the south of the island. All too soon the delicate balance of these arrangements, so 'fair' on paper, became hostage to fortune in two major respects. In Nicosia a concession towards the Turkish minority allowing them some legislative vetoes led to their hamstringing several Greek-proposed

initiatives. Second, and in the municipalities, the concept of fair sharing was bedevilled by quarrelling over rights and duties and taxes. The notion of proportional representation seemed to most Turkish council delegates a perpetual slap in the face by an institutionalised majority. Perhaps the most doubtful of proposals was one to confer responsibility for law and order on a lightly armed force of British and Cypriot soldiers under a British commander. There was never any chance of this force pacifying any conflict, let alone settling it. From month to month in the early 1960s the conflict between the two ethnic factions deteriorated into unstoppable mayhem. No reinforcement of the existing peacemakers was acceptable to Nicosia. There were approaches to New York in early 1964 to see whether the UN might provide an impartial force to stave off an imminent conflagration. Self-government in the infant republic was now virtually impossible as Turkish participants withdrew. In town and countryside rival parties dug in behind defensive barriers separated by 'no go' areas.

THE UN INTERVENES TO MANAGE CONFLICT

The Cyprus government, faced with unquenchable civil strife, asked the UN for help in January 1964. The response of U.Thant, the UN Secretary-General, was prompt. As soon as possible, a peacekeeping force would be sent to Cyprus.

The UN force was given the acronym UNFICYP. Six thousand soldiers from Ireland, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Britain donned blue berets and, together with 174 civilian police, landed in March 1964. For the first time a peacekeeping force was to include a contingent from one of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council (Britain), for it seemed appropriate to acknowledge the particular interest of the former administering power. The mandate given the force put a complex task in rather simple terms:

In the interests of preserving international peace and security to use their best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.

In retrospect, many years later, it could be said that the UN mandate was vague and ambiguous from the outset. It would certainly have helped greatly if there had been provision for review and possible revision when the mandate was renewed, every three months initially

and then every six months. There are several aspects of this mandate which make it different from that usually given as a remit for peacekeeping.

- There was no explicit link with progress in conflict settlement and no incentives or penalties in regard to negotiation.
- The UN force probably over-relied on the reassuring, restraining image of military peacekeepers who held the ring without being able to effect mediation. They had little experience of and training in the skills of peacemaking.
- The teamwork between military, legal and political advisors was constantly hampered by the unwillingness of Greeks and Turks even to consider experiment and compromise.
- The mandate was interpreted differently by the parties in conflict. For those in the ROC, the UN force was there to bring an end to Turkish insurrection and to help extend the authority of the government over the whole of Cyprus. For the Turks a 'return to normal conditions' implied that UNFICYP should restore, by force if necessary, the inferior status of their minority as provided for under the 1960 constitution. In their eyes no mandate could legitimate any action on the part of Nicosia.

While UNFICYP did not wish to prejudice settlement, the very neutrality of the UN mission meant that there was no solution in sight which either party felt able to accept or even modify. Indeed, the conflict often grew so ugly that the non-threatening character of UN peacekeepers, which might have induced combatants to draw back without using force, only added to local convictions that no interpositional action could remove terror.

As the Cyprus conflict entered the 1970s a number of things became clear. The holistic idea of a unified island people co-existing amicably was thwarted by the reality that only partition would allow collaborative co-existence. Equally obvious was that the 1960 constitution had failed to secure the fair representation of majority and minority. Representation, of course, was only the beginning of restitution and development, since both minority and majority contained disadvantaged and disaffected elements. A New Deal for All was indispensable if any reconciliation was to come about. Particularly worrying to the UN's Security Council were Greek and Turkish attitudes to the Cyprus conflict. Greece suspected Turkey of readiness to mount an invasion of Cyprus. Turkey constantly accused the Makarios government of violating minority rights, of kowtowing

to London (and especially its Ministry of Defence). They declared readiness to intervene to protect their fellow Turks. It seemed reasonable to conclude that peace in Cyprus would come about through some political reconciliation between Athens and Ankara rather than by leaving it to Cypriots to bridge their agonised gulf. A point frustrating the peacemakers was that while the Greek leader, Glavcos Clerides, and the Turkish leader, Raouf Denktash (both lawyers trained in British courts), were in fact on basically affable terms and able to sketch the rudiments of an understanding, there was little prospect of people in towns and on farms and in press rooms reaching the same extent of mutual accommodation. As always in conflict situations there is the disproportion between reason achieved at a distant table and the 'gut feelings' of the vulnerable and fearful. Disarming the conflict proved increasingly impossible since each side was smuggling in arms and trained personnel. After ten years of keeping the watch a time-bomb had not been defused.

INTERVENTION BY THE MAINLAND POWERS

A second stage of the conflict was reached in July 1974, setting alarm bells ringing in European foreign offices. Athens, now governed by a military clique, despatched gunmen to Nicosia to oust a Makarios they viewed as too 'soft'. The President narrowly escaped assassination but was extricated from his palace by British helicopter and then flown to London, and thence to the UN in New York to voice protest. A hardline terrorist, Nicos Sampson, took over the presidential chair. As expected, the Turkish army retaliated by launching a strike with three divisions to occupy a third of Cyprus. The operation, code-named Operation Attila, was proclaimed a Peace Operation. The island was now firmly split into two antagonistic zones, the ROC, recognised by the world community as an autonomous and legitimate government, and the TRNC, recognised by no state other than Turkey. There ensued a swift displacement of people as 200,000 Greek Cypriots (almost one-third of the population of Cyprus) loaded up their belongings for a journey southwards and 40,000 Turkish Cypriots took up a new habitat in the north. Did this now put an end to any hope of conflict settlement through reconciliation and rehabilitation? The UN's original task ten years previously had been to maintain a watch and to take the heat out of destabilising situations. With the military flare-up of 1974, the priority was once more to defuse hostilities, save that this time rivals were separated by barbed wire and minefields. Mutual

hatred was literally entrenched. Even UN units were sometimes fired upon. This raised the question, as it had in Cambodia, whether UN peacekeepers could themselves use force. Nobody could bank on an end to Turkish advance. Once more the Cyprus conflict was acquiring international significance.

A Special Session of the General Assembly and meetings of the Security Council were quick to condemn the Turkish offensive. Sanctions to penalise Ankara were impracticable since this would add to the isolation and disadvantage of the poorer north of Cyprus. A fact skewing the situation was the imbalance between the numerical preponderance of Greek Cypriots and the military effectiveness of their Turkish compatriots (easily reinforced in five minutes' flying time). This relationship was hazardous to any ceasefire, let alone settlement.

In the wake of the 1974 military incursion, the civilians of Cyprus have settled down to everyday living in a divided island. In olive groves and pastures, where they are not crossed by trenches or booby-trapped, the Blue Berets see to secure harvesting and grazing under armed guard. An earlier notion of inching towards reconciliation through cautious groups meeting each other has largely gone into the ground, since the fear of abduction and murder keeps villagers behind shutters, and tradespeople have closed their shops.

Greek Cypriots, welcoming 2 million tourists each year, look balefully northwards to what they term the 'enclave', the pseudo-state of the TRNC. It is a heavily militarised, alien territory with rudimentary industry and unexploited natural resources. Not only were the rightful Greek owners ruthlessly displaced by Turkish Cypriots after 1974, but a steady flow of 85,000 Anatolian settlers has been brought in to expropriate the old Greek villages. This immigrant labour force has been granted Cypriot 'citizenship' by its Turkish sponsors. Only 670 Greeks now remain in the northern enclave, half of them over sixty-five, denied freedom of movement and possession, disorientated, seeing all visible signs of their Greek heritage being systematically eradicated.

For many Greek Cypriots, the Cyprus conflict is not an intercommunal dispute. It is a matter of foreign intervention, continuing occupation and 'ethnic cleansing' (Bosnian style). One in three Cypriots has been displaced (as in Afghanistan).

IDEAS FOR RECONCILIATION

Away from the immediate bared-teeth conflict in Cyprus there have been many earnest, dogged attempts to mediate by UN Secretary-Generals. In

1977, 1979, 1986, 1988, 1989 and 1991 there were moments of hope that an approach to settlement was gaining ground. Generally, the stress was put on getting the disputants to face up to a bi-communal federal structure. Over the period 1990 to 1991 President George Bush used United States persuasion to underpin the appeals of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Compromise there must be, it was said; a continuation of the status quo was no longer a viable option. Cypriot leaders were brought to New York and to Washington, and confronted with the necessity of constitutional unity. A Cyprus federal state must have a single sovereignty and citizenship status, and one customs union. The Nicosia legislature would have two chambers with a Greek-Turkish representation of 50:50 in the upper house and 70:30 in the lower. The Turkish army of occupation must withdraw its 30,000 men and in so doing yield up the 10 per cent of Cyprus they had fortified. As for civilian resettlement, those displaced by Operation Attila would be given the option either of return to their original homes or of applying for compensation. As these negotiations got under way, it was hoped that such proposals might be found workable even if they failed to satisfy the quarrelling parties. In the end, few were surprised that the parleying got nowhere. Withdrawing Turkish troops was for the Greeks a step towards agreement and restitution; Turkish Cypriots saw restitution in a different light if it meant a return to their position of inferiority unguarded by vigilance and strength. Resettlement raised sharp difficulties in respect of sorting out land and property ownership rights. In any case, over two decades or so, many have forsaken farmland and vineyard and made for the security of the town and the tourist fringe. Not all thinking Cypriots view the conflict in exclusive terms. Military investment fails abjectly to solve political problems. Against the considered flaws of a unitary state—discrimination and denial—partition as a protective device is not a constructive way of ordering a means of co-existence. Although more extreme elements fan opposition to accord through press and radio, the more moderate appear inclined to rely on stalemate as a rocky path to better things. Basically, it is neighbours who must be reassured and reconciled. Confidence-building measures have to be contrived.

CONCLUSION: IMPERATIVES FOR PEACE

Time is running out for Cyprus and its conflict. States supplying the UN's peacekeeping complement are growing increasingly tired of the burden. The peacekeepers themselves guarding 110 miles of demarcated territory are loyal to their obligations. They are now pared down in

numbers to 1,180, less than one-third of the number judged necessary to fulfil the mandate. Their presence costs the UN almost \$50 million a year and an accumulated deficit nears \$200 million. What, then, might be done to convince Cypriots that disaster faces them soon if they do not solve their conflict themselves? Should UNFICYP be reduced to a small token force perhaps only of police personnel? Should there be any external, international intervention at all? There is no evidence that 'downsizing' in stages or withdrawal by a defined, final date would have a helpful outcome. One possible result might be a takeover by vigilante groups anxious to settle old scores. Intervention of a sort brought about the first independence constitution of 1960. Independence was shackled by ungovernability. Neither self-government nor self-determination was conferred as we have seen. For all these years Cyprus has seen a weaving of political forces outside and inside, with external power mainly that of Turkey and internal power being held defensively by Greeks.

The Cyprus conflict has broadened out of its post-colonial time of transition into something that the wider world cannot ignore. As the millennium approaches, two linked external issues are likely to make settlement more difficult, and so reconciliation, in its most complete sense, impossible. First, there is the matter of Greece and Turkey wanting to join the European Union (the EU). In late 1988, Greece, then President of the European Community (the EC, the former name of the EU), went so far as to block any closer relationship between Turkey and the EC, something that was dear to Turkish hearts. If Athens were to relent, it would be in exchange for Turkish withdrawal from the TRNC. European membership as a problem came to the fore in 1990 when Cyprus itself decided to try for EU membership. Validation of the Cyprus government application has taken a long time. By late 1998 careful scrutiny by the EU has established Cyprus as a strong candidate which meets economic criteria. However, Brussels has met with an embarrassing dilemma. Is Cyprus one, or is it two? There are those in Greece and Turkey who are hoping that Nicosia's application might prove a catalyst towards partisans coming together in a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Unhappily, the official positions of Turkey and of the TRNC are setting ever harder. Turkey has been sent to the rear of the applicants' queue for EU membership, largely because of its inability to meet the EU's economic criteria and also because of its poor human rights record. A resentful Ankara and implacable anti-Greek hostility in the TRNC have threatened that, if Cyprus presses its EU candidature, then Turkey and its Cypriot threshold will merge into one. This, of course, would torpedo any possible settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

The second external issue was described in 1997 as a 'missile crisis'. Russia supplied Greek Cypriot forces with tanks and armoured troop carriers following the end of the Cold War in 1990. However, since then, Russia has also been keen to sell S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to its Cyprus customers. An alarmed Turkey sent a delegation to Moscow to protest. Washington and London have warned Nicosia of the dangers of adding to regional instability. Contemporary Turkey threatens retaliation if missiles are emplaced provocatively. Turkish army leaders, so it is reported, suspect the Greek Cypriots of using a stalemate in the Cyprus conflict to build up an aggressive potential aimed at those they see as their opponents.

A study of the Cyprus conflict ends with questions for reflection. Has willingness from outside to promote peace inside merely tranquillised the disputants? Has the watch along the Green Line induced complacency, even fatalism? If peacekeeping by those outside a quarrel is largely crisis management, in what respects has the Cyprus conflict been effectively, even rationally, 'managed'? Will outside pressures, political and economic, move contestants towards compromise and a holistic solution? Nicosia, Ankara and Athens are all uncomfortably aware that one-third of Cyprus is so badly organised that its economy relies on money-laundering and copyright piracy. Political realism and concession could bring the benefits of EU funding, economic reconstruction and stability to end conflict.

A possibility arousing discussion in the summer of 1998 was the use of the 'Dayton technique'. In Bosnia measures to bring an end to the conflict were given a kick-start in late 1995 when the three presidents of the warring factions were airlifted to Dayton, Ohio, to be lodged within a US Air Force base until they reached agreement to end their quarrels. One of the initiators of this technique in Bosnia was Richard Holbrooke, an emissary of the US President, who went on to Cyprus in 1998 to conduct intensive negotiations with the backing of the UN and of the US government. In Cyprus and elsewhere is there room for more manoeuvre in conflict settlement and eventual reconciliation if the leading protagonists are detached for a while from their local centre stage?

6 Afghanistan

Descent into turmoil

Conflicts in El Salvador, South Africa and Cyprus have all moved through implacable hatred, fraternal savagery and social chaos. Despair, though, has given place eventually to moments of hope. Outside encouragement, and the slow growth of reason and tolerance within the conflict areas have brought resolution and some stumbling towards reconciliation. Sadly, after twenty years of strife, the conflict in Afghanistan shows no sign of clear resolution and no hope of meaningful reconciliation. This is a conflict turned sour, where the first hopes of peace and social progress were dashed by descent into an unbridgeable gulf between a new coalition government and a religious fundamentalist front. This is a conflict whose worsening is all the more regrettable because negotiated approaches to settlement were being championed by the Superpowers, the US and the USSR, working in harmony at last after decades of Cold War. This was a conflict that major powers and the UN could hope to settle in association. What has happened in Afghanistan constitutes a grim drama for would-be peace-builders.

‘A SMALL UNRULY STATE’

Many people have not been surprised that Afghanistan has erupted into conflict. Its crossroads position on the roof of the world invites contest between neighbours—the Russian republics to the north, China and disputed Kashmir to the east, Pakistan to the south, and Iran in the west. Afghanistan is a land of extremes. Three-quarters of the country is mountainous with peaks reaching 25,000 feet (7600 metres). Passes between the mountains give critical access to fertile valleys and are vigilantly guarded. The day may begin with a freezing dawn and climb to 38° Celsius by noon. Poor land is in the hands of shepherds; good

land is wrangled over by family patriarchs. There is little sense of unity in a country where tribal groups treat others with disdain. They do have one thing in common and that is that 99 per cent are Sunni Muslims. Only one in four is able to read. Afghan poverty has much to do with the sheer difficulty of physical movement in difficult terrain and the use of natural resources allied to a grip by feudal landlords. The smuggler moving along ancient silk routes is more respected and more affluent than the engineer who, after all, may be an 'infidel' Russian or German.

For many years it was fashionable for writers to declare that those who lived in countries beset by geographical extremes were hardy, invincible breeds rarely disposed towards sharing or reconciliation. They were suspicious and hostile towards intruders. Banditry and trouble was their way of life. Conflict was to be expected. Where such people were within the realm of an empire, control could be exercised through maintaining public order through prompt and often decisive action. This is the stuff of film and fiction. Such deterministic views can still be found today in print and discussion. They offer little help in discerning the real roots of conflict in difficult habitats. More helpful is the truism that conflict anywhere costs lives and liberty, and often fans out as a threat to peace and security in a whole region.

THE ORIGINS OF THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT

Afghans are no strangers to intervention across their borders. Since the third century AD they have been invaded by Arabs, Iranians, Turks and Mongols. Czarist Russia and Imperial Britain played out a 'Great Game' of seeking ultimate control of the buffer-land of the Afghans. Britain, in the grip of Russophobia, employed what was termed a 'forward policy' to guard its suzerainty in India. Successive governments in London sought to pacify Afghanistan, either through tentative alliance with dynastic patriarchs or, occasionally, the despatch of punitive expeditionary forces and, in later days, bombing from British aircraft. It was not until 1907 that an Anglo-Russian entente secured some peace for Afghanistan, although the advent of Bolshevism in the Russia of 1917 reintroduced political uncertainties and tension into Central Asia and the routes to the south.

Afghans, too, are accustomed to a wrestling for power in their own homeland and in the capital city of Kabul. It was in the 1930s that shifts in overlordship and demands for allegiance contributed to political confusion. In 1929 the Afghan King Amanullah, who had been educated in the West, launched an ambitious modernisation

programme, thinking that his kingdom should be a trendsetter. Women's emancipation was to the fore. A system of state schooling was put in place. Students were sent to Europe's technical colleges. In the towns there were plans for better housing, for water and sanitation facilities. Predictably, this radical zeal encountered waves of protest from conservatives among landowners and Muslim clerics. It was perhaps some solace for a king ruefully seeing his land rent by internal conflict that the outside world of 1934 acknowledged Afghanistan as a worthy new member of the League of Nations.

Forty years of relative peace were to ensue until bitter feuding among Afghan leaders put an end to the monarchy in 1973. In the wake of the palace coup, one of the close relatives of the veteran King Amanullah set himself up as republican autocrat, and tried rather unsuccessfully to balance both political intrigue in his own land and the increasing political intrusions of East and West at the height of the Cold War. Certainly, the greatest danger for most Afghans appeared to be the strained relations with Pakistan to the south. Neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan were entirely satisfied with the line of frontier between them that snaked across 900 miles (1,400 kilometres) of mountain ridge. From time to time there was sporadic fighting between the two countries. However, Kabul could always enlist the help and sympathy of the international community, for again its peaceful autonomy had been recognised by admission to the UN.

In 1978 another coup occurred, this time with the difference that outside influences were causing a domestic conflict to worsen. An Afghan protégé of the USSR, Hafizullah Amin, dismissed as many conservatives as he could find, and formed in Kabul a Revolutionary Council to initiate a pseudo-Marxist programme of 'scientific socialism'. In its way this reform move was as impulsive as that of the king nearly two generations earlier and once again the response in many quarters was equally dismissive, with the difference this time that armed insurrection with modern quick-firing weapons was just as fierce in the hills as it was in city streets. The regime of Amin lasted barely twelve months. It was the prelude to full-scale conflict in December 1979, as 50,000 Red Army soldiers from the USSR poured into Afghanistan. Moscow promptly installed in Kabul a puppet leader, Barbrak Karmal.

The conflict in Afghanistan had now become an international conflict and crisis. There were worldwide political reverberations and questions. Given that the USSR was understood to be ideologically aggressive, was this a calculated thrust in global strategy—from a heartland to a threshold? Or was it a defensive move shielding the

heartland from a threshold familiar to Moscow as ‘the near abroad’? Encirclement was, after all, known to be a Soviet anxiety, with the USSR bordered by capricious and fundamentalist Iran, and by unreliable forces located between Turkey and China. Although the mission from Moscow was presented as a relief operation following an appeal from Kabul, it is now known from recently-opened Soviet archives that the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was ready to reject such an appeal. Soviet military moves by way of intervention across a sovereign country’s frontier would be castigated at the UN, and play into the hands of a multitude of enemies. And Brezhnev himself, cooling the ardour of Cold War warriors as a Soviet advocate of détente, had a reputation to preserve. On the other hand Soviet intelligence was picking up the message from its agents that Barbrak Karmal and his clique might prove unreliable. There was a risk that the American CIA might intervene. There had to be a Soviet legitimisation for entering the Afghanistan conflict to ‘set things right again’. The Politburo in Moscow now issued an authorisation, namely that the USSR was going to the aid of Afghanistan, ‘a country which was losing its independence and being turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our country’s southern borders’. This rather specious rationale failed to find much of an echo elsewhere. Generally, Third World states remained apprehensive and the Islamic world showed little inclination to support threatened Afghanistan. What would the UN do about it?

As expected, a resolution condemning an ‘unlawful act’ put before the UN Security Council in January 1980, was vetoed by the Soviet Union. A way round this impasse was then found by convening an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly under a contrivance known as the Uniting for Peace Procedure. (This measure, dating back to the Korean crisis of 1950 when the Security Council was deadlocked by a veto, allows the General Assembly itself to call if necessary for the use of force to deal with a situation judged to be endangering world peace.) UN member states, by a majority of five to one, condemned a move which violated a state’s sovereignty, its territorial integrity and its independence. Interestingly, the UN was cautious in regard to the Afghan conflict. The USSR as violator was never named in the Security Council. It was considered that discretionary side-stepping might allow more scope for negotiating an end to a conflict whose origins after all were somewhat complex. Eventually, a General Assembly resolution, on 13 January 1980, called for ‘an immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the *foreign troops* from Afghanistan’.

It was the United States that led anguished condemnation outside the UN. President Jimmy Carter, facing a presidential election campaign, could hardly afford to be either complacent or passive. He had to reckon with anti-Soviet vituperation on one flank, and conjectures elsewhere as to the real motives of the Soviet leaders. Yet again, there were those who harked back to Afghanistan, the land of eternal conflict. The great event of 1980, the Olympic Games, was cold-shouldered regretfully by many nations, following a lead from Washington. Very quickly the US cancelled grain sales to the USSR and put an embargo on the export of 'high-tech' materials. Defence budgets were expanded. To the dismay of the US, however, a number of European states—France, West Germany (as it then was) and Italy—together with Japan, went ahead with bilateral trade talks. Clearly, international response to the conflict in Afghanistan was far from consensual.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

The UN Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar, assumed the role of arch-mediator in 1981. There were signs that the USSR 'wanted out' of a situation that had all the makings of a Soviet Vietnam. They began to look for an approach to conflict resolution that took by stages an arrangement for troop withdrawal, to be followed by guarantees of non-intervention by all parties, and a large-scale rescue operation for the one in five Afghans who were clinging to life as refugees in the remoter hill-provinces. Set in historical terms the conflict settlement would be an innovation where external powers would guarantee Afghanistan's inviolability and security. After twelve months, this role would be discharged in the field by a Latin American Personal Representative, Diego Cordovez. At that point nobody could have foreseen that the peacekeeping enterprise would be an interminable one. What might have been forecast a little more clearly and realistically is that there is no prospect of swift and lasting resolution, and certainly not of combatants' reconciliation, if the void left by departing invaders is filled by a host of ruthless insurgents. The Mujahadeen, the 'Soldiers of God' (they include religious and radical followers), left their hill villages and dug themselves in in the valleys and towns, determined to assert advantage and power. They had been armed during the time of invasion by Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and China. As a counterweight to Communism, they received ample weapon supplies from the United States. The Afghanistan conflict was now acquiring so many players, ironically as another 'Great Game',

that embers were re-igniting and the conflict was to become an international crisis.

A welcome and highly significant breakthrough came in 1985. The permafrost of the Cold War was very slowly beginning to give way to collaboration between former adversaries in East and West. The new, imaginative Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, took up the challenge of facing his own people with the inadvisability, indeed, impossibility of persisting with the 'unfinished business' of the Afghan adventure. There were two lines of advance in his stratagem. First, Afghanistan must acknowledge its loss of tangible support from outside (that is, from all directions). Second, Marxist Kabul would have to cope with deliberate political compromise. In the Soviet view, as Gorbachev secured the agreement of his people, political settlement was a prelude to Red Army withdrawal. This did not appeal to other members of the Security Council—physical disengagement must certainly come first. To the relief of the Council, the old Soviet obduracy at length gave way to assent to withdrawal as a priority, with a careful time-frame for its procedure. In fact, this search for peace became a complex and delicate operation. Political and military dispositions had to be harnessed in an attempt at conflict resolution. An ex-police chief, Mohammed Najibullah, was brought to Kabul to replace the unreliable Marxist, Kamal. It was envisaged that a general election to be supervised by the UN would bring about consolidation of Najibullah's authority and also lend democracy to his regime through putting in place a multi-party coalition. As for the military side of things the UN was to oversee a ceasefire, then supervise 'cantonment' (the assignment of specific areas as staging posts for withdrawing forces). All these points were tentative suggestions aired either through the UN in New York or through liaison officials in Geneva.

Gorbachev's proposals continued to be inventive. First, there was an ethical note sounded in the frank Soviet admission that it had been 'wrong', a 'sin', in fact, to trespass into Afghanistan. Second, if this had been an 'immoral' response on the part of an agitated Great Power, then realistically, future anxieties and tensions could be alleviated by putting in place a background of guarantees from major external powers, in this case the United States and the Soviet Union, guarantees that should safeguard the autonomy of Afghanistan. Third, and as a precursor to definitive political arrangements, there ought to be a general conference convened by the UN to attempt to try to secure a neutral and demilitarised Afghanistan. There is little doubt that Gorbachev regarded the linking of mediation and guarantee as a likely prototype for the resolution of other regional conflicts. When the

'Afghanistan knot' was untied, its loosening would have a far-reaching impact elsewhere. (The following year saw the USSR effectively applying leverage to UN reconciliation efforts in Cambodia.) There was real hope, too, in Moscow and in Washington, that Najibullah could be persuaded to launch a policy of 'national reconciliation'. The design of this policy in 1987 was to feature the release of political prisoners and to put into effect a policy of land reform. Reconciliation in this guise, it will be recalled, had been attempted in El Salvador and in Cambodia. Islam as a religious force would now be given a leading role as an inspirational force partnering the secular impetus of Najibullah's People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

RESOLVING CONFLICT: THE GENEVA PEACE ACCORDS

Representatives of the UN and of the USA and the USSR gathered in Geneva in mid-April 1988 expressing optimism that a solid peaceful settlement to nine years of conflict in Afghanistan could be worked out. There was undoubtedly vision and resolve in linking together resolution and reconciliation, and seeing that process as essentially within the hands of the Afghans themselves. Diego Cordovez from the UN put this cogently when he told the meeting that the objective of a comprehensive settlement implied the broadest support and immediate participation of all segments of the Afghan people, and that 'any questions relating to government in Afghanistan are matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of Afghanistan and can only be decided by the Afghan people...'

The Geneva Accords had four main elements.

- 1 An agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on mutual non-interference and non-intervention.
- 2 The same two signatories were to be responsible for the safe return of refugees—5 million of them.
- 3 A Declaration on International Guarantees, a brief and very clear undertaking on the part, this time, of the USSR and the United States to refrain from any interference and intervention in the internal affairs of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- 4 A so-called Agreement on Interrelationships for Settlement which detailed the steps by which agreement on essential issues had come about in ways that underpinned international law and the

principles of the UN Charter. As a programme for conflict settlement the Geneva Accords clearly recognised the international dimensions of a conflict part-domestic and part-escalated by foreign interference. The security of a whole region had been put in jeopardy and basic human rights and freedoms had been violated. The Geneva settlement did not explicitly load blame on anyone; more positively it provided for measures which, if carefully applied, would enable the inhabitants of a country to reconcile their differences and live in peace.

THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION

Optimistic, and perhaps idealistic, the Geneva Accords may have been, but at least they contained a pragmatic element in a Memorandum of Understanding signed by all the participants. Intervention of a peaceful nature would replace warlike intervention. A UN detachment, the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), would have offices in the two state capitals, Kabul and Islamabad. From May 1988—when the Red Army was to have left—a small group of fifty unarmed officers from ten countries would be deployed to make sure that the Geneva Accords were being fully observed. Of course, this was an indispensable part of returning Afghanistan to independence, but was it not a quite unrealistic mandate? Fifty observers were expected to exercise vigilance as 80,000 Red Army personnel vacated eighteen garrisons. This duty became something of a nightmare as Mujahadeen, resorting to sharpshooting and sabotage, began to pick off any Soviet soldiers they met. Even in town the observers, if they had dodged ambush, had to find shelter from aerial bombing by the Mujahadeen. The political task of UN supervisors grew virtually impossible to handle. In Kabul a precarious Afghan government, tacitly supported by Moscow, never ceased to upbraid Pakistan for its illicit support of the Mujahadeen. In return, Pakistan poured a fusillade of censure on Kabul for interfering in Pakistan. Amid disparagement and violence on this scale, peacekeeping was not feasible and peace-building was a chimera. The UN persistently offered to mediate disputes that flared daily and were constantly rebuffed in the Afghan capital. Especially worrying was the contemptuous unconcern of the government for the array of UN Specialised Agencies frantically trying to meet the relief needs of the 70,000 Afghan refugees now looking for repatriation each week.

PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION

If the Geneva attempt at conflict settlement proved unable in practice to stifle fratricide and abort the supply of fresh funds and weaponry, it is useful to consider the thinking behind the proposed resolution measures. Movement forward into peace would proceed along two tracks: that of disengagement (in a military sense) and that of consolidating a reconstructed society. These twin objectives have been seen as relevant in our other case studies, El Salvador, Cambodia and Cyprus. A coalition of all political elements, including any exiled resistance members, would form the basis of democratic, representative authority. As far as possible these steps towards autonomy would take place within definite timeframes. In the case of Afghanistan there were three distinctive and articulate popular elements which ought to be brought into the political scheme:

- 1 The *Loya Jirga*, the Great Council of adult males delegated traditionally by Afghan tribes to meet and hammer out decisions.
- 2 Islamic *mullahs* or priests, some of them strictly fundamentalist.
- 3 Secular professionals, intellectuals, some Soviet-trained army officers—generally rejecting tribalism.

If these three elements could be welded into an amalgam, it was believed, then past, present and future would have salience and provide a foundation for mutual reconciliation, a process, it was stressed, which could only be effected by the Afghans. The prospect seen in 1990 was, then, reasonably optimistic. Some 10 per cent of Afghans had not survived the war but there were clear grounds for asserting that the ‘bold’ outnumbered the ‘defeatist’. Perhaps prematurely, the UN decided to stand down UNGOMAP, the Good Offices Mission, in 1990. True, there had been very real hindrances to implementing peacekeeping but Kabul was slowly moving forward an ambitious five-year plan for reforms in education, health and welfare.

Optimism dived in 1992, when a heavily armed Mujahadeen force captured Kabul. Despite this setback to hopes of stability, the insurgent regime reluctantly agreed in 1993 to an interim constitution as a prelude to a fresh general election. The following year brought the most dismal of prospects. In Kabul the insurgent president and prime minister split irrevocably. External developments now assumed an angry colour. Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia told a furious Mujahadeen that they would no longer offer any support or resources. Moscow drew back from further involvement. What was the future for

Afghanistan now? Surely not another power void to fracture any possibility of conflict resolution?

CONFLICT RE-IGNITED: RECONCILIATION POSTPONED

Everything in Afghanistan was eclipsed by a power takeover in 1994. A well-mobilised group of Sunni Muslims, the Taliban, were now forming an alternative front to the weak government in Kabul. Enrolled in this group were Muslim priests, secular professionals and soldiers formerly loyal to the Kabul government. They shared a clear utopian fanaticism, and believed that 'the new Islam man will be free of vice and live in a perfect society'. There was a Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice with its own corps of security police who, armed with Kalashnikov automatic rifles, coasted along city streets on the lookout for 'subversives'. In most Muslim societies it is the religious court, the *Sharia*, that metes out what to Westerners may seem harsh punishments to adulterers and thieves. Taliban's militiamen exceeded the religious rigour of the *Sharia* by harassing anyone whose haircut or lack of beard suggested a loose observance of fundamentalist belief. Not only townsfolk feared Taliban zealots. Countrywide, recruiting agents for the cause of superrighteous Islam bullied and bribed their way, and in the divided and fearful state of affairs they soon had two-thirds of the land of Afghanistan under their domination. The rump government in Kabul lapsed into crumbling, corrupt ineffectiveness, and their former backers in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were quick to break off contact.

Taliban's initial success owed much to disciplined self-confidence and self-sufficiency. Such ardour, naturally, despatched all prospects of people living together in a reconciled society. Nonetheless, the Taliban front were missionaries with rather divided allegiances. The soldier needed the priest and the priest needed the soldier. Yet, war-hardened officers competed for privilege and neglected religious worship. Religious leaders resented the secular assertiveness of headstrong generals, and worldly journalists and businessmen. To begin with neither cinema nor TV were to displace the primacy of the spoken word so that radio must beam the religious ethic nationwide. Young men joined the *mullahs* from the *madrassah*, the religious seminary either in Afghanistan or in nearby Pakistan. So far the Taliban movement has been able to disguise and, on occasion, even root out those divisive tendencies which make for internal conflict. In

consequence, and paradoxically, the only unity contemporary Afghanistan knows is the product of intolerance and discrimination.

Finally, two questions seem pressing. What is the likelihood of the Taliban regime being recognised as a legitimate Afghan government? And, in view of the sad collapse of hope of settlement, what are the chances of conflict solution and reconciliation? The two questions must be intertwined. Recognition has much to do with the assurance of stable and responsible administration. Not just Russia (successor to the USSR) is wary of the one rallying identity in Afghanistan, namely the Taliban interpretation of Islam. Reluctantly, Pakistan was the first state in early 1997 to acknowledge Afghanistan's new regime. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates followed. Iran is considering recognition but its people are Shia Muslims and mostly regard Taliban's creed and activities as heretical. The United States allowed Taliban to open an office in New York in March 1997 but that is as far as things have gone. The UN view is that there can be no question of recognising Taliban's legitimacy unless there is a radical curb on its violation of fundamental human rights and a real preparedness to implement the humane principles of the United Nations Charter to which 185 states subscribe. The prospects of reconciliation taking hold in contemporary Afghanistan are particularly bleak in several respects because of the displacement of people, the divide between townfolk and countryfolk, and the discrimination against women:

- Displacement of peoples, more than one in three Afghans, has devastated society. In the confused wake of the 1988 Geneva Accords, almost 6 million people crossed over into Pakistan or Iran, or vanished into remote mountain valleys. From time to time following the Soviet retreat, Afghans felt a surge of optimism and came back by the hundred thousand to ruined villages and pastures lethally strewn with landmines. Almost no Afghan has survived the conflict without having their family shattered, their physical safety imperilled and without their settled future being a matter of agonised doubt. Internal displacement on this scale eclipses anything seen in Cambodia, Cyprus, Bosnia or El Salvador. There, also, refugees were unwilling to return to chaos. And in all these cases no restitution of settled life is possible unless people return to live in harmony.
- Rural-urban contrasts are stark. Villagers, picking up a bare existence, can rally round their clan leaders and pool energies to retrieve some sort of self-sufficiency and communal spirit. Life for them has always been hard, but there is a wealth of natural resources at hand. Those moving back to Kabul and other towns, on the other hand, face life

without homes, schools, clinics, usable roads and drinkable water. After years of control by warlords, Taliban has restored law and order. Life is safer and more predictable. But physical security has been gained at the expense of individual liberty and human rights.

- The women of Afghanistan are those who suffer grievously and whose future is uncertain. Women are forbidden to work, with the exception of female doctors who must have no contact with male patients or colleagues. All women are forced to wear the *burka*, a head-to-toe black garment with a mere slit for eyes. The refugee camps are the only places where a woman may pick up some sort of education. Yet Kabul is reckoned to have 30,000 widows who are often breadwinners and heads of large families. Taliban has insisted that overseas aid be distributed solely through 'male blood relatives'. More than anywhere else in the Muslim world this sexist split is rigorously enforced; it was branded recently as 'despicable gender apartheid' by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

Clearly, in all these respects, those living in Afghanistan will find it hard to reconstitute a way of life that is peaceable and mutually tolerant. It will be particularly difficult for 'returnees' who have met understanding, generosity and wider horizons in countries of refuge. Without foreign contacts and care and enlightenment, is there any way in which Afghans today can move forward out of conflict into reconciled daily living? What help is there for Afghanistan if the rest of the world treats it as a win-or-lose pariah state? There are some glimmers of contact with Taliban. In early 1998 the UN International Drug Control Programme reckoned that the current production of opium poppies in Afghanistan was 25 per cent up on that of the previous year. Most of this was bringing in a \$60 million annual income for 200,000 farmers in provinces controlled by Taliban. Approaches to the Taliban government in Kabul are succeeding in getting the authorities to take special measures to ban the cultivation, sale and use of illegal drugs. There is now a readiness to cooperate with the international community in drug eradication. A useful step in moderating conflict and deprivation would be for Kabul to admit international relief agencies on unconditional terms. Reconciliation measures in a situation as desperate as Afghanistan's will require tolerance and patience and ingenuity from all sides.

7 Israel and the Palestinians

A conflict between two rights

Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs have wrestled in contest for much of the present century. They have fought four major wars. Dogged confrontation, assertive defensiveness, spasmodic violence have marked a win-lose scenario frequently prominent in press headlines and TV screens. Two Titans have clashed over the same tract of territory—neither has had any other place to go. Palestinian Arabs regard Jews, gripped by Zionist faith, as interlopers, predators, expanding their Promised Land deep into the heart of Araby. Jews, mindful of the horror of the Holocaust and intent on devising a state of their own, have displaced Arabs regarding them as terrorists sniping at civilised communities. A fog of partisan rhetoric clouds truths and half-truths. From outside, attempts to mediate either by the UN or by concerned major powers have failed to reduce polarised rivalry. As in other conflicts—in Cyprus, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Northern Ireland, South Africa—there are elements of dispossession, discrimination, ethnic-religious divide. Yet, here in the Middle East, more than anywhere else, we have disputants utterly convinced that each has right on their side. Will a collision which has inflamed the region for two generations spill over into the next millennium? What is it, briefly, that makes this particular conflict so impossible to settle, and dependable, lasting reconciliation so difficult to achieve?

THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT

Jews and Arabs lived together in reasonable harmony for thousands of years. There were traditions of tolerance and harmony in pastures and desert. The modern clash of interests and confrontation with no holds barred is very much the consequence of external influence and interference. During the First World War Britain enlisted aid from both



Map 3 Israel

Arabs and Jews in campaigns against the Ottoman Empire of Turkey, then in command of Palestine, and promises were made to both between 1916 and 1917. Britain would support in Palestine the establishment of a national homeland for Jews who were then increasingly faced in Europe with anti-Semitism and expulsion. This was to be put in hand without prejudicing the civil and religious rights of the Arab majority (some 90 per cent). In 1923 the League of Nations conferred a supervisory mandate upon Britain (that was to last until 1948) to allow it to administer the land of Palestine. Several questions, at this time, however, aroused anxiety among discerning Arabs. Would a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine constitute a separatist state? Would Jews ever consent to equitable co-existence given the fervour of their Zionism, a politico-religious set of beliefs for a Chosen People? Were Arabs to be displaced inexorably by chauvinistic and combative policies? Palestine as a land to be 'transformed' by a crowd of immigrant pioneers dotted here and there in *kibbutzim* (cooperatives) represented a continuity of threat and loss to Palestinian Arabs.

Britain, during the Mandate, tried to balance the interests of the Arab majority and those of the *Yishuv*, the Jewish community. Nevertheless, to many, the policies of the British government appeared inconsistent and contradictory. Britain needed harmony in the Middle East if ocean trade and oil supplies were not to be imperilled. In the cause of stability, the irritant of Zionist demands had to be reduced via restrictions on immigrant numbers and land sales. Arab resentment must be mollified. Either way, pro-Jewish or pro-Arab inclinations in London alarmed the people of the Palestinian mandated territory.

In 1937 Britain's Peel Commission recommended partition, that is to say that there should be distinct Jewish and Arab areas. The inviolability of the Holy Places (sacred to all religions) must be guaranteed and there was to be unimpeded access to Mediterranean harbours. Little was said about the future of any minority living in those designated areas. To effect homogeneity in the enclaves, must populations be transferred? Such a measure would be political dynamite. Apprehension on all sides was not defused in 1939 when a Whitehall White Paper proposed limiting Jewish immigration to 15,000 over the next five years, and thereafter a quota to be agreed with Arab representatives. Compromise on these lines did little to dampen feelings of alienation all round.

By 1947 Britain was anxious to drop the hot potato of the Jewish-Arab conflict. Anxious to relinquish its troublesome mandate, London asked the UN to assume responsibility. One way of

improving the situation might after all be partition with Jewish and Arab entities associated in economic union, and with Jerusalem as an international zone under UN jurisdiction. How, though, could any partition scheme ever bring two very different peoples into balance and association? Since the 1923 mandate, the *Yishuv* had grown from 50,000 to 600,000. In one year alone, in 1935, 62,000 Jews had arrived by sea from Europe (mainly from Nazi Germany). Partition would give these people 54 per cent of Palestine as against their current land holding of 6 per cent. This must further impoverish the subsistence farming of over a million Arabs. Moreover, seven out of ten of Palestine's 5 million people were crowded into towns in uneasy contact with jealous neighbours. Again, how would this population mix be unravelled to separate distinct and satisfied communities? Nowhere in UN circles, and most certainly in Middle Eastern countries, was there much confidence that such an 'unrealistic' device as partition could stave off conflict.

CONFLICT BECOMES 'CATASTROPHE'

Almost predictably the developing crisis in Palestine was thrown into dramatic crisis. World Jewry, traumatised by 5 million Holocaust deaths, was galvanised into setting up a new state in what was called Palestine, but would now be independent Israel. In quasi-biblical terms, those who had suffered so much would be delivered out of exile into a promised Land of Milk and Honey. The British mandatory authority was more and more blamed by Jewish extremists for indolence and uncooperativeness, and by Arabs for passively allowing an onrush of 'foreign' intruders. Fired by the maxim 'Peace through Strength', the Zionist thrust was based on two unequivocal principles: that of reinforcing group solidarity and that of securing exclusive dominance through insisting on the settlement right of any Jew (the Law of Return). In practice, this was soon to lead to wholesale expropriation of Arab lands and the segregation of Arabs in downtown 'residence areas' (the ghetto in ironic reverse). Immigrants were to farm rich alluvial soils and to go into bright new apartment blocks; Palestinian Arabs were directed to scrubland, unreliable water and insanitary shanties in towns. With the proclamation of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948, bitter violence was inevitable. Then, and since, on the lips of every Palestinian Arab, the words *al-Nakba* describe the ruinous sequence of Israeli hegemony and war as a 'catastrophe'. The sequence has proved disastrous for the losers:

- May 1948 (the day after Israel's foundation): five Arab armies (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq) join Palestinian guerrillas. The conflict now has an international dimension. The Arabs lose, the UN contrives a truce. Israel becomes 20 per cent larger, gaining the West Bank of the River Jordan. Some 750,000 Arab refugees are uprooted and trail into the wilderness, many of them to camps hastily erected by the UN. (Fifty years later a number of these people are still there.) Vanquished Arabs, in their resentment and humiliation, now insist that no peace is possible without restitution of sequestered land.
- October–November 1956: the harassment of Palestinian 'freedom fighters' goads Israel into drastic retaliation. (Britain, France and Israel are in dispute with Egypt's leader, President Nasser, over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal.) Swift and decisive tactics enable Israeli forces to seize the Sinai Peninsula from discomfited Egypt. The UN calls a halt to fighting and sends a peacekeeping force, UNEF, to the Canal Zone. Once more, the conflict has an international salience.
- June 1967—the Six Day War: simmering Arab resentment and search for revenge pitch massed legions from Egypt, Jordan and Syria against Israel's 'citizen army'. Victorious Israel takes the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the Jordan's West Bank from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria. Fenced about with useful defensive buffer zones in designated 'Occupied' or 'Administered' Territories, Israel is now four times its size in 1949.
- October 1973—the Yom Kippur War: Egypt and Syria strike on Israel's holy fast day. Israel reels in surprise. Ominously, this conflict occasions a Superpower crisis, with the United States and Soviet forces on high alert. The former is partial to Israel, the latter to the Arabs. Tension is relieved by UN peace-brokering and by the despatch of interpositionary peacekeepers, UNEF II.

The continued savagery in the way this Palestinian conflict was developing led to earnest efforts to bring about its peaceful resolution. The United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, sped back and forth to the Middle East during 1973 and 1974 working out, in 'shuttle diplomacy', consultation schedules for disengagement. Tentative negotiation there and at the UN ultimately brought about a degree of accommodation. Israel's Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and Egypt's President, Anwar as-Sadat, in the presence of US President Jimmy Carter in September 1978 subscribed to what was described as a framework for a Middle East settlement. The crux of the so-called

Camp David Accords, and one to be the most contentious provision, was for Israel gradually to leave the West Bank so that some degree of Palestinian autonomy could be developed there. This and other initiatives were useful steps towards conflict settlement. That they proved elusive was to a great extent the result of two incompatible movements: one an upsurge of Palestinian Arab nationalism and the other a hardening siege mentality among Jews. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was created in May 1964 as an umbrella group by refugees and by professional, student and worker organisations. This protest front was dedicated to mobilising Palestinians to 'recover their usurped homes', in other words, to form a liberation spearhead. A commando force, the *fedayeen*, would employ all possible means of advancing the cause. Ultimately, the PLO was to be led by a charismatic engineer, Yassir Arafat. Thus, already in the 1960s the conflict was acquiring and recruiting implacable adversaries. On both sides there was a measure of dissatisfaction that the Camp David Accords were proving a sedative when decisive therapy was essential. Something else making conflict settlement, and certainly reconciliation, improbable is the ethnic and demographic complexity of people engaged in conflict. Of the population in contemporary Israel, 82 per cent are Jewish. Half of them have been born outside Israel, their parents and grandparents are from 100 different lands speaking eighty-five various languages. They represent a bewildering Foreign Body to the 18 per cent of Palestinian Arabs. Even so, half of the Arabs—a surprising fact—originate from beyond Israel's confines. Reconciliation of attitudes and way of life among such diversity will always prove a Herculean task. Sorely inflaming the attainment of peaceful co-existence is the fact of Arab dispersal, loss of livelihood and exile. These people are to be found in three groups—those inside the pre-1967 boundaries, those living in Occupied Territories (about a million of them) and those at present outside Israel (some 2 million or so).

THE UN AS MEDIATOR

As the voice of international concern over the Middle East the response of the UN has moved through a number of stages. In the 1940s and 1950s the UN was a listener and a debating forum. Rarely were Middle Eastern affairs missing from the agendas of the Security Council and the General Assembly. In the 1960s the UN was busy sending peacekeeping forces to various trouble-spots in the region and

authorising large-scale relief efforts for refugees. There was a good deal of plain speaking in its endorsement in 1974 of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. In the same year the PLO was accorded permanent observer status at New York. As was the case over apartheid, a General Assembly majority found itself approving the legitimacy of an armed 'liberationist' struggle. In 1978, General Assembly members from Arab states declared that the Camp David Accords went nowhere far enough in determining the self-determined future of the Palestinian Arabs. This was a point constantly and vigorously urged by the PLO. Henceforth, at the UN there was to be coordinated campaigning both to brand Israeli discriminatory policies as violating human rights and to sustain a programme of action for the achievement of autonomy for those denied it. In many respects, this campaigning at the UN and by various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) was similar in emphasis and method to that waged on behalf of the victims of South African apartheid.

The UN's dealing with this conflict is a long and complicated story, moving away from the tentative and not very practical partition suggestions of early days to the stern Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 and the General Assembly 'Zionism is Racism' resolution of November 1975. The unambiguous text of this resolution spelled out the obligation of all parties to work for a just and lasting peace, to drop all belligerent claims, to let go territorial acquisition, and settle the refugee problem. Israel must withdraw from lands occupied in the 1967 Six Day War. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in the region, and the need of self-determination for all would-be states must be acknowledged and respected. These were brave words. In practice they lacked resonance since parties in dispute read the text differently and none was satisfied. Interpretation was clouded in view of the parties' imbalance, for one was a wealthy, well-armed state, the other a spirited campaigning force, deficient in influence and resources. Inescapably, the constant reiteration of Land for Peace meant gain for one and loss for the other. For both sides this was an inadmissible way of resolving conflict.

CONFLICT WITHIN CONFLICT

The River Jordan's West Bank is where the conflict remains ugly and unremitting. This, then, is where the conflict one day must be settled. Peopled perhaps for 10,000 years, an area which has Jordan and the Dead Sea to the east, and ancient routeways to north and west was always

likely to change hands as successive invaders, Babylonian, Persian, Greek, Roman, Turk, fought for control. The state of Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950 until Israeli 'liberators' took over in 1967 during the Six Day War. Then began a Time of Trouble. Palestinians living along the West Bank, some 800,000 of them, had been giving refuge to large numbers of refugees fleeing Israeli expansion and eviction elsewhere. When Israel came to take over the West Bank many went on the move again to seek sanctuary in Jordan.

The West Bank is of great symbolic importance to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and its cities and towns—Jericho, Hebron, Nablus, Bethlehem—have many historic and religious sites. Lack of security and of amenities discourages all but the most stalwart of tourists.

In the West Bank today tension is everywhere, most obviously in the explosive discontent of 900,000 Arabs who consider themselves marginalised and disadvantaged. They are furious in discerning the higher living standards of the minority of 90,000 Jews. The conflict is most unrelenting in those areas where Jewish settlements pepper the landscape. These are satellite colonies authorised by the Israeli government in a bid to provide opportunities for its fast-growing rural population. What has irked the Palestinians is that this government policy seems to have been pressed ahead, and particularly by the present government of Netanyahu in clear disregard of the basic rights of non-Jews. There are now at least 100 intrusive settlements, each impressively resourced and carefully guarded. Youth is in the vanguard of protest, as it was in apartheid South Africa. Young people are more angry and prone to violent outbursts than their parents. Half of the West Bank population is under the age of fifteen. Two out of three of these are jobless, 70 per cent of them drop out of school, 50 per cent of them rely on welfare for income. Their helplessness and despair swelled after December 1987 into the defiance of the *intifadah* (uprising), when a watching world saw youths pelting the Israeli Defence Force with rocks and petrol bombs. Israeli response was in the shape of tear gas and rubber bullets, and there were numerous casualties on both sides. Conflict wrapped the whole community in a web of measures to bring about order—closures of schools and factories, road blocks, house search and eviction, the cutting off of gas and water supplies. Palestinian mayors were dismissed. Curfews were imposed.

Conflict and crisis in the West Bank dismayed liberals among Jews and non-Jews. It spurred a whole range of exploratory enquiries and discussions, some of them in various Middle East quarters but others in Washington, New York, London, Geneva. Very confidentially and out

of the public eye representatives of the disputing parties compared notes and advanced suggestions. What guarantees might be offered to offset turbulence? Which were the overriding priorities—autonomy for Palestinians, security schemes for Jew and non-Jew, land claims and settlement, refugee return, reduction of terrorism, possession of natural resources and access to them, definition of legislative and administrative responsibilities? Above all, there was the critical question: supposing we do at length agree on the guarantees and concessions, to whom do we present these for discussion, agreement and ratification? Apart from election procedures would there be a need for referendums? In what ways might the encrusted shape of fifty years' conflict be removed? And what place could profitably be given to neutral assessors, to mediators, to representatives of the UN or of other states willing to help? Where might this 'peace process' be lodged to enable delegates to meet easily?

Interestingly, the hardest scrutiny and dealing, the widest consultation, was carried through in places other than the actual zone of conflict. In October 1991 there gathered around a table in Madrid envoys from Israel and the Palestinians, together with delegates from the United States, the USSR, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Recommendations went back to the conflict rivals for lengthy examination. Over the next eighteen months further secretive discussions ensued between principals housed in a Norwegian hotel and given *carte blanche* to look as widely as possible for possible ways of terminating conflict. The results of this meeting of minds saw light as a plan in the guise of Oslo Principles. They were further elaborated as a Declaration of Principles in Washington in September 1993 and again refined as the Gaza-Jericho Accords, to be ceremonially signed in Cairo in May 1994. It was becoming clear to all that approaches to settling this most intractable of conflicts might be secured from places where the air was clearer, and the mood more objective and rational. Before they went to Cairo, the PLO leader, Yassir Arafat, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, had agreed on a transitional scheme of limited self-rule for the West Bank's major city, Jericho. This would last five years pending definition of what was termed the 'final status' of West Bank autonomy. A breakthrough of this magnitude heartened the world. At last there was mutuality of concern, understanding about security, and rational plans for a greater degree of self-determination for people who had been treated badly. Moreover, on the Arab side there was now honest acknowledgement of the political, social and economic problems that troubled Israel. Both Rabin and Arafat were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. Tragically, Rabin was

assassinated in his homeland the following year. There were people who were not disposed to walk the way of moderation and amity.

The West Bank today is an uncertain and confused place. Further extension of Israeli settlements or a bomb thrown by the Palestinian extremist group, Hamas, are likely to tip the balance between smouldering hostility and bloodshed. People are deeply divided. Israelis there are subject to Israeli law and authority just as if they were living beyond the Jordan. Palestinian Arabs are not citizens of Israel—as ‘other persons’ they may well have Jordanian identity or even be stateless, as are the 100,000 still in refugee camps. The agreement of 1994 splits the West Bank into two diverse areas giving the Jericho area five years of self-rule under a Palestinian National Authority and the rest of the region to control by Israel. Arafat’s regime has been allowed control of tax, health, social services, education and tourism; to their continual irritation, responsibility for general security and movement is that of the Israeli Defence Force. From the beginning of 1997 the town of Hebron has been permitted a degree of Palestinian self-administration. Generally, there is an atmosphere of hardly concealed hostility and disbelief that divided administration can do anything other than perpetuate division. Disunity erodes economic confidence and progress and, apart from the accusations of corruption and mismanagement levelled at the PLO, there is the fact, according to an IMF survey of March 1997, that unemployment in the West Bank has doubled in five years.

In matter of fact terms there is little optimism in the West Bank as to the outcome of a festering conflict. Even the progress planned in 1994 has deteriorated into stalemate and ambiguity. Under the Oslo Principles, Palestinians should have exercised control of 90 per cent of the West Bank by mid-1998 without further Israeli overseeing of security control and movement. The Netanyahu Government, clearly constrained by Right Wing lobbying and religious orthodoxy in the Israeli Knesset, has laid a claim to half of the Occupied Territories which would give Israel a deep north-south buffer zone against any Arab attack from countries further east. This would reduce the West Bank’s autonomous zone by some 70 per cent. A further impasse was reached in January 1998 when, in negotiations between the Israeli government and the PLO, the question of withdrawal from the West Bank by Israel’s security force was raised. Arafat insisted on a withdrawal of 30 per cent but the Prime Minister was adamant that 9.5 per cent was all that could possibly be conceded. This state of affairs and a general atmosphere of malaise and evasion have for many months led to despair at the UN and among other negotiators. There is a real

possibility according to the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, returning in 1998 from another abortive conference in Tel Aviv, that nobody will be prepared to endure the see-saw of a 'phoney process'.

PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION

Those who were defeated in conflict in 1948 will not be winners in the year 2000. Those who were the victors of 1948, 1967 and 1973 have not earned peace or security or undisputed recognition. The indispensable prelude to reconciliation is understanding the position and problems of others—this mutuality is still far over the horizon. Four issues especially are presented in incompatible terms. Briefly, they are as follows.

Autonomy

Largely understood as self-government, this principle has pulled contestants in different directions. A definition from the PLO in November 1991 still stands, namely that Palestinians require 'meaningful control over decisions affecting their lives and fate'. The Israelis' position, notably in the time of Begin and Netanyahu, is to concede as little independence of status and action as is possible in the light of their concern to bolster their own sovereignty and fend off any explicit threat. Palestinians require the legitimacy of their own proto-state to be acknowledged internationally, and specifically they demand full legislative authority rather than the mere administrative authority which Israel would prefer to grant. There have been times when the conflict might have soared out of control as a result of a unilateral declaration of statehood by Arafat. At one point, in April 1998, Netanyahu hinted at a press conference that he had a contingency plan to deal with such an event. Israel forthwith would reoccupy those rural areas in the West Bank which ought to have been handed over ultimately to Palestinian self-rule. Arafat in response implied that such a move would turn a mainly domestic conflict into an international one for Palestinian statehood and its denial concerned 'an Arab land [and an] international issue'. It is just possible that continued advocacy from 'outside' may assist those who quarrel over legitimacy to understand by way of compromise its possibilities and some of its limitations. A self-governing authority is established within negotiated limits—the Palestinians would scarcely be allowed to become a fully independent state. Is one possibility that of a bi-

communal federation, perhaps backed by other guarantor states (on the lines of what was suggested for Cyprus)?

Land and water

Conflict in the Middle East has frequently raged over possession of cultivable land and access to reliable water supplies. Palestinians will never accept relegation to some type of Bantustan homeland or 'reserve', as was the fate of many blacks in apartheid South Africa. For them the essence of Land for Peace is an unimpeded and unqualified right of return to lands seized and developed by non-Arabs. Above all, thousands of their kinsfolk languishing in refugee camps must be allowed to come back. As we have already seen, majority opinion in Israel has opposed comprehensive resettlement schemes for non-Jews believing that this denotes surrender. Unless rational solutions can be contrived, the nature and scale of this aspect of the conflict means less land for Palestinians and less peace for Israel. Realistic views in both camps acknowledge that Israel's lack of natural resources for a large population must inevitably entail peaceful collaboration in promoting large-scale economic development, where regional planning and foreign assistance will be crucial.

Security

Understandably the disputants interpret this term in very different ways. While there may be some agreement as to the nature of a threat from external attack (and this is very much an Israeli preoccupation surrounded as they are by other Arab states) there is little consensus about dealing with 'terrorism' and crime. Israel has had to stave off disruptive incidents which are sometimes spontaneous, on other occasions orchestrated. There has been a grievous loss of civilian life and damage to property. Palestinians see the situation differently: while they are regretful about casualties among others, they regard it as the painful consequence of their fighting for their rights to exist as a free people. Palestinian Arabs have very much less military 'hardware' and fewer soldiers in uniform. Their chief anxiety could be materially reduced if Israel would scale down and finally remove the penetration of its colonial settlements, something that was tentatively agreed at the conferences in 1993 and 1994. Most certainly, as an approach to conflict solution there will have to be renewed examination of the

means of peace promotion and people protection. Israel is still carrying an enormously costly defence budget approaching \$1.5 billion a year.

Economic redevelopment

This would seem to be indispensable to resolving conflict, as our other case studies have shown. Israel now needs freedom from the tight blockades that the Arab world has from time to time imposed; Palestinians suffer intolerably because of inadequate job opportunities, material shortages, lack of outside investment. By way of starting to patch things together there will have to be comprehensive reinvigoration programmes for the whole region and these will require extensive international management advice and funding.

Finally, there is the question—does peacemaking in this conflict need a broker? Apart from government representatives, it is said that Jew and non-Jew meet only in hospital or in prison. Perhaps it will be a facilitator from somewhere like the UN, or a Contact Group from concerned powers, or something like the Contadora over El Salvador who can help Israelis and Palestinian Arabs give up their absolutist myths, their notion of revenge, their selfishness about possession and dispossession, their exclusive interpretation of ‘security’. In order for reconciliation to inch forwards, those ranged in dispute will have to be assisted in the ‘unlearning’ of two generations of mistrust and hatred.

8 Northern Ireland

Reconciliation delayed

It is sometimes asserted that those taking opposing sides in a conflict are prisoners of their dreams. Attitudes and behaviour are consequent on fantasising the past, following a range of perspectives in the present, and visualising expectations of the future. All the conflicts surveyed so far have demonstrated the unhappy readiness of people in many places to think and act within the narrowest of bounds. Whether in Cyprus, South Africa, Israel or Bosnia, circumscribed attitudes render conflict resolution difficult and general reconciliation unpredictable. In Cambodia and Afghanistan reconciliation among the population at large seems almost nil, despite painstaking efforts in many directions. This chapter, looking at conflict in Northern Ireland, will again have to meet head-on assertions about fantasy, irrationality, and consequently the impossibility of finding a lasting settlement. This conflict is one with deep divides and a measure of external intervention. Once more, the question can be heard—why don't we leave them to it? Both sides, we are told, are 'as bad as one another'.

THE LAND OF TROUBLES: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

'The trouble with the Irish is the English', is a traditional Irish refrain shared more often by Catholics in the southern Republic of Ireland than in Northern Ireland. The English connection through history has brought them harsh oppression, tumult and tragedy, high-handedness from absentee landowners, detached and apathetic government from Westminster. Seven hundred years ago Anglo-Norman overlords forced the barbarous Irish tribes beyond the confines of their defended 'Pale'. Four hundred years ago Tudor monarchs exported rapacious nobility to Ireland once more to grab land. Three hundred years ago Northern Ireland was a battleground for the followers of William of

Orange to establish Protestant dominance over Catholics, loyal to James II in England and very likely disloyal enough to favour Louis XIV of France. Two hundred years ago the English were intent on penalising the Irish for being influenced by the seductive egalitarian ideas of revolutionary France. Throwing off the yoke of a Hanoverian king and his Protestantism in the name of equality and liberty would invite remorseless retribution. There was a brighter moment in 1800 when the English Liberal Prime Minister, William Pitt, put on the statute book an Act of Unity uniting England, Scotland and Ireland, and granting 100 House of Commons seats to Irishmen—Protestant Irishmen. Catholics had to await any degree of emancipation for another twenty-nine years. Where now was the reputed British belief in democracy and liberalisation? Was the concept of ‘British’ a euphemism for the hypocritical and untrustworthy English? Victorian times did nothing to satisfy resentments in Dublin and the association between London and their dependency in Northern Ireland grew stronger. In 1886, W.E. Gladstone, the veteran Liberal at Westminster, campaigned eloquently and passionately for Home Rule to placate the troubled Irish.

Hostile Tories and the suspicious Unionists of Northern Ireland would have nothing to do with this proposed breaking of imperial bonds. Home Rule would turn out to be Rome Rule. Buoyed by the message to them from Winston Churchill’s father, Lord Randolph Churchill, that ‘Ulster will fight, Ulster will be right’, they made preparations for manning defences against Catholics in north and south.

The First World War brought trouble in Ireland to breaking point. By 1915, among Catholics there was fury at the injustice and anomalies in English and Protestant ascendancy. Rifles were smuggled in from Europe, and German sympathies for Irish dissolution were evident. In the United States powerful Irish lobbies in New York and Boston voiced loud concern and this was amplified in the influential Hearst press. In Dublin, with its underground links to Belfast, Irishmen planned to cut moorings from London and to expel the English. There was an angry alliance of idealists within the Sinn Fein nationalist movement seeking a Celtic Revival and of armed men mustering determined forces. English excesses in the past, English prevarication against Ireland’s contemporary demands, and the prospects of English curbs on future progress were not so much dreams as motivating forces pushing the Irish towards complete independence.

Against gathering clouds of conflict, part-religious, part-political, there were firm constitutional gains for Ireland. In 1920 the

Government of Ireland Act conferred self-government on Dublin. Two years later the Irish Free State was born in Dublin, made up of twenty-six Irish counties. At the same time, Ulster was given six counties and a frontier drawn up between the two Irelands. Constitutionally this may have suited the English. For the Irish there were the beginnings of conflict here, with the south rejecting partition, hoping for eventual unification of the entire island, and with Ulster absolutely determined never to permit unification. For many hardened Protestants it was the 'no Popery' of their forebears again. A conflict of intention and will was inevitable. It was to be a conflict with deep historical roots.

THE ULSTER DIVIDE

The civil conflict in Northern Ireland reveals three components—a battle for civic rights, that is, socio-economic rights, a nationalistic North-South contest and a politico-military struggle mainly between extremists on the political flanks. These elements are interdependent, relating political controversies to the gulf between an oligarchy and a disadvantaged minority. There is a polarisation of religious affiliation in this conflict, which has made consensus difficult to achieve. There are strident voices in Ulster and vigorous, often bloody, action. Most conflicts have political leaders, their profiles highlighted by the media, their personalities often demonised. In Northern Ireland there is no Mandela to bring discordant elements together in another rainbow nation.

In Ulster the divide reveals most Protestants supporting Unionist or Loyalist parties—the Ulster Unionist, the Official Unionist, the Democratic Unionist. At the time of the April Agreement of 1998 David Trimble was the Unionist spokesman. (Dr Ian Paisley, a maverick to the hilt, headed his own creation, the Democratic Unionists.) These people play the 'Orange Card' of attachment to Great Britain. Two-thirds of their men belong to the fraternal, uncompromising Orange Order. Nine out of ten members of Ulster's own security force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) are Protestant. Overall, Unionists feel themselves hemmed in politically and geographically. Catholics, in the main, are loyal either to Sinn Fein, whose President is Gerry Adams, or to the Socialist and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) where John Hume has been active for twenty-five years. There is a small Alliance Party. Some idea of the proportionate representation of these parties may be roughly estimated from the voting patterns in the 1993 local council elections, which

gained Unionist parties almost 50 per cent of the votes, the SDLP 25 per cent, Sinn Fein 15 per cent, the Alliance Party 6 per cent and other groups 8 per cent. This chapter will eventually outline the acrid infighting between these political factions. Many Catholics, terming themselves Nationalists or Republicans, are wedded to the ideal of a united Ireland, and they see the Unionists as Disunionists and the Loyalists as Disloyalists. Threaded through the political stance of the Catholic protest are symbols of sacrifice, of martyrdom, of a 'colonial freedom' movement against imperial subjection. Slowly this protest is widening from the rather self-centred Sinn Fein recruiting slogan 'Our Day Will Come' to the general appeal 'Give Peace a Chance'.

Northern Ireland's other divide is its socio-economic diversity. Social contrasts are now less marked than they were when industry and commerce were booming and affluence and poverty co-existed uncomfortably. Protestant and Catholic now share unemployment (Europe's worst) and reliance upon welfare. Much of this is the result of industrial transition similar to that experienced in the rest of Britain, where heavy industry, shipbuilding, steel forging and linen industries have declined sharply since 1960. Redevelopment and retraining began to bring back prosperity until the street fighting in Belfast and Londonderry after 1969 put an end to much industrial relocation and investment. Again, it was the Catholic workers who suffered most. With peace restored, it will take enormous efforts to reinvigorate industry and to introduce equitable practices in employment and training. With assistance very likely from the European Commission's structural funds for regional development, Ulster may be helped to move out of divided backwardness to be 'repositioned' in a European context rather than its present insular dependence on mainland Britain. Even so, the test of progress and the possibility of reconciliation for ordinary people in Northern Ireland will be the provision of fairer shares and fairer chances. Gerry Adams, in August 1997, put this squarely to a Sinn Fein meeting in Belfast: 'A settlement where the poor remain poor and the dispossessed remain dispossessed would not be a real change of lives. A cobbled-together political settlement and an end to killings are not enough...'

THIRTY YEARS OF STRIFE

Contemporary Ulster has to look back over three decades of bloodshed. Mainly since 1969 Northern Ireland has been convulsed by sectarian violence as rival groups have taken arms against each other and against the British army which has been endeavouring to maintain the peace. In

that time the casualties and damage have been horrendous, with 3,500 civilians dead, 30,000 injured and a loss to property totalling many millions of pounds. In a province with only 1.6 million people this is a toll that touches nearly everybody in some fashion. Northern Ireland's police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) has had 300 officers killed and over 9,000 wounded. Mainland Britain has tried to staunch the flow of dissolution, at times deploying 20,000 soldiers together with 8,000 armed police, all at a cost of £3 billion a year. Thirty years of carnage have prompted emotional responses in the rest of Britain, which span everything from outrage to scapegoating and, at times, feelings of utter inability to do anything in terms of pacification and conflict solution.

Armed confrontation has brought groups termed 'paramilitaries' face to face. The Nationalist (Catholic) vanguard is led by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and three other splinter groups. Unionist (Protestant) forces, calling themselves Loyalists, are the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and again three splinter groups. Altogether, there is an impressive armoury of thousands of rifles, home-made machine-guns and grenade throwers, anti-tank weapons, and a great deal of Semtex and other explosives.

The IRA has acquired notoriety as an agent of destruction. Founded in 1919 as a commando unit against British rule in Ireland, the organisation split three years later with the proclamation of the Irish Free State. The majority of these 'Freedom Fighters' rejected the new state, the minority accepted it with regret. With detachments of British soldiers Whitehall now had to fend off an armed band of insurrectionists who were to be outlawed in 1931 and again in 1935. During the Second World War there were even those in IRA brigades who regarded themselves akin to the French Resistance movement, fighting an army of occupation in the same way. Otherwise, the conflict in Ireland was low-key.

It was in the 1960s that the mood of many Irishmen changed. They became interested in United States protest movements, particularly those connected with the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War. The thrust of their demands had to do with a better deal for Catholics in regard to local government reform and improved housing. As their agitation brought little response both from the Protestant majorities on local councils and from Whitehall, a largely peaceful demonstration by the working class turned sourly into a popular uprising. In Belfast and Londonderry (Derry) barricades went up and angry words gave way to priming of weapons and the making of petrol bombs. By 1969 there were running battles in the streets, a

curfew had been imposed and arrests were widespread. The IRA was now on a war footing, though somewhat split between an extreme element, the Provisional IRA (Provos) forming assassination and punishment squads to deal with Loyalist opponents, and a more moderate Official IRA, prepared, so they said, to substitute talk for bullets.

The 1970s brought wavering fortunes for all sides. There was little prospect of any negotiation in a situation now aflame with destruction and death. British use of internment after the rounding up of suspected 'terrorists' merely served as a recruiting office for the IRA. Closing down the Belfast parliament at Stormont in 1972 and the imposition of Direct Rule from London of course angered Nationalists, who saw themselves condemned to live in a British fiefdom, and it also distressed those Unionists who championed the right to substantial self-determination within the orbit of a protective Great Britain. Direct Rule was reimposed in 1974. Violence soared and atrocities were committed by all sides. The English press, reporting outrage after outrage, soon voiced the questions: how can Britain deal with street guerrillas who appear to know what they are against but have little notion of what they are for? How far is it possible to dethrone the martyr-image? Apart from the confrontations with rifle and bomb there was the more political tactic of detainees who resorted to a hunger strike. How was Britain to deal with that?

The Northern Ireland conflict was beginning to enter a different phase as the 1980s brought bombing and murder to places in the Republic of Ireland and to the British mainland. Although the IRA and the Loyalist paramilitaries vilified each other and there was much wringing of hands in British government circles, there now began a series of covert probing by all sides as to the tentative possibilities of settling the conflict. Quite clearly, contestants, the protesters and the security forces, had underestimated the determination of others to keep the action going, and had overestimated the extent to which they could wear them down. The only rational way out of this was to initiate a peace process. Sinn Fein made clear that they distanced themselves from the violent tactics of the IRA.

Inching forwards, through enquiry and discussion, towards a prospect of peace received frequent hammer blows when town centres were blasted by high explosives and gunmen wreaked havoc. Attempts to bring about an unconditional ceasefire succeeded finally in 1994, only to be aborted two years later when London's prestigious business centre at Canary Wharf and the heart of Manchester suffered immense bomb damage. The British government now made the bottom line of its

negotiating position quite clear: no talk without unequivocal repudiation of all violence. Only then would Sinn Fein be allowed a place at the table. Terrorism would never win anything. In South Africa and in the Middle East the ANC and the PLO had been permitted to engage in resolution discussion only when they had agreed to relinquish strategies of violence. As a first step to Northern Ireland's demilitarisation all weapons must be 'decommissioned'. A special commission to devise ways of doing this was to be set up under the chairmanship of Senator George Mitchell from the United States. These moves did not find favour with Sinn Fein. Their simple retort was: remove the circumstances which lead men to resort to arms and the arms will then be laid down. In 1997 there seemed to be an impasse. Decommissioning must be implemented before peace talks began; no decommissioning would be started before peace talks were under way. In autumn 1997 good sense prevailed with the IRA militarists agreeing with their political allies in Sinn Fein that the issue of decommissioning and an end to violence should not block the beginnings of real conflict settlement. 'Speedy demilitarisation of the entire [Northern Ireland] situation' was their demand.

Efforts to design a peace process acceptable to all participants at last brought diminished violence and in April 1998 a peace agreement. There were times in 1997 and 1998 when the very real concessions made by the Nationalists were in danger of being derailed by Unionist disaffection and by the resentful opportunism of their extremists. Would a peace agreement be a sell-out? Would that be surrender? No conflict of interests should be resolved through selling short the basic rights of a majority.

Unionists, perhaps in the throes of an identity crisis, continue to assert freedom to march in celebration of the Battle of the Boyne, a victory 300 years ago which had confirmed their possession of part of Ireland. Unfortunately, and relevant to this conflict, this victory was to tread upon the rights of Catholics and establish a rigid Protestant hegemony. When Protestants march past Catholic housing estates in Belfast or Londonderry, the demonstration is seen not as a Civil Rights exercise (a Unionist claim) but as an assertion of the freedom to antagonise and intimidate others. In 1998 Westminster set up a Parades Commission to scrutinise Unionist applications for march approval. Some sensitive marches would almost certainly be disallowed. After thirty years of strife and in the interests of a full peace process many people ask: should sectarian demonstrations of this kind be done away with? Despite controversy over marches a fragile peace has now been fashioned.

THE FASHIONING OF PEACE

Out of the thirty years of bloody conflict in Northern Ireland twenty-five have been devoted to putting together workable machinery for conflict solution and future reconciliation. In general, the options for peace have been these: (1) a united Ireland and British withdrawal; (2) a completely independent Ulster; (3) redrawing the borderline between northern and southern Ireland; (4) Direct Rule from London; (5) a scheme for joint sovereignty, devolution and power sharing. The shape of resolution agreements that have been searched for, drafted, rejected and partially or fully accepted may be summarised as follows:

- 1973: the Heath government's Sunningdale Conference proposes a Northern Ireland Assembly, elected by proportional representation, as a power-sharing executive together with a Council of Ireland with Dublin and London delegates. Most Unionists dismiss this. A general strike and the reintroduction of Direct Rule collapse all negotiations.
- 1980: the Thatcher government prefers 'rolling devolution' to build an all-party assembly of seventy-eight members. After four years of this experiment Nationalist and Unionist acrimony capsize the initiative.
- 1984: the New Ireland Forum of Nationalists from the Republic and from the North table three suggestions—joint sovereignty for North and South within a united Ireland, or a federal or confederal state allowing the North some self-government, or a united Ireland with special protection for a Protestant minority. Most Unionists reject this as anathema, and London is unenthusiastic.
- 1989: the Anglo-Irish Agreement is a fresh attempt to plan for joint sovereignty between Dublin and London, especially on security issues. Early Nationalist interest is soon dispelled by Unionist fury at the prospect of Dublin's 'interference'.
- 1993: the Anglo-Irish Joint Declaration based on SDLP-Sinn Fein talks and Dublin-London diplomacy. London agrees, 'that it is for the people of Northern Ireland, alone, by agreement between North and South to exercise the right of self-determination to bring about a united Ireland if that is what they freely wish'.
- 1994: in August the IRA proclaims an unconditional ceasefire in return for peace talks; in October the Loyalists do the same.
- 1995: Prime Ministers Major in London and Bruton in Dublin table Framework for Peace negotiations. These involve a right to self-determination and widened autonomy for Northern Ireland. A cross-

border assembly is to represent the North and the Republic. The Republic is to pledge to relinquish claims on Northern Ireland (Articles 2 and 3 of the Republic's constitution) and to guarantee allowing the people of the North to choose whether they wish to stay within Great Britain or go over to the Republic. The North is to be disarmed and British troops are to be withdrawn.

- 1996: a twin-track approach—intensive exploratory talks between London and Dublin. An independent body, the Mitchell Commission, reports after two years' work looking especially at arms decommissioning. Mitchell recommends: six principles for peace talks to cover total disarmament and an end to violence; decommissioning itself to go in tandem with peace talks; disarmament to be monitored and verified by a non-governmental body. Talks participants are to agree to abide by the outcome of all-party deliberations.
- 1997: Sinn Fein meets the British government officially and for the first time in Belfast and Downing Street. (Tony Blair's Labour government is widely reckoned to have more flexibility in negotiation, being less dependent on Ulster Unionist votes at Westminster.) Negotiating targets include: comprehensive conflict settlement by Easter 1998; a referendum in Northern Ireland for May; elections to a new Northern Ireland assembly in June 1998.
- 1998: final consensus reached on 10 April. The April Agreement has three strands: a democratically elected assembly with executive and legislative authority protecting the rights and interests of all; a North-South Ministerial Council for consultation, cooperation and action on matters of mutual interest; a British-Irish Council representing Belfast, Edinburgh and Cardiff. Human Rights are to be protected through a possible Bill of Rights. Arms are to be decommissioned within two years. Provision is to be made for improved security liaison and for prisoner release.

Throughout Great Britain the settlement of April 1998 was greeted with immense relief. Was the conflict of thirty years now brought to an end? Aside from understandable hyperbole there remained areas of concern and controversy. As in all moves towards conflict settlement, it is difficult for negotiating participants to encourage their followers to accept the compromises and concessions they feel bound to make. In South Africa and Israel, for instance, the ANC and the PLO exerted time-intensive efforts in the task of 'reorientating' those who previously had held to 'non-negotiable' positions. In the case of Northern Ireland there was the question of reconciliation, first of all,

in political terms. Would Unionists in general ever believe that the new Councils would adequately protect what they must still regard as their distinctive identity and their specific interests? Among party leaders around negotiating tables concessions could be offered and the theory of 'pluralist devolution' accepted, but what would this mean for Northern Ireland's Catholics and Protestants segregated in schools and housing estates? The April Agreement, it was said, was designed to address the facts of history and geography—those of long feuding between North and South, and between East and West, where Ireland and England had wrangled in indeterminate fashion for many decades. Yet the Irish, prisoners of the past and the present, had never really been consulted about their future. What would happen if the May referendum brought rejection of the April Agreement? While some Unionists campaigned vigorously for a 'No Vote' the tide appeared in the last few days to be settling for clear acceptance. The words ending the Mitchell Report of January 1996 were given wide press publicity: All sides should forget their 'vast inventories of historical recrimination'. What was needed now was 'a decommissioning of mind-sets'. There was a powerful desire for peace, 'that desire which creates the present opportunity'.

The date of 22 May 1998 brought decisive endorsement of the tabled plan for conflict resolution. There was an 81 per cent turnout of voters in the North, and a majority of 71 per cent accepted the April Agreement. At the same time a referendum held in the Republic of Ireland, with a turnout of 55 per cent, agreed by a majority of 95 per cent to the ending of those troublesome articles in their constitution which called for unification of North and South. The referendum results appeared to be clear evidence of a general longing for peace. There were Catholics who saw in Easter a significance other than a religious one. Easter 1916 had seen the *insurrection* that paved the way for a new southern Ireland; Easter 1998 must be a time for *resurrection* and the emergence of a newly-fashioned, happier Northern Ireland.

PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION

The April Agreement of 1998 has this to say about reconciliation: 'We can best honour the victims through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance and mutual trust and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all.' The task of reordering the Northern Ireland community, in so

many ways devastated after thirty years of conflict, must go beyond a settlement process to one of helping people to live together amicably. A study of other conflicts demonstrates that this is something few want to leave to chance. Sadly, there is little sign of reconciliation among Cypriots, Cambodians, Palestinians and Afghans. Salvadorans and South Africans, however, have embarked upon ambitious re-education schemes under government sponsorship to initiate enquiry, to publicise the revelation of truth about happenings, to arrange confession in response to amnesty. That, at least, is the theory; in practice, there is conjecture as to how far reconciliation has taken hold of most of the population.

Reconciliation approaches in Northern Ireland have been concentrated in three main areas—legislation, the corporate approach of non-governmental bodies and grass-roots activities.

The legislative approach

In regard to employment the Fair Employment Act of 1989 was a Northern Ireland initiative to deal with discrimination among employers and in the workforce. Bodies to monitor innovation and progress were set up—the Fair Employment Commission and a Fair Employment Tribunal, working with the Equal Opportunities Commission and a Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights. It was thought necessary to combine a prescriptive approach with an advisory one. It was never going to be easy to bring about reconciliation in a workforce rich in divisive and defensive conventions—one, moreover, which is having to adapt to changes in patterns of employment. Industrial shutdown puts the less-skilled Catholic minority at risk. Six out of ten of the long-term unemployed are Catholic. Their mobility is limited, it is said, by a ‘chill factor’ which discourages Catholics from seeking work in Protestant firms. Only in the expanding service and retail occupations and in a number of professions have Catholics been markedly successful in gaining admission and working harmoniously alongside members of the other (religious) tradition.

In education a strong voluntary movement among groups of parents is pressing hard to establish ‘integrated’ schools to educate children of all denominations (and none) together. Government legislation has been slow to endorse this goal, but in 1989 the Education Reform Order Northern Ireland, and in 1991 the Department of Education in Belfast both authorised funding in support. In 1992 the European

Commission and the UK government agreed to underpin financially the setting up of an Integrated Education fund within Northern Ireland. Believing that peace and reconciliation will never be realised permanently if children are separated at the beginning of life on account of religious affiliation, many parents, teachers and people outside education are supporting the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education. The interest in 'transformed' schools is growing, but at present their pupils are only 3 per cent of the total school population. There are practical difficulties: for instance, there can be no enforcement of cross-tradition schooling since parents have the right to determine the nature of their children's education; and, second, many schools are segregated because they reflect the segregated residence of Catholic and Protestant families in Belfast and Londonderry.

The corporate non-governmental approach

The Dublin government established in October 1994 a Forum for Peace and Reconciliation as a consultative body to examine and make recommendations on ways in which agreement and trust between both traditions in Ireland could be promoted. Originally there were thirty-nine members from twelve political parties and civic groups meeting in Dublin Castle one day each week. Sessions were open to the public, whose written submissions were invited. One of the speakers invited was South Africa's Deputy President, F.W. de Klerk, who described the restitution of rights in post-apartheid South Africa. Unfortunately, the Forum's balance was marred by the non-participation of Unionists from the North. Generally, this Forum is understood to have proved a most useful power-house for debate, although at present it is in abeyance as minds are concentrated on implementing the 1998 April Agreement. The EU decided in 1995 to underwrite the Ulster peace process with a Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland. The strategy in mind was to promote the social inclusion and regeneration of those marginalised in social and economic life by offering substantial funds to a partnership of government, local councils and civic groups. Ideas for action projects were to come from the people themselves, rather than being offered, thus hopefully giving a sense of bottom-up decision, reducing alienation and recourse to violence. Peace-making in Ulster has been acquiring a European dimension (Professor Richard Kearney in Dublin and others see the future of Ulster's new pacific identity as a 'post-nationalist' one, a zone

of peace rather than a zone of conflict, and one yielding tribal disunion to European solidarity).

The grass-roots approach

Two Belfast women, Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams, formed the Peace People in 1976, following the deaths of three children in an incident. Their championing the cause of reconciliation made huge strides, earning them a Nobel Peace Prize. In the wake perhaps of public frustration and some cynicism, the movement was to lapse. Something of the sense of this movement has been retained in the ever-increasing prominence of women's organisations such as the Women's Coalition and Women Together. Replacing hostility by the mutual understanding that comes from working and living together has been the dedicated resolve of the Corrymeela Community for the past thirty-three years. A swathe of other groups works in various ways, as they put it, at 'the interface between myth and reality'—the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust (sponsoring 4,500 reconciliation projects), the Irish Council of Churches, the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action, All Children Together, the Committee on the Administration of Justice (for equity in law and order issues), an Ex-prisoners Centre (with crisis counselling for violence-inclined youth), and a host of others.

In contemporary Northern Ireland the Mediation Network functions as a watchtower keeping an eye on legislative moves, the intervention of non-government corporate bodies and the thrust and fervour of a people feeling newly liberated. 'For every ten years of conflict,' the Network declares, 'we need a hundred years of conflict resolution.' The process of remediation and bringing together will be long and arduous. There is a choice. A choice, in the view of the Corrymeela Community, 'between the politics of reconciliation where space is given to the interests and identities of all communities or the politics of separation where each community pursues its own interests which will lead back to violence'. That choice is in process of being made in Northern Ireland now.

9 Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia)

Peace under contract

Contemporary Yugoslavia is referred to in UN documents as the 'Former Republic of Yugoslavia'. This is an ominous-sounding term. Many thousands of people remember Yugoslavia as one of the new states emerging bravely from the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. An outwardly calm monarchical state endured German attack and occupation during the Second World War, then in 1945 took on the trappings of Communism. Soviet domination was thrown off in 1948 in an audacious display of independence, and a largely unified state experimented with a form of social democracy, albeit under the dictatorial rule of Marshall Josip Tito, until Tito's death in 1980. Yugoslavia became a favourite haunt of tourists charmed by its scenery and the warm-hearted welcome they received.

Now, for almost ten years, Yugoslavia has been the cockpit for the most sustained and vicious of internal conflicts. Nothing so terrible and barbaric has been seen in Europe since the worst of the Second World War, with an entire nation at each other's throats. This is an ethnic contest more elemental and savage than anything seen in El Salvador, South Africa, Cyprus or Israel. Only in Cambodia do the Killing Fields of Yugoslavia have a ghastly parallel. As internal mayhem has flared into international crisis, how effective has the response of the international community been in ordering, as it were, 'peace under contract'? What issues has this conflict raised in regard to external mediation, intervention and relief? Is there any hope at all of reconciling Yugoslavs?

Bosnia, at the epicentre of this tumult, is the region in Yugoslavia most prominent in the media. The Bosnian conflict is the one we shall look at briefly in this chapter.



Map 4 Bosnia and Herzegovina

THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT

There were six constituent republics in Former Yugoslavia—Serbia, Bosnia (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Serbia alone retained a strong Communist party and its leader, Slobodan Milosevic (now less Marxist and more nationalist), has proclaimed, chiefly since 1990, a mission to rescue the 2.5 million Serbs living in other republics, not by bringing them home but by moving to envelop them in places that should be cleared of non-Serb elements. Belgrade, the Serbian capital, amplifies this discriminatory creed in press and radio, and elicits a sympathetic response from Serb communities in Bosnia and Croatia who fantasise about deliverance from their ‘enemies’. Their visions have erupted into a torrent of vituperation and assaults upon neighbours.

It is a cruel irony that Bosnia and the northernmost republic of Slovenia, each proud of a reputation for ethnic co-existence, have been

victims of chauvinistic extremists in Serbia. Bosnia, especially, has valued ancient traditions of harmony and inter-marriage among its people, of whom 43 per cent were Muslims, 32 per cent Serbs and 18 per cent Croats. Their President Alija Isetbegovic is Europe's only Muslim head of state. When tanks of the Yugoslav National Army rolled across Bosnia's frontiers at the beginning of 1992, the Bosnian Cabinet in the capital, Sarajevo, numbered eight Muslims, six Serbs and six Croats. Indeed, ethnic discrimination in word or action was deemed illegal.

Slovenia was the first to stand up to illegitimate invasion in June 1991 followed by Croatia in September 1991. The Slovenes stood their ground, Belgrade parleyed with them and there was a fragile peace accord as the Serbs turned next towards Croatia. At the end of 1991 an external element was introduced into the worsening conflict when Germany and the EC (EU) recognised Croatia and Slovenia as independent states and did the same for Bosnia in the following April, to be followed shortly afterwards by the UN and the USA.

Enraged at the way an internal quarrel was assuming crisis proportions and inviting interference from outside, the Serbs launched a well-prepared blitzkrieg. They laid siege to Sarajevo and soon had control of two-thirds of Bosnia, particularly of the farmlands where most Bosnians lived. The Bosnian government continued to request UN intervention in this expanding war. Sarajevo also pointed out that any imposition of sanctions to penalise Belgrade would then deny Bosnia vital supplies for daily living—further, that the international arms embargo on Yugoslavia prevented Bosnians from facing up to the well-armed Serbs. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims were swept out of their homes in a welter of 'ethnic cleansing'. The towns of northern and eastern Bosnia went down like skittles before the murderous Serb advance. As the conflict in its early days revealed horror after horror, other nations did not find it easy to know what to do. There was no doubt that the conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia would drain the attention, emotions and resources of a much wider world.

INTERNATIONAL MISSION: MEDIATION

International attempts to help solve the conflict in Yugoslavia were in process in 1989 as simmering discontent there was followed by the disappearance of unifying government under the rule of the charismatic Tito. Six republics now each sent their own deputy president to a cabal in Belgrade, an arrangement unlikely to stem

disparate tendencies among parties competing for power. As discontent turned to sporadic violence among people who had lived together hitherto, it was the UN and the EC that initiated enquiry and the tabling of proposals to Belgrade. By the summer of 1991, with not much achieved in dampening down discordant threats and actions, the first of the international peace proposals was in draft. Altogether, there were to be eight main peace plans:

- September 1991: an EC conference at The Hague proposes a confederation of six sovereign republics. Serbia rejects this fearing loss of dominance and anxious about Serbian enclaves in the other republics.
- August 1992: a London peace conference headed by British Lords Carrington and Owen (David Owen), together with Cyrus Vance from the USA, recommends separate sovereignty for six 'cantons', so far as possible ethnically based. A peacekeeping force, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), has already been recruited and is to be despatched, with the help of NATO, to Croatia to escort aid convoys. Violation of state boundaries and genocidal actions are to be punishable.
- May 1993: the Vance-Owen Plan divides Bosnia into ten largely autonomous provinces, with Serbs, Croats and Muslims each having three of these provinces. In Sarajevo a central government is to represent ethnic elements with a presidency, held by one representative of the different ethnic elements, rotating every four months. A corridor, guaranteed by UN surveillance, is to link Bosnia's Serb enclaves with the homeland of Serbia itself. Sarajevo is to be declared an 'open city'. Progressive demilitarisation is to be on the heels of a ceasefire. And human rights are to be safeguarded by an international commission, four ombudsmen and a court. UNPROFOR is to be raised to a total of 75,000 individuals, and given a mandate to expand its function beyond escort and civilian protection to one of associated monitoring.
- August 1993: a team from the UN and the EC, co-chaired by Lord Owen and the Norwegian ex-Foreign Minister, Torsten Stoltenberg, proposes a scheme which retains the partition plan set out earlier that year but which goes further to safeguard what seem to be incompatible security interests between Serbia and Bosnia, and Croatia and Bosnia. Serbia is to pull back from disputed zones, given an assurance that UN supervision of territorial agreements can still be carried out by UNPROFOR (now to be scaled down to 40,000). Agreements about ceasefires which have been continually

broken are to be upheld. The designation of six 'safe areas' is to help staunch the flow of terrified and displaced people. Certain towns, like Sarajevo and Mostar in Bosnia and Croatia's Dubrovnik and Zagreb, are to be offered international protectorate status provisionally for two years. Mainly land-locked Bosnia is to have clearer access to the Adriatic. If antagonism is reduced and these proposals are implemented in good faith, then sanctions against Serbia may be lifted.

- February 1994: the US Clinton administration proposes a Croat-Muslim confederation. A joint legislative council will then negotiate with Belgrade to reduce Serb occupancy of occupied lands. A representative of the UN Secretary-General is to be posted to Sarajevo to arbitrate, to coordinate relief operations with non-governmental agencies, and, with the help of NATO observers, to make sure that comprehensive disarmament is put in hand. In time, a Central Council, with delegates from all three ethnic groups, will move to prepare for elections and the devising of a new constitution.
- July 1994: a Contact Group (USA, Britain, Russia, France, Germany) meet in Geneva to outline for Bosnia a plan of 'territorial adjustment' which concedes to Bosnian Serbs a 51 per cent share of the republic. In return for their acceptance of the offer, sanctions are to be lifted and a large United States loan will be forthcoming. Otherwise, if there is no positive response, Belgrade is reminded that the US Congress is itching to lift an arms embargo restraining Muslims and Croats.
- December 1994: ex-President Jimmy Carter secures a four-month truce between Bosnia and the Serb leaders. In more optimistic mood, the UN Security Council reconstitutes the Croatian wing of UNPROFOR as the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO). As there are still worries about the conflict spreading south into Macedonia (and arousing anxieties in Greece), a United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEF) is also established.
- November 1995: the Dayton Agreement is signed by the Presidents of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia while they are holed up in a US Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio, and put through an intensive process of 'tough peace contracting'. Bosnia's new deal will cover territorial adjustment, constitutional reform, refugee resettlement and general rehabilitation of shattered communities. Moreover, there will be a clear military underpinning, with UNPROFOR being replaced in the field by a 60,000 strong Implementation

Force (I-FOR). Under NATO command and with impressive resources, this task force is charged with overall implementation of the agreement. Time limits are clarified—in December 1996 IFOR is to be succeeded by a Stabilisation Force (S-FOR) of half the size whose function is to take forward the next peace-building phase of 'stabilisation'. Rules of engagement, whether military or civilian, are described as 'robust'.

At a glance eight peace plans point to external good intentions and readiness to help being foiled at every turn by internal stubbornness and, worse, deep enmity. In fact, few people, whether in Europe or North America, were at all satisfied with the general shape of this peacebroking, and over many of the details there was frustrated discussion, often biting criticism and a good deal of incredulity. The main objectives of the peacemakers were reasonably clear; namely, the acknowledgement and recognition of independent entities crystallising out of an older state-framework no longer acceptable to its people, and a partition scheme to take account of ethnic diversity (and sense of belonging). If these twin aims were interdependent they were obviously not attainable without peace and a climate of mutual regard and tolerance. There may have been logic somewhere in the theory; in practice, the aims seemed at odds and unrealisable. How could such aims be enforced from 'outside' if those on the 'inside' disputed the independence claims of other republics? Was it either sensible or humane to sketch schemes for partition which must involve displacement, relocation and sacrifice among people who had lived together for centuries? What rationale and assurances about safety could be given to those scheduled to move elsewhere? And who would have the necessary authority and even-handedness to explain and carry out partition? Partition schemes had been non-starters in both Cyprus and Israel. There, as in Bosnia, the leaders of rival elements had required 'cast-iron assurances' as to the security of the minorities they represented. Understandably, nobody has ever been able to guarantee such an extent of autonomy and this in most places has been enough to abort negotiations.

Much criticism, too, has been directed at external reliance on the word of internal leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic, the latter much more obviously considered guilty of violating human rights. Are these leaders men who have exploited for nefarious ends what they imagine to be distinctive and separatist claims for their followers? (The question has been asked, of course, in Cyprus and Northern Ireland.) Are the peacemakers doing enough to

search for alternatives in policy and among the intermediaries they depend upon? Lord Owen himself described the Vance-Owen Plan as 'solutions born in hell'. This plan, in fact, sank below the waterline, and one of the reasons for that was that its suggested lines of partition appeared to many observers to be rewarding the aggressor and to be relying on arithmetical calculations to divide up territory. The 'robust' nature of international intervention in its later stages found critics in two camps. There were those who thought that heavy pressure from armed peacebrokers might be counter-productive in arousing Yugoslav resentment and uncooperativeness. The threat of NATO airstrikes proved a credible deterrent on occasions when UN peacekeepers had been taken hostage but they had quite failed to prevent many Serbian excesses, nor had they generally secured a less hostile response. There were certainly many who lamented the powerlessness of the UN to forestall the attempted rubbing out of sovereign states and the consequent ruthless disturbance of settled populations. At the outset of the conflict, when the UN had asked for a force of 15,000 peacekeeping 'Blue Berets', only 6,000 had been offered by member states. United States participation had preferred words of advice to deeds. Altogether, should intervention to deal with a crisis acquiring international dimensions rely on a large amount of bluff? Nor was efficient management of a multi-national force guaranteed if there was indecision and irresolution in a distant North American headquarters and difficulty in determining operational needs, priorities and options in the field.

INTERNATIONAL MISSION: PROTECTION OF PEOPLE

Nobody watching the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia can have doubted the overriding need to provide protection and relief. The civilian population was being harried to break morale, to induce near-starvation, to fritter away any resistance to advance and forced reorganisation. Anti-personnel mines as in Cambodia claimed many lives. Hostages were used to mask infantry movements, weapons were sited close to hospitals and churches, and evacuation of casualties was impeded. With an effective contingent of 14,000 or so, UNPROFOR had to face up to a catastrophic scenario of at least 2 million refugees and the resuscitation of those who had been maimed, raped and bereaved. The sixteen-month siege of Sarajevo left 10,000 dead, 58,314 wounded, 1,680 permanently crippled and an estimated 60 per cent of industry in ruins. During that siege of their capital city Bosnians

had only been kept alive by means of a nineteen-nation airlift, surpassing in its scale that of the Berlin airlift of 1948–9.

The UNPROFOR mandate, of course, never differentiated between ethnic groups, although in practice most forlorn and ill-treated victims were non-Serbs. On similar lines to measures used during the Gulf conflict when Allied forces tried to protect Kurdish refugees, the UN once again set up 'safe havens' and 'no-fly zones'. Refuge offered by six safe havens was based on three principles: first, that this facility was there to protect people and not defend territory; second, that the security provided was to enhance support of aid operations and contribute to an overall peace process; and third, that the overseeing force, UNPROFOR, remain non-partisan. Unfortunately, the safety of these havens remained quite inadequate since they were routinely attacked by Serb forces in 1993 and 1994. Nor were the no-fly zones respected. Although they were monitored by NATO, they were frequently ignored by Serb aircraft—in 1993 alone these zones were violated on 400 occasions. In Serbian eyes the lack of suitable protection for what were supposed to be protective devices no doubt led to cynical disregard, but other questions arise in consequence of international intervention. In such an all-out conflict were safe havens considered to be more than sanctuaries, perhaps to be regarded as islands of resistance by a 'liberating' force? In most respects the mission discharged by UNPROFOR and a number of aid agencies was carried through in a most hostile environment. One of the ugly hallmarks of the Bosnian conflict was constant refusal by fighting men to honour agreements on secure transit of humanitarian convoys. Clearly marked convoy vehicles and their escorts were harassed and intimidated. Situations of this kind gave rise at times to the charge that UNPROFOR was more concerned to shield its own personnel than to concentrate on the distribution of relief supplies. This is a misunderstanding. In fact, relief convoys refusing to terminate their mission had often to barter their way forward when their way was blocked by the irregular advance parties of various warlords. Relief was got through—at a price. A more general problem is that fighting men often view humanitarian aid as furnishing material help and bolstering the morale of their adversaries. The provision of such resources may even be seen as prolonging conflict.

In regard to refugees, similar questions to those asked in El Salvador, Israel and Cambodia arise. Does not a displaced person enjoy an intrinsic humanitarian right to return to the place from which they have been forcibly removed? The UN today is using the term Internally Displaced Person (IDP) more often than the term 'refugee' to refer to

those who are forced by internal strife to flee their homes and who remain trapped in an unsafe environment within the borders of their native land. (Worldwide, there are an estimated 30 million of these unfortunates.) The whole problem of displacement has a number of sides to it. Conventionally, the 'refugee' has been defined as a person with a well-founded fear of persecution in the homeland for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, who is unable to rely on the protection of the home state and so feels the need to seek protection in the outside world. Protection of the displaced as the UN understands it takes three forms:

- 1 Voluntary repatriation to the original locale when safety can be assured.
- 2 Reception by a host state for a limited time and with definite quotas.
- 3 Resettlement through a long-term programme to give a fresh start in life in a new country.

The Bosnian scenario is very complicated. A first response by way of international intervention by the UN and other relief groups was to escort thousands of dispossessed people either into camps, sometimes in the 'safe areas', or to have them ferried out of Yugoslavia. These arrangements, not surprisingly, have led to accusations that the UN is taking sides in the conflict by showing partiality to non-Serbs, and that by moving large numbers of non-Serbs to other areas it is participating in the business of 'ethnic cleansing'. Essentially though, protecting the displaced is a short-term programme, conditional, as we have seen, on arrangements for return to places of origin as a component of a peace accord such as the Dayton Agreement. A key question in any operation to bring aid to a conflict area is: in what respects does an outside agency move from emergency relief to guaranteed long-term support? That question still awaits an answer in Cambodia. Large numbers of Bosnians have been admitted to Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries and Britain as a temporary place of refuge, but few have been granted asylum as a prelude to integration. Indeed, since early 1998 there has been a concerted Western campaign to effect large-scale repatriation of the displaced. That campaign has led to horrendous problems of relocation. Germany, for instance, attempted to return 250,000 Bosnians (half of them children and most of them Muslim) and in so doing wanted them returned to the half of Bosnia that had been overtaken by the invaders. Those who arrived in their old villages found their property rights torn away. So deep were feelings of hatred among former neighbours that the 'returnees' wondered how

they might survive. In practical terms, numerous assurances offered by all sides at the time of Dayton lie frozen. Once more, as in Cambodia, the question is: for how long and in what way can the UN (or anybody else) protect 'fresh starters' traumatised by conflict?

INTERNATIONAL MISSION: PEACE IMPLEMENTATION

One of the Dayton participants described the implementation stage of the peace process as 'pluralising the scenario'. Central to efforts from without and within was a programme requiring restitution of an ordered and shared community. Everything depended upon those given governmental responsibility to ensure that political, economic and social reinvigoration was based upon mutual respect, tolerance and equality of opportunity. The stages through which implementation would move were clearly defined at Dayton as we have seen earlier — territorial realignment and constitutional reform were to provide parameters within which people could be resettled safely. A large and very well-armed force, I-FOR, would be responsible for implementation. The crux of community renewal, as we have noted elsewhere, would be economic regeneration usually aided by funds from outside.

Progress, in fact, has been minimal in bringing a real plural community into being, yet despite this many of the people from the UN and the EU who are working with Bosnians, Serbs, Croats and Muslims to re-erect a civilised state are guardedly optimistic. That is not to say that they do not admit to flaws in the planned peace programme. Was it entirely realistic to provide for swift acceptance of relocation schemes by those who had ousted thousands? Were scheduled preparations for elections not premature in that few entirely representative candidates were likely to come forward for some time? And because the designated constituencies would be newly carved out and freshly peopled what guarantees could there be of fair choice and, afterwards, of electors' wishes being put in hand? We are back to the classic issue of how far peace with democracy can be 'imposed' from outside, whether by a small task force, as in El Salvador, or by a large organisation like the 60,000-strong I-FOR. It seems ever necessary for mediators (and implementers) to recognise, in Lord Owen's words, 'the line between an outcome that can be defended and one that can't'. Predictably, the vehemence of the Bosnian conflict and the later unresponsiveness of Yugoslav negotiators prompted a readiness in Europe and North America to think out the lines of an 'exit strategy'. The

rationale for this had an emotional tinge in suggesting that after five years of divisive strife reality encouraged the wisdom of no further interference in a contest with no just or feasible solution. There were those in London and Washington who urged respectively parliament and Congress to cut an entanglement which was irrelevant to their national interests. They were being sucked into a war over which they had little control and 'nothing to gain'. Basically, this conflict was a civil war and, internationally, nobody else should be in it. One could not stop people fighting if that is what they were determined to do. Another conflict was now being fought out at long range, and among the peacemakers.

Politicians of many hues and nations feeling responsible about the Dayton process talked long and loud about the moral obligation to stay close to the Bosnian conflict, with a duty to relieve suffering and bring peace to a crisis which might easily spread to other regions. Interestingly, it was the generals who made most of the running in eliciting a positive public response. A British leader of UNPROFOR, General Sir Michael Rose (addressing the Oxford Union in June 1995), put the obligation very directly in asserting that the conflict would surely have escalated had the UN not intervened. Staying out would have left this conflict to be resolved only by force. We all had to be ready to take risks, anywhere, for peace. 'The UN', he put it, 'is not a separate force but part of all of us.'

INTERNATIONAL MISSION: STABILISATION

It was agreed in the peace agreements of 1995 that I-FOR would hand over to a new force, S-FOR, in December 1996 and that the new force would have a mandate expiring provisionally in June 1998. The remit of the new task force, as its title suggests, was to help bring about that extent of peace and consensus which was indispensable for unity and progress. In every respect, this was a transition from conflict resolution with a military component to one wholly within the civilian sphere. Impartiality and objectivity were to be its keynotes.

An ex-Prime Minister from Sweden, Carl Bildt, was appointed by the UN as High Representative in Bosnia. He was to use a Joint Civilian Commission to encourage cooperation between parties, to oversee preparations for elections, to liaise with NGOs about humanitarian projects. This enormous responsibility for stabilising Bosnia was to be helped by working with delegates from the

Bosnian-Croat Federation (a product of President Clinton's initiative in February 1994) and the Republika Srpska (a child of Dayton).

Stabilisation clearly depended upon some degree of reconciliation among former enemies. It was readily evident that those responsible for the violation of rights were still in high places. Of the seventy-five officials indicted as war criminals by an international tribunal at The Hague only seven had been arrested. It proved difficult to get parties to make signed obligations. Material resources were hard to get and often deliberately withheld by rival communities. A major setback to bringing an educated people into thoughtful unity was the haemorrhage of scientists, engineers, economists—people needed for regeneration but unwilling to remain in a country run by those hostile to the outside world, and to ideals of tolerance and communal progress. 'First graduate, then emigrate' was a student slogan in Sarajevo.

The reconstruction programme to stabilise Bosnia took this shape on paper:

- Military implementation—December 1995-March 1996: the task of I-FOR and 'the prerequisite for all other activities'.
- Preparation for elections—March 1996-June 1996: the task of a team from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and security backing from I-FOR.
- Election process: —scheduled for 1997: S-FOR to supervise and assist.
- Institutional establishment—after 1997: S-FOR to supervise and help with devising a new constitution and setting up an administration and other institutions.

A long comprehensive programme of social rehabilitation as the groundwork for a reconciliation process was the lead theme of the whole stabilisation programme.

PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION

Other conflicts discussed in this book throw into sharp relief the issue of reconciliation. There are signs of it coming about tangibly in El Salvador and South Africa, and there are faint glimmerings of erratic moves in that direction in Israel and Northern Ireland. What is taking place in Bosnia, as most observers see it, is not unrelenting contention between implacable adversaries who are ethnically polarised, rather it is carefully engineered belligerency spurred on by populist warmongers and

amplified by propaganda. Internecine hostility trumpeted by combatants in outlying Macedonia and Kosovo is the product of orchestrated and irrational malevolence. The force of violence is obnoxious but not irreversible. It remains to be seen what effect careful planning for community rebuilding will have for the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Outside help may encourage the formation of a credible opposition and an objective media force, and put money into education, industrial retooling and resettlement schemes. A better way forward would be for constituent republics to work together in associated peace-building. Is it at all likely that reconciliation could be imposed by others and that this process could be achieved either easily or rapidly? Is there any place in Bosnia and Croatia and Serbia for the sort of truth and reconciliation strategy that Salvadorans and South Africans are employing? Whatever the future, reconciling a more stable society will be a slow-paced affair. Carl Bildt, in a driving seat in Sarajevo and with a multi-national force to hand, outlined, in a report to the UN Security Council of 13 March 1996, some of the difficulties inherent in going beyond the first steps in conflict resolution:

Without an active effort at reconciliation and cooperation, there will be distinct limits to what the international community can do.... Reconciliation will be possible when there is a common perception that justice for all will be created when the energies and efforts of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina are concentrated less on the legacies of the bitter past than on the promise of a common future.

10 The contemporary world and conflict

The purpose in selecting and presenting eight examples of conflict troubling the contemporary world is to aid study and discussion. These are the conflicts that drew public attention and led to anxiety and concern as to resolution. The previous chapters have outlined something of the origins and development of each conflict. This final chapter will offer a resumé and suggest lines of enquiry. All the conflicts presented so far have a number of characteristics in common. Originating as potential conflicts (conflicts in the making), they go on to move through confrontation and contest into internecine violence involving army, paramilitary recruits and a civilian population voluntarily or compulsorily implicated. Disputants in every continent are supplied with weapons and a range of material resources from outside the area of conflict. Internal schisms between Left and Right, or Radicals and Conservatives, or Democrats and Authoritarians, fracture the community, either that of the state or of elements within the state which proclaim a separate identity.

Of equal significance, perhaps, is that many of these gladiatorial contests display opposing forces that are themselves somewhat disunited. Generally, the origins of these conflicts have deep historical roots, more recently invested with symbolism and coloured by myth. External pressures add fuel to internal discord, increasing tension and uncertainty, and owing much in the last three decades to the void left behind by a retreating hegemony or imperial power, or to the polarities of the Cold War which, all too often, exploited divisions within client states. The nature of these conflicts is both multi-factor and multi-layer. Usually there is an oligarchy in a state of siege, a lowest-level population mass seething with discontent, and to complete the triad, a middle-class professional core, articulate and dissatisfied. This is the emerging opposition front moving forward as a wave of protest. In a variety of ways this revolutionary force rejects the politics of exclusion

and discrimination and its frustration and zeal to overturn and reform an oppressive regime almost inevitably turn the conflict into a violent one. What might have been their loyalty to a unified, peaceable state is replaced by the ardent following of religious and ideological leaders and their mantras.

There are, on the other hand, significant differences in the causal factors and evolution of these conflicts. The geographical, strategic placing—at a ‘crossroads’—of five of the conflict zones (Cyprus, Afghanistan, Israel, former Yugoslavia, El Salvador) almost inevitably has meant and still means the probability of contest for advantage and ultimate power. Five of them (South Africa, Bosnia, Cyprus, Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland) have political and economic problems resulting from a plural population which calls for fair and representative power. All-out zeal for fundamental reform against privilege and refusal to concede has in four instances (El Salvador, South Africa, the Palestinians, Northern Ireland) given rise to liberation movements, to the notion of necessary sacrifice, to the veneration of martyr figures. The United Nations General Assembly ultimately endorsed by a majority, though not without vigorous dissent, the battles for freedom of South Africa’s blacks and Palestine’s Arabs at the same time as it condemned their oppressors. No less than seven of these conflicts (El Salvador, apartheid South Africa’s relegation to designated ‘homelands’, Cambodia, Cyprus, Afghanistan, Israel, Bosnia) have given rise to displacement of considerable numbers of people either through authoritarian edict or as an escape from oppression or bombardment. Refugees by the hundred thousand spill out of conflagrations. The evil of genocide has scarred the image of conflicts in Cambodia and Bosnia, where the last-named fratricide coined the phrase ‘ethnic cleansing’. There is a struggle for the life-giving natural resources of water and cultivable land in the two marginal environments of Israel and Afghanistan. Indeed, it is probable that the driving force initiating many future conflicts in a heavily populated world will be attributed to the need to secure dependable supplies of fresh water. One of the conflicts, that in Afghanistan, has spiralled out of what was thought to be an agreed settlement and which was heralded as the fruit of great power harmony. A second conflict, of singular proportions in its ideology and religious fundamentalism, has replaced the first.

Resolution of conflict seeks to expedite transition from war to peace. All of the conflicts discussed in previous pages have gone through the stages, first, of military disengagement through ceasefire, demilitarisation and demobilisation. Second, a crippled infrastructure

needs to be rebuilt as a foundation for civilian processes such as the establishment of legitimate and democratic government, and the enfranchisement of a population released from fear. The resolution procedures in the eight examples are different in many respects. The peace process drawn up around a table and subscribed to by former combatants has a fragile assurance given the proximity of substantial caches of arms in almost all the conflict zones (Cambodia, Bosnia, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, among the Palestinians, and, to some extent, still in South Africa). It was in El Salvador and in Northern Ireland that the issue of the laying down of arms, 'decommissioning' as it was termed, threatened to abort peace negotiations. Inevitably, there is the question: do years of death and dissolution fracture a community so completely that the restoration of civilised society and reconciliation among individuals is impossible where the gun may rule? Whatever the intentions of those who strove for peace and the nature of the arrangements they designed, there is in a majority of these conflicts (Cambodia, Cyprus, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and in some respects contemporary Northern Ireland), at worst, the handicap of undependable governability or, at best, some doubt as to the permanence of allegiance to the overriding authority.

Resolvers of conflict have come in from outside in all but two of the conflicts. Both South Africa and Northern Ireland were disinclined to consider any form of peace planning other than their own, except that the settlement in Northern Ireland was very much the product of undaunted and very complicated three-way manoeuvring between London, Belfast and Dublin; and that in South Africa the onset of the final phase of peace implementation was monitored by invited representatives from the UN, the EU, the Commonwealth, and the Organisation of African Union (OAU). Otherwise, as the case studies show, there was careful peacebroking by regional organisations. Final accord was, in fact, reached at long range in places far removed from the actual conflict, where representatives could meet informally to explore possible avenues of agreement before putting their hand to official documents. In 1988 Accords signed in Geneva released Afghanistan from almost ten years of savage warfare, in 1991 peace agreements in Mexico, Paris and Madrid did likewise respectively for El Salvador, Cambodia and the Palestinians. In the last case, the 'shuttle diplomacy' of Henry Kissinger during 1973 and 1974, the Camp David meeting of 1978 and the later discussions and conferences in Oslo, Washington and Cairo all showed by 1993 that sustained and careful peacemaking could break through barriers of intransigence. Unfortunately, cardinal issues for Israel and for the Palestinians remain

slow in realisation: namely, complete withdrawal by Israel from the West Bank and a much greater degree of independence for the Palestinians. The wholesale transport of warring and uncompromising Yugoslav leaders to Dayton, Ohio, and a resort to 'guided reflection' brought in train a peace settlement to be 'enforced' by military groupings under franchise to the United Nations.

Resolution of conflicts which have an ethnic content have proved especially difficult situations to manage. Apart from the deeply lodged attitudes of discrimination and hostility inevitable in a culture clash, the conflicts are seen to rise and fall unpredictably within the network of a society. The clash of arms may rage across land with no defined borders. In Cyprus, Bosnia and Israel resolution began with a study of maps and calculations of area and access, and it had to move on to convincing those who quarrelled that they could co-exist in places that were mutually acceptable. If no agreement is reached because a party with strong ethnic affiliations strenuously believes that its claim for territorial separation is entirely justified, then those who stonewall may be anaesthetised (by the UN), as in Cyprus, or allowed to languish pending their coming to their senses to accept the lines of a settlement drafted for them, as in the case of Israel and the Palestinians. Co-existence, of course, should be a peaceful alternative to a community split by contempt and hatred. For many years the peacemakers have sketched the possibilities and desirability of partition schemes on their drawing-boards. Designation of separate zones for distinctive ethnic groups with a defined frontier would surely bring peace and progress to Israel, Cyprus and Bosnia. Well-meaning proposals have been rejected by those who regarded the suggestions as inappropriate to their basic needs. No Greek Cypriot ever sees designation of north Cyprus as a Turkish enclave in any way other than as the unacceptable slicing away of his native island heritage; no Palestinian is content with a minimal allocation of ancestral territories. Land for Peace as an irreducible minimum for co-existence means just that: no land, no peace. Does not a partition scheme in any case mean displacement of people, their relocation, dispossession, disinheritance? Who then offers guarantees as to safety and material benefits? If those who frame partition arrangements withdraw, what assurances are ever left? As Lord David Owen said of an earlier partition draft for Bosnia, such a final solution must be a Solution from Hell.

Resolution of a conflict in some cases can be seen to have paved the way for a new society. This is pre-eminently the case in South Africa. Interestingly, much of the success in steering that country into a vibrant post-conflict society was the product of increasingly closer liaison

between those elements about to assume government posts and a broad front of civic groups, church leaders, academics, media personnel and business representatives (both black and white), all pushing vigorously for a reconstituted South Africa. In the event, the new government, appropriately styled the Government of National Unity, co-opted a number of these people as teamsters for a rebuilt state. Conflict had brought renaissance. Something similar by way of governmental and lay collaboration has begun to show promise in El Salvador and Northern Ireland. The process of rebuilding following the process of achieving peace is, understandably, best advanced through the combined efforts of those who live within that community. Even so, the reinvigoration and rehabilitation of a community is an expensive undertaking. A generous supply of funds and of personnel by the UN has materially helped the 'transformation' of El Salvador into a pacific society (even though, as pointed out in Chapter 2, economic restitution was very slow). Transformation, too, is the objective for Cambodia and the UN, working in harness with a comprehensive rehabilitation programme. Where conflict devastated the social fabric, collapsed all aspects of the economy and concentrated all power in the hands of a merciless autocracy, a 'new deal' will weave together loose strands in the fabric of society and attempt to decentralise administration. Out in Cambodian rural areas 'Quick Impact Projects' are being mounted by task forces to resuscitate the living standards of people slowly returning to normality.

What do the case studies show us about the UN as a resolver of conflicts? Apart from South Africa and Northern Ireland, all our conflict situations have seen direct involvement by the UN in peace negotiations. The UN Charter of 1945 set down procedures in its Chapter VI for peacefully resolving disputes and threatening situations before they became conflicts, and in Chapter VII provided for action to restore peace after any conflict. Peacekeeping between nations (the main concern of the Charter) has more often become keeping peace within nations. Preventive and restorative action in various places has needed different guidelines, arrangements and management. The UN Secretary-General posted Special Representatives in Cyprus, Cambodia and Afghanistan to act as listening posts for settlement possibilities, and to coordinate military and relief arrangements. As we have seen earlier, the UN Charter specifically rules out any intervention in matters essentially within a state's domestic jurisdiction. Moreover, the Charter acknowledges a state's inherent right to self-defence, either within its own resources or in association with others. Furthermore, although the UN was founded by its members to promote global peace

and security and the furtherance of basic human rights, there is no enforcement power, no 'teeth' in the resolution. As the case studies demonstrate, the actual resolution of conflict, with or without the help of the UN, has undoubtedly become more dynamic, pragmatic and controversial than ever those who framed the Charter could have envisaged half a century ago.

Three criteria have conventionally underpinned UN involvement in any internal crisis. Is an internal conflict becoming so dangerous that it constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security? Is the state in question willing and competent to deal with its internal conflict? Is there any feasible alternative to intervention by the UN? These criteria need examination by the Security Council, the instrument for authorising any remedial action, and appraisal which must be objective and not excited by the public's sense of frustration and futility at the scale of conflict and its violations. The horror at what was happening in Cambodia and in Bosnia and between Israelis and Palestinians was a popular, instinctive and humane response without any very careful assessment of what might be mobilised to bring about a ceasefire and ultimately mend a divided nation. In any case, no UN intervention is possible without an invitation from a 'host' state government. In the light of the basic criteria, UN intervention can be seen to have taken various forms. There was intensive mediation and peacebroking over El Salvador, Cambodia, Cyprus, Afghanistan and Bosnia. Interposition between combatants, aid in securing an end to fighting, the observation of armistice agreements, and the monitoring of withdrawal and demobilisation was the UN task discharged in Cyprus, Cambodia, in the Middle East and (with immense difficulty) in Bosnia. There has always been attention to the need to protect civilians in distress from hostilities, but in the case of Bosnia and Cambodia 'robust protection' of non-combatants was deemed a major demand on a specially despatched force of multinational peacekeepers.

Intervention by any UN force sent into the field must have an authorising mandate which will carefully state what the objectives are and enumerate the means by which they are to be approached and attained. The mandates in regard to the operations to help Cyprus, Cambodia and Bosnia had a military element of restraining combatants and deterring them from further action and, above all, from moves which might harm civilians. In respect of Bosnia, there was the protection of civilians and for Cambodia, there was an ambitious rehabilitation programme. UN mandates are designed in explicit terms and objectives should not be in doubt. Nevertheless, as

the mandate is translated into action there can be visible ambiguities. The mandate for Cyprus drawn up in 1964 was based on reasonable propositions that a peace settlement would be contrived once agreement between contestants had been secured. Nobody then could have foreseen that even after thirty years neither Greek nor Turkish Cypriot would see the wording of the mandate in the same light. Most Greeks see the mandate as a military holding operation which by its containing nature confirms separation in what should be a unified island. Turks view the military stand-off as preventing their emergence as an independent republic. The conflict in essence remains, though, in a suppressed state.

Another example of a clouded mandate is the one providing for intervention in Bosnia. At the outset, protection of civilians was the assigned priority, although the size of the UNPROFOR force was clearly going to be inadequate. Events on the ground soon pointed to a mandate which ought to have been more carefully drafted. How are civilians to be protected in difficult terrain when a UN force cannot be in ten places at once? What enforcement of a protective role is possible if invaders drive people from their homes (the 'ethnic cleansing' policy), if villages are torched, if hostages are taken, if communications are mined? The UN commitment to non-violent measures was sorely tested in trying to defend civilian emplacements, particularly those areas nominated as 'safe havens'. An added problem was that of maintaining impartiality (another UN commitment) in the face of grievous provocation and in the knowledge on all sides that a protective role which was deliberately handicapped might incur the wrath and the armed response of nearby NATO forces. Problems and dilemmas in conflict resolution were somewhat eased for the UN when the 'Dayton Process' superseded a more ad hoc peace process. Resolution now was seen not as an event or even as an end in itself; it was the beginning of a transition to something incomparably better than what had gone before. A carefully coordinated programme was to be put into effect (at least on paper) ranging through implementation to stabilisation with a multinational force, again franchised to the UN, being appropriately styled IFOR and SFOR. Dealing with the conflict in Bosnia has provided many salutary lessons for peacemakers.

Not all the issues such enterprises raise can be answered easily or convincingly. How does the conflict resolver measure progress and outcome? Is it possible to go on 'defending an outcome' which is manifestly unrealisable? In that event, should there not be an 'exit strategy'? When and how would that operate? When those who offer

protection and security and a reasonable future as an intermediary force are withdrawn, what assurances can the resident population look to? Questions such as these were often asked about Cambodia and Cyprus and Bosnia.

Reconciliation is that further stage of conflict settlement that previous chapters have much discussed. An outline consideration of eight examples of contemporary conflict uses a rather simple working definition of reconciliation: namely, the process of promoting an integrated community consequent upon group and individual preparedness to make concessions for the sake of tolerance and civilised behaviour. Reconciliation in this sense is not something that can be imposed. It is arguable that individuals will never feel secure, in the fullest sense of that term, until the community in which they live has demonstrated a renewed sense of order and is able to make improvements in the basic needs of shelter, food and public amenities. As conflict settles in Cambodia, South Africa and Northern Ireland, reconstituted government is seeking to establish basic economic priorities as the threshold for equitable social advance. The terms used by makers of a new society, namely 'revitalisation', 'reconstruction', 'reordering' and 'restitution', are all question-begging to an observer. The 'transformation' of a society in betterment terms, as it is seen confidently from the corridors of government buildings or proclaimed in the press, may not be so obvious to individuals still requiring and expecting a better standard of living expressed in income, education and steady employment.

What is less controversial is the uphill task faced by post-conflict societies. South Africa's Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy, launched in 1996 is, as the name suggests, an ambitious drive to put the country's economy into higher gear where, among other objectives, redistribution of wealth and reallocation of land and residential areas have the needs of the individual to the fore. Yet two-thirds of South Africa's blacks (75 per cent of the population) are still living below the 1997 World Bank poverty line. How many of these people are likely to feel reconciled towards their white neighbours whose incomes are almost three times higher and more dependable? When 56 per cent of black South Africans are illiterate, how do they cope with the pressing demands of tolerant living in increasingly sophisticated urban communities where six out of ten of them now live? El Salvador remains confident that the horizons of its liberated people can be widened and deepened by 'affirmative' programmes of economic and social redress. Here is another example of two-thirds of the population existing in real poverty where any redistribution of life chances is nothing more than an

injection by the government of temporary relief. A majority released from oppression still awaits a better deal alongside an affluent minority, many of whom, as we have seen, have been helped back into comfortable life after they have confessed their 'sins'.

Not all though is gloom. In Israel, among the Palestinians, who still feel dispossessed by the Jewish settlers on *their* Promised Land, there is a slow resurgence of hope that eventually Jew and Arab may resume living together. Hopes in this direction are being expressed in professional and academic quarters. There are signs of similar fellow-feeling, perhaps just whispers of it, in Bosnia and Cyprus where divided loyalties can never be a humane or realistic alternative to living in a settled, plural society.

Finally, there is the greatest enigma of all—the function of revealed truth as antidote to falsity, discrimination, intolerance and malevolence. In the case studies in earlier chapters South Africa and El Salvador are shown as exemplars of the notion that facing demonstrated truth honestly and squarely has a moral and political purpose. Post-conflict 'survivors' are then enabled to move towards a peaceful and unified future. Otherwise, as South Africans have put it, 'a vacuum of silence is filled with lies'. In their country the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has spent two and a half years hearing evidence from 2,000 witnesses, considering applications for amnesty, and in general fulfilling a restorative process which has already cost £15 million. El Salvador's 'From Madness to Hope' has the similar goal of creating a common society, a transition which must avoid retaliation. As the millennium approaches, telling the truth as prelude to new beginnings is coming into fashion. There are now fourteen, possibly twenty, states with authorised truth commissions in the wake of the first two in Chile and Argentina—in Africa these are at work in Uganda, Zimbabwe, Chad, Rwanda and Ethiopia, and imminent in Malawi; in Latin America, Bolivia and Uruguay have sanctioned these proceedings. Similar arrangements are in the making in the Philippines, Guatemala, Mexico, Honduras, South Korea and Germany. A detailed study of these would make for a large book.

The ways in which conflicts and their resolutions are handled by states as stepping-stones to reconcile individuals living in the contemporary world have been discussed only in outline in previous chapters. The questions raised are legion. Given that those who live in a strife-ridden country are all victims of conflict, how far is there a 'trickle-down' process of reconciliation as it is expressly encouraged by government in South Africa, El Salvador, Northern Ireland or Cambodia? Is there a possibility that state-endorsed reconciliation measures assume priority over reconciliation between individuals? The

first three of the countries just mentioned have energetic reconciliation work being undertaken at the grass-roots level by groups of 'bridge-builders'. There is in those countries some speculation about procedures which promote reconciliation—without justice. Conventionally, the institution of justice depends upon fair trial and appropriate punishment where guilt is proven. Otherwise, aggrieved victims of discrimination and wrongdoing feel no sense of reparation. Their suffering in conflict is unresolved. Can they ever become reconciled living in 'a culture of immunity'? Amnesties, it is held, induce the guilty to stand up and confess. The consequence of that cannot be punishment as such—it can only be a pardon to which all, guilty and innocent, must subscribe. What exactly should be the restorative measures that promote individual capacity to live and engage with others in reconciled fashion, as well as giving them the assurance that they have been treated justly?

Tidying up after conflict and bringing about peace in a restored society is demonstrating determination, humanity and some degree of moderation among workers in those few places where the dust is settling. Conflict, resolution and reconciliation are viewed as an interdependent triad in these words, spoken over South African Radio in December 1997, by South Africa's Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission:

We want to avoid seeming like we've got blueprints that we're dishing out all over the place. We are such an unlikely bunch. Nobody would ever have thought that South Africans would be held up as anything but an example of awfulness.

I think it is part of God's sense of humour to say to the world: 'Now look at them. Remember who they are? They had a nightmare they called apartheid. It has ended. Your nightmare will end too. They had a problem that people said was intractable. They are solving it. So, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Rwanda, wherever, your nightmare, your intractable problem will end.'

Guide to further reading

BOOKS

- Beinart, W. and Dubow, S. (eds) (1995) *Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa*, London: Routledge. Collection of essays covering a wide field.
- Brown, F.Z. (1989) *Second Chance: The United States and Indo-China in the 1990s*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Background history, some future speculations—useful for origins.
- Byrne, H. (1996) *El Salvador's Civil War: A Study of Revolution*, London: Lynne Rienner. Rather pedestrian presentation of good points.
- Coogan, T.P. (1955) *The Troubles*, London: Hutchinson. Straight speaking commentary on origins and development of the Northern Ireland conflict.
- Cyprus, Republic of (1997) *The Cyprus Problem*, Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus (obtainable from Cyprus High Commission, London). Most useful.
- Deegan, H. (1998) *South Africa Reborn*, London: UCL Press. Thoughtful, concise, includes interviews with South Africans.
- Denitch, B. (1996) *Ethnic Nationalism, the Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Shrewd, comprehensive account of ethnic extremism with pointers to what is happening elsewhere in the world.
- Dougherty, J.E. and Pfaltzgraff, R.C. (1990) *Contending Theories of International Relations*, New York and London: Harper and Row. Conflict theory authoritatively and exhaustively discussed. Not easygoing but has excellent indexes and book lists.
- Doyle, M.W., Johnstone, I., Orr, C. (1997) *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Penetrating, balanced, very full analysis of achievements and failures. Excellent bibliography and index.
- Evans, G. (1993) *Cooperating for Peace*, London: Allen and Unwin. Keenly analytical in a short space. Strongly recommended.
- Frost, B. (1998) *Struggling to Forgive*, London: Harper Collins. Narrates Nelson Mandela's part in the South African search for reconciliation.
- Glenny, M. (1992) *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, London: Penguin. An early discussion—still very relevant.

- Harbottle, M. (1971) *The Blue Berets*, London: Leo Cooper. Not really out of date—eye-witness account by former UN Chief of Staff to UNFICYP in Cyprus.
- Hudson, M.C. (1990) *The Palestinians: New Directions*, Washington DC: University of Georgetown Press. Highly informative, opens up the issues.
- Kearney, R. (1997) *Post-nationalist Ireland*, London: Routledge. Intriguing scrutiny of contemporary relevance of Irish politics, cultural and philosophical influences. Not an easy read but a mine of information, especially in the fifty pages of notes.
- Klass, R. (1987) *Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited*, New York: Freedom House. Mainly the historical background to the conflict origins.
- O'Leary, B. (1995) *Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images*, Oxford: Blackwell. Rather academic in parts but clearly debates myths and realities of 'sovereignty' in the Province.
- Ozgur, O.A. (1982) *Apartheid: the United Nations and Peaceful Change in South Africa*, New York: Dobbs Ferry. Slightly laboured treatment and, of course, rather overtaken by events.
- Rikhye, I.J., Harbottle, M., and Egge, B. (1974) *The Thin Blue Line*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Again, timeless. Fine discussion of Cyprus peacekeeping in Chapter 6.
- Sicherman, H. (1993) *Palestinian Autonomy, Self-Government and Peace*, Oxford: Westview. Well-arranged material but difficult to use because no index. Useful appendices give over twenty years of diplomatic documents.
- United Nations (1995a) *The United Nations and El Salvador 1990–1995*, UN Blue Book Series vol. IV, New York: UN Department of Public Information. Voluminous coverage of policies and events. Includes many documents.
- (1995b) *The United Nations and Cambodia 1991–1995*, UN Blue Book Series vol. II, New York: UN Department of Public Information. Voluminous coverage of policies and events. Includes many documents.
- Vulliamy, E. (1995) *Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War*, London: Schuster. A journalist's chronicle—fresh and illuminating.
- Weiler, J. (1985) *Israel and the Creation of a Palestinian State*, London: Croom Helm. Still highly relevant. Incisive argument. Most useful source.
- Whittaker, D.J. (1995) *United Nations in Action*, London: UCL Press.
- (1997) *United Nations in the Contemporary World*, London: Routledge. Both books on the UN complement the present book, with case studies on the UN role and activities. Written especially for students. Useful references.
- Wilson, R.A. (1997) *The People's Conscience*, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations. Readable comparison of 'civil groups, peace and justice in the South African and Guatemalan transitions'. Useful bibliography.
- Wright, M. (ed.) (1989) *Cambodia: A Matter of Survival*, London: Longman. A great deal of information, some essays more readable (and realistic) than others. Good to consult.

JOURNALS

From time to time, much valuable material about conflict is to be found here:
Foreign Affairs, International Affairs, International Relations, International

Studies, Millennium Review of International Studies, Political Science Quarterly, The World Today, Third World Quarterly.

And in most public and college libraries:

Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*), London: Longman. Easy-to-use reference source monitoring world information sources. Updated supplements each month.

USEFUL ADDRESSES

Full information on all aspects of UN involvement with conflicts worldwide may be obtained from these sources:

United Nations Information Centre, Millbank Tower (21st Floor), 21–4 Millbank, London SW1P 4QH. Tel: 0171–630–1981. Fax: 0171–976–6478. Email: info@unic.london.org

United Nations Department of Public Information, Public Enquiries Unit, UN Plaza New York NY 10017, USA. Tel: 00–1–212–9639245. Cybersites: UN home page is at <http://www.un.org>; UN databases are at <http://www.un.org/databases>; UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library is at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl>

The UN Chronicle (from the UN Department of Public Information) is published quarterly on a modest subscription basis. Excellent for keeping abreast of policies and happenings.

Index

- Adams, Gerry 83, 84
- Afghanistan: conflict 2, 3, 4, 6, 56–67, 68, 81, 108, 109, 111, 112; reconciliation 8, 62, 64–7, 91, 108, 109; and the UN 59–60, 61, 62–3
- African National Congress (ANC) 26, 27, 28, 87, 90
- Akashi, Yasushi 40
- Albright, Madeleine 78
- Amanullah, King 57–8
- amnesty 7, 10, 13, 14, 17, 30, 31, 32, 33, 91, 115, 116
- apartheid 3, 21–33, 108, 116; anti-apartheid movement 25; *see also* South Africa
- Arab League 6
- Arabs *see* Israel; Middle East; Palestinians
- Arafat, Yassir 76, 77, 78; *see also* Palestinians
- Argentina 19, 30, 115
- Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 6
- Australia 38, 43
- Begin, Menachem 72, 78
- Bildt, Carl 104, 106
- Bosnia: conflict 2, 3, 4, 6, 21, 68, 81, 94–106, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113; reconciliation 8, 103, 105, 106, 110, 115; and the UN 7, 97–9, 101–3, 104, 104–5, 106, 113
- Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 53
- Brezhnev, Leonid 59
- Bush, President George 36, 53
- Buthelezi, Chief Mangosuthu 29
- Cambodia: conflict 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 34–44, 62, 64, 68, 81, 94, 112, 114; reconciliation 7, 9, 37, 41–4, 91, 109, 111, 112, 114; and the UN 7, 34, 36–7, 38, 41, 42–3
- Camp David meeting 73, 74, 109
- Carter, President Jimmy 60, 72, 98
- ceasefire 7, 14, 15, 37, 61, 86, 89
- Chile 19, 30, 115
- China 35, 36, 39, 56, 59, 60
- civilian protection 38, 49, 52, 100–2, 112–13
- Clerides, Glavcos 51
- Clinton administration 98, 105
- coexistence 1, 8, 18, 28, 35, 38–9, 40, 53, 68, 70, 96, 110, 114–15
- Cold War 3, 11, 14, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 107
- Commonwealth (British) 109
- Communism 58–9, 60, 61, 94, 95
- compromise 3, 27, 33, 50, 53, 55, 61, 70, 90, 114
- conflict: economic aspects 3, 10, 12, 16, 19–20, 21–2, 23, 27, 28–9, 38, 39, 40, 79, 80, 84, 103, 107, 114–15; ethnic conflict 2, 46, 47, 49, 94, 96, 99, 102, 106, 108, 110; guerillas 2, 13, 15, 17, 72, 77, 86; *see also* amnesty; intervention;

- mediation; negotiation; peace process; reconciliation; rehabilitation; resolution
- Contact Group: Bosnia 98; Israel 80
- Contadora 13, 80
- Cordovez, Diego 60, 62
- Corrymeela Link 93
- Cristiani, President Alfredo 19
- de Cuellar, Perez 15
- Cyprus: conflict 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 21, 44–55, 56, 64, 81, 94, 99, 100, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112–13, 114, 115; reconciliation 7, 8, 9, 52–3, 55, 91, 110, 115; and the UN 4, 6, 7, 8, 47, 49–51, 52–4, 110, 111, 112–13
- Dayton Agreement 4, 98–9, 102, 103, 104, 105
- Denktash, Raouf 51
- disarmament 14–15, 38, 51, 61, 86–7, 89, 98, 108
- disputes 1, 5–6, 13, 14, 15, 48, 53, 63, 68, 76, 79, 107–8
- education 23, 26, 27, 28, 36, 58, 64, 67, 75, 90, 91, 92, 106, 114
- Egypt 72, 76, 109
- elections: Afghanistan 64; Bosnia 103, 105; Cambodia 38, 39, 40–1; Cyprus 48–9, 53; El Salvador 14, 15, 34; Israel 76; Northern Ireland 90; South Africa 27–8
- El Salvador: conflict 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10–20, 34, 56, 64, 66, 80, 94, 108, 109; reconciliation 7, 8, 15–20; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 7, 16–20, 30; and the UN 1, 12, 13–15, 16, 18–19, 20
- enforcement 1, 100, 103–4, 110, 112
- European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) 6, 54–5, 84, 92–3
- Farabando Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) 12, 14, 17–18
- Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, Dublin 92–3
- genocide 36, 37, 44, 96–7, 108
- Gorbachev, Mikhail 36, 61–2
- Greece 45–8, 50, 51–2, 53, 54, 98, 110, 113
- Holbrooke, Richard 55
- human rights 1, 2, 13, 19, 29–31, 34, 36, 48, 50, 65, 66, 67, 71, 74, 83, 85, 87, 91, 98, 99, 105, 111–12
- Hun Sen 42
- ideology 2, 3, 8, 12, 13, 14, 18, 24, 33, 35–6, 56, 58–9, 61, 65–6, 107
- imperial hegemony 3, 21, 24, 35, 46, 57, 59, 94, 107
- Implementation Force (Bosnia) (IFOR) 99, 103, 104, 105, 113
- India 24, 57
- internally displaced persons (IDP) 1, 40, 51, 52, 60, 62, 66–7, 70, 72, 75, 77, 96, 97, 100–3, 108, 110; *see also* refugees
- intervention 4, 6–7, 8, 36, 37–41, 94, 96, 100, 101–2, 103–4
- IRA *see* Northern Ireland
- Iraq 24, 72
- Isetbegovic, President Alija 96
- Israel: conflict 2, 3, 6, 21, 68–80, 81, 94, 108, 109, 110, 112; reconciliation 76, 78–80, 115; and the UN 68, 70–1, 72, 73–4, 78, 80; Zionism 68, 70, 71, 74; *see also* Middle East; Palestinians
- Jordan 72, 74, 76, 77
- Karadzic, Radovan 99
- Karmal, Barbrak 58, 59, 61
- Khmer Rouge 34, 35–6, 40, 41, 42; *see also* Pol Pot
- Kissinger, Henry 72, 109
- de Klerk, President F.W. 27, 28, 29, 31, 92
- League of Nations 58, 70
- liberation 2, 25, 27, 36, 101, 108, 114; liberation theology 13; *see also* African National Congress; Palestine Liberation Organisation
- Makarios, Archbishop (President) 47, 48, 50, 51
- Mandela, President Nelson 22, 26, 27, 28, 29

- media 3, 30, 33, 53, 65, 86, 90, 106
mediation 5–6, 14–16, 61, 63, 73–4,
76, 94, 103, 109–10, 112;
Mediation Network (Northern
Ireland) 93
Middle East 112; *see also* Egypt;
Iraq; Israel; Palestinians
Milosevic, President Slobodan 95,
99
Mitchell, Senator George 87, 89, 90
Mujahadeen 60–1, 63, 64
Muslims (Islam) 57, 58, 65, 66, 67,
75, 96, 97, 98, 103; *see also*
Taliban
Najibullah, Mohammed 61, 62
nationalism 12, 24, 70, 73, 82, 96
negotiation 4–5, 14, 37–8, 47–9, 50,
53, 55, 56, 59, 61–3, 72–3, 74,
75–6, 77–8, 87, 88–90, 97–100,
104, 109
Netanyahu, Benjamin 77, 78
Nobel Peace Prize 76, 93
non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) 24, 25, 31, 36, 98
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) 6, 8, 97, 98, 99, 100,
101, 113
Northern Ireland (Ulster): conflict 2,
3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 21, 45, 68, 81–93,
100, 108, 109; and England
81–3, 85–7, 88–9, 90;
reconciliation 8, 9, 91–3, 111,
114, 115; and Republic of
Ireland 81–3, 88–9, 92–3
Observer Group in Central America
(United Nations), ONUCA 14
Observer Mission in El Salvador
(United Nations), ONUSAL 15,
18
Organisation of African Union
(OAU) 109
Organisation of American States
(OAS) 12
Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 6,
105
Owen, Lord David 97, 100, 103–4,
110
Pakistan 56, 60, 62–3, 64, 65, 66
Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO) 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 87, 90
Palestinians: conflict 2, 3, 6, 7, 8,
68–80, 108, 109, 110, 112, 115;
reconciliation 8, 77, 78–80, 91; *see
also* Israel
partition 21, 45, 48–9, 50, 52, 53,
70–1, 74, 79, 83, 88, 97–100, 110
peacekeeping 4, 5–7, 34, 37–8, 45,
49–50, 51–2, 53–4, 63, 72–4,
96–100; UN peacekeeping
mandates 49–50, 101, 109–10,
111–13; *see also* Implementation
Force (Bosnia); Stabilisation Force
(Bosnia); United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF); United
Nations Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP); United Nations
Good Offices Mission in
Afghanistan and Pakistan
(UNGOMAP); United Nations
Protection Force (Bosnia)
(UNPROFOR); United Nations
Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC)
‘peace process’ 4–7, 14–16, 19, 34,
86, 87, 97, 100
Pol Pot 34, 36, 41, 42
post-traumatic stress 20, 103
preventive diplomacy 7
Rabin, Yitzhak 76–7
racial conflict 21, 23, 24, 26, 74; *see
also* apartheid
Ranariddh, Prince Norodom 42
Reagan administration 12
reconciliation: 7–9, 114, 115–16;
Afghanistan 8, 62, 64–7; *Bosnia* 8,
96, 103, 105–6; *Cambodia* 7,
41–4, 91; *Cyprus* 8, 52–3, 54, 55,
91; *El Salvador* 7, 15–20; *Israel
and the Palestinians* 8, 76, 78,
80; *Northern Ireland* 8, 9, 91–3;
South Africa 7, 29–33; *see also*

- amnesty; conflict; 'peace process'; rehabilitation; resolution
- refugees 2, 4, 13, 35, 51, 60, 62, 63, 66–7, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 97, 98–9, 101–3, 108
- rehabilitation 7, 34, 99, 110–11, 112; *see also* conflict; 'peace process'; resolution
- religion 3, 8, 22, 23, 26, 56, 62, 64, 65, 83, 93, 108; *see also* Roman Catholic Church
- resolution 1, 4–7, 8, 9, 13–16, 36, 49–51, 61–3, 64, 76, 77–8, 86, 88–90, 96–100, 108–114; *see also* conflict; mediation; negotiation; 'peace process'
- revolution 11, 17, 18
- Roman Catholic Church 10, 13, 18, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87–8, 90, 91–2
- Rose, General Sir Michael 104
- Russia 56, 57; *see also* Cold War; Soviet Union
- Sadat, President Anwar (Anwar as-Sadat) 72
- Saudi Arabia 64, 65
- segregation 3, 21–4, 27, 71, 75, 79, 90, 110
- self-determination 3, 47–8, 54, 62, 74, 88
- self-government 47–8, 50, 54, 64, 73, 76–7, 78–9, 88–9, 110
- Sihanouk, Prince Norodom 35, 39, 41, 42
- Siviruddh, Prince Norodom 42
- South Africa: conflict 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 21–33, 56, 68, 81, 87, 90, 94, 108, 109, 111, 114; reconciliation 6, 7, 29–33, 91, 92, 105, 110–11, 114–15; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 7, 19, 29–33, 115; and the UN 24–5, 26
- Soviet Union (USSR) 4, 11, 14, 35, 36, 56, 58–9, 60, 61–3, 64, 66; *see also* Cold War; Russia
- Stabilisation Force (Bosnia) (S-FOR) 99, 105, 113
- stalemate 4, 8, 15, 55, 104
- Taliban 65–7
- third parties 4–5, 8, 62–3, 109–10
- truth 7, 10, 16–17, 34, 91, 106, 115
- Truth Commissions: Argentina 19, 30, 115; Chile 19, 30, 115; El Salvador 7, 16–20, 30; South Africa 7, 19, 29–33, 115
- Turkey 45–6, 47, 48–9, 50–3, 54–5
- Tutu, Archbishop Desmond 30, 32, 116
- Ulster *see* Northern Ireland
- United Kingdom (Britain) 21, 25, 46–7, 48, 49, 51, 55, 57, 68–71, 81–2, 88–9, 97–8, 102, 104, 109
- United Nations: Charter 5–6, 37, 111–12; help with elections 15, 40–1; sanctions 6–7; *see also* Afghanistan; Bosnia; Cambodia; Cyprus; El Salvador; Israel; peacekeeping; South Africa; United Nations General Assembly; United Nations Security Council; United Nations Specialised Agencies
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 15, 43
- United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) 72
- United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 45, 49–50, 54
- United Nations General Assembly 13, 24, 25, 39, 73, 74
- United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) 63
- United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) 67
- United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia) (UNPROFOR) 97–9, 100–1, 104
- United Nations Security Council 5, 25, 38, 73, 74, 112

- United Nations Specialised Agencies
15, 63; *see also* United Nations
Children's Fund; United Nations
International Drug Control
Programme
- United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC) 38–41,
42–3
- United States 4, 12, 13, 14, 16, 25,
35, 36, 53, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62,
66 72–3, 74, 75, 76, 78, 82, 85, 87,
98, 104, 105 109, 110
- U. Thant 49
- Vance, Cyrus 97, 100
- Vietnam 12, 35, 36, 60, 85
- violence 1, 12, 13, 16–17, 18, 26, 30,
32, 34, 35–6, 38, 41, 45, 48, 50, 58
63, 66, 71–2, 75, 84–5, 86, 87, 89,
93, 94, 97, 100–1, 107
- Yugoslavia (former republic of):
conflict 94–106, 108;
reconciliation 7, 106